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INTRODUCTION
"A standing army? We don't even have a sitting army", H.E. Hussain Manilcufan,
The Permanent Representative (former) of the Maldives to the UN, when asked
about the strength of the country's armed forces.1
In a world where all states are seemingly equal on the basis of their
sovereignty, all states are expected to participate as equal members of the
international community. In this respect, Small Island Developing States or SIDS are
no different. However, in their attempt to find footage in the international arena they
often have to confront special problems and difficulties, especially with regard to
security concerns. These issues were, nevertheless, relegated to the background of
independence and there was no acceptance that these SIDS needed special attention
to their problems. It is only fairly recently that the international community has
placed the dilemmas faced by these states on its agenda and seriously addressed the
problems of their smallest members. It was the US invasion of Grenada that first
highlighted the vulnerability of these states and brought the issue on to the forefront
of international politics. Since then they have become the subject of various types of
research from their developmental problems to their military vulnerability. However,
most of the research undertaken concentrates on the SIDS of the Caribbean and the
South Pacific. This is no surprise as most of the world's SIDS are located in these
two regions. However, there are four SIDS located in the Indian Ocean: Comoros, the
Maldives, Mauritius and the Seychelles. As far as I am aware there has been no
research undertaken on the security of the SIDS in this region. Therefore, the focus of
this research will be on the SIDS of the Indian Ocean. It attempts to identify and
assess the various security problems confronted by the SIDS of the Indian Ocean and
the strategies and responses that are available to them to achieve a measure of
security. This thesis however, concentrates on only three of the Indian Ocean SIDS.
Quoted in Asiaweek 18 November 1988, p.38
Research on Comoros had to be sacrificed at an early stage due to the lack of
material available in Britain. Furthermore, due to financial reasons, research on the
security problems of Mauritius and the Seychelles had to be restricted to Britain.
Nevertheless, extensive interviews were carried out with the officials at the High
Commissions of both countries in London supplemented with information from
various institutions such as the Commonwealth, the United Nations and from the
government departments of both countries. A period of six months was spent in the
Maldives where in-depth interviews were conducted. While the focus of this thesis
will be on the security problems faced by individual states, it is a fundamental tenet
of this research that the security problems of SIDS cannot be analysed or understood
in isolation from their regional security environment. Therefore it also attempts to
analyse the security problems in relation to their regional security environment, in
this case the Indian Ocean.
A fundamental axiom of this research is that the SIDS have special attributes
that condition their security and therefore the security problems of SIDS are
substantially different from those of larger states. The main issues raised are:
1. What are the security problems faced by SIDS in general?
2. What are the security problems faced by the SIDS in the Indian Ocean?
3. Are the security problems faced by the SIDS in the Indian Ocean due to the fact
that they are small island developing states or Indian Ocean states?
4. What are the strategies and responses available to these SIDS?
It is hoped that the research undertaken will provide insights into the above
issues.
Organisation of the work
In succeeding chapters it will be argued that the characteristics of SIDS
results in their security problems being substantially different to those of larger states.
Chapter one seeks to provide the background information about international interest
in small states in general and deals with the difficult issue of defining 'smallness'. It
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also reviews the existing theories of security and applies these theories to SIDS.
Although no attempt will be made to give an alternative 'definition' of security it
nevertheless attempts to outline security in relation to SIDS. Chapter two examines
the concept of vulnerability and seeks to identify the different areas where SIDS are
vulnerable. It also strives to identify the special attributes of SIDS pertaining to these
states that makes their security environment different to small continental states.
This is followed by Chapter three in which the threats confronting the SIDS are
presented drawing insights from the Caribbean and the Pacific. Using examples from
these two regions various types of threats are identified in the following: areas:
military, political, economical, societal and environmental. Chapter four is devoted to
the security scenario of the Indian Ocean. It analyses how the Indian Ocean
geopolitics affect the Indian Ocean SIDS, especially the regional security scenario
and in the various sub-systems in which the Indian Ocean SIDS are located. It also
attempts to identify the changing security pattern of the Indian Ocean from the Cold
War setting to the present day.
Chapters five, six and seven are case studies of the Maldives, the Seychelles
and Mauritius respectively. They attempt to give an in-depth analysis of the security
problems of these states. Each chapter starts with a brief insight into the physical,
historical and socio-cultural background of the countries. Next, it analyses the
security problems as perceived by the leadership of these countries. It goes on to
identify the security capabilities that exist in these countries. Finally, it attempts to
identify the current security problems while differentiating security threats into real,
potential and latent threats. Chapter eight is divided into two parts. The first part is a
comparative analysis of the security problems faced by the three Indian Ocean SIDS.
It deals with national, regional and international dimensions of the problems and tries
to draw out the similarities and the differences between the three states and why they
are so. The second part deals with the responses to the security problems of the SIDS.
It identifies existing strategies and responses at various levels: Domestic, Regional
and International. It also attempts to identify measures that the SIDS could undertake
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to enhance their security. Chapter Nine is a brief summary of the findings of this
research.
Significant Findings 
With regard to the Indian Ocean SIDS (I0S), the result of the research shows
that these SIDS have security problems that are considerably different to those of
larger states; and that these problems are attributable to the characteristics arising out
of their smallness and their islandness. Furthermore, the research clearly strengthens
the view that there is very little that the SIDS can do to enhance their security. While
the geo-politics of the Indian Ocean did influence the security problems faced by
these SIDS in the past and still does so to a certain extent, the majority of the
problems faced by the Indian Ocean SIDS are due to the fact that they are small and
island developing states rather than SIDS located in the Indian Ocean. As such there
does not seem to be a common Indian Ocean security problem. On the basis of this,
there is very little ground for an Indian Ocean response to the security problems faced
by these IOS.
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Chapter I
SMALLNESS AND SECURITY OF SIDS
This chapter reviews briefly the current interest in small states. It also
studies the difficulties in finding a satisfactory definition of smallness and analyses
why size is important in the overall analysis of security in relation to Small Island
Developing States (SIDS). Further, it will review the existing theories of security and
attempts to demonstrate why it is necessary to modify these theories in relation to the
security problems of SIDS. Although no attempt will be made to give an alternative
definition of security it nevertheless attempts to give a framework within which
security in relation to SIDS can be identified.
The International Interest in Small States
Previously, the small states that existed were mainly in Europe. The Greek
city states and the Italian city states are often quoted as evidence for the existence of
small states in the past. They have had an interesting role in the history of political
thinking in Europe and have influenced political philosophers to analyse their
situation.' Of the European small states only a handful remains today (i.e. Andorra,
Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican). With the inception of many
new smaller states in various parts of the globe the issue of the small size of states
has received considerable attention in recent years. Numerous empirical studies have
been conducted regarding the 'smallness' of these states and how it affect them.2
The current interest in the small states originated in the 1950s and the 1960s
when many small territories began to throw off their colonial yokes. This resulted in
the creation of small independent states in large numbers. The Conference of the
1 Niels Amstrup, The Perennial Problems of Small States: A Survey of Research Efforts", Co-operation and Conflict, Vol.',
1976, pp. 163-182
2 See Burton Benedict (ed.), Problems of smaller territories, (Athlone Press, London, 1965); United Nations Institute for
Training And Research, Small States and Territories: Status and Problems, (Arno Press, New York, 1971); R.T. Shand
(ed)The island states of the Pacific and the Indian Ocean: an anatomy of development, (Australian National University,
1980)
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International Economic Association in Lisbon, in 1957, took up the question of the
importance of the size of the country, although the small states used by the
Conference as case studies would not be under the category of small states today (i.e.
Switzerland and Belgium). The problems of small states were first taken up by the
seminar of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, in 1963, on problems of
smaller territories. It was followed by Burton Benedict in 1967, who gave the first in-
depth political, economic and sociological analysis relating to the small states trying
to identify the various characteristics associated with smallness in these areas. In
1966, UNITAR produced a comprehensive study on very small states and territories,
concentrating on their role in international relations and recommending a number of
options. The issue of the security of small states was initiated by the Commonwealth
much more vigorously in the late 1970s and 1980s, especially after the US
intervention in Grenada. In 1979, the Development Studies Centre of the Australian
National University organised a conference on the small island states of the Pacific
and the Indian Ocean analysing the various developmental problems faced by these
states. The UNCTAD Conference on 'problems and policies of small economies'
gave its attention to the economic problems of small states in 1981. The
Commonwealth has made several attempts to identify the special characteristics of
small states but acknowledges that although they share similarities, they also share
considerable differences based on their geopolitical situation as well as their physical
features. 3
 Among the more recent work on small states is the book by Hintjens and
Newitt on small island states. They base their cases on the problems associated with
how the problem of smallness adds a separate dimension to island states.4
Problems of defining small states
The influx of small states into the international community in the 1960s and
1970s brought with itself a flood of definitions; the very terms used to refer to them
3 Commonwealth Consultative Group, Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society, (Commonwealth Secretariat, London
1985), p.11
4 Helen M. Hintjens and Malyn D. D. Newitt (eds.), The Political Economy of Small Tropical Islands: The Importance of
being Small, (University of Exeter Press, 1992)
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as well as the criteria used to measure their smallness was wide and varied. 'Mini
states', 'micro states' and 'very small states' have been used by various authors in
referring to small states. Terminological confusion is further compounded by
alternating the terms, although in the recent years these expressions are gradually
being replaced by 'small states'. The yardsticks used to measure smallness included
the size and density of their population to the strength of their defence forces.5
Amstrup identifies six different approaches to the definition namely, those who do
not seek the relevance of a definition; those who use population, territorial size, and
GNP as the main parameters; those who envisage a systemic approach to the
problem relating to variables such as the role of the international system and the
domestic political system; a fourth approach that prefers a perceptual explanation;
those who restrict the definition to specific situations; and finally those who rely on
differentiation of the size concept. 6
 Those who are interested in the developmental
aspect of the small states subscribe to one based on the economic situation claiming
that "it is a situation of limited development options". 7
 They claim that small states
are resource poor with limited agricultural potential. They have small domestic
markets and few opportunities for employment that limit their scope for
development. 8
 Others who seek to analyse the security of small states from purely a
military view point define a small state as one "with a very low conventional war
capability". 9
 War making capability in this case is identified by looking at potential
war power and its preparedness for war. Maniruzzaman measures these two
quantitatively by the GNP of the state and its military budget and ranks states
according to their military capability by giving the value of 100 points to the highest
GNP and 50 points to the highest military budget. In such a ranking system 99 states
had a score of less than one and therefore he claims that since the highest total score
was 150 for the United States, "the categorisation of those states each having a score
5 See Talkuder Maniruzzaman, The security of small states in the Third World, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, No.
25, (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1982)
6 Amstrup, "The Perennial Problems of Small States: A Survey of Research Efforts", pp. 163 - 182
7 Swinburne Lestrade, "Economic Issues affecting the Development of Small Island States" in VSO and Royal
Commonwealth Society, Small Island States - Aid problems and practicalities, 1987, p. 8
8 Ibid. p. 8
9 Maniruzzaman, The security of small states in the Third World, 1982, p. 14
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of less than one as 'small' states would not seem unreasonable". 10 However, the
difficulty in using such definitions is that smallness is measured with respect to a
certain situation viz, economic or military and therefore it is difficult to apply to all
aspects of security. This problem of defining a small state has also resulted in some
discarding the relevance of the small state as an analytical tool arguing that the
present large number could disappear quickly." Yet, there is no evidence for this at
present.
The reason why the problem of measuring smallness has resulted in so much
controversy is no real surprise. It is the same problem that one would face if one is to
identify the criteria necessary to measure how large a state is. The difficulty is that
size, whether small or large, is subjective. Something is either big or small compared
to something else. Consequently, it is difficult to find one that will apply to the
varying objectives of studies undertaken. Most writers, however, appear to have
reached consensus on at least some of the criteria that are necessary to measure
smallness, i.e. the size of the territory, Gross National Product and the size of the
population or a combination of these variables. In many instances, these three
variables are often highly correlated; i.e. states with small population have small land
area as well as low GNP.
Those who advocate the need to identify smallness on the basis of territory
claim that territorial size places special problems on these states that are considerably
different from other larger states. When dealing with traditional security issues, the
example most frequently quoted is that they will have no place to withdraw in the
case of an armed attack. It is true that small land area will result in special problems
for these states in many spheres. Nonetheless, the problem with relying on territorial
size alone is that it discounts other characteristics of smallness associated with most
small countries. If we rely on territorial size alone, then Singapore will have to be
considered as a small state. However, the characteristics and problems faced by
11 Peter R Baehr, "Small states: A tool for analysis? ", Review Article, World Politics, Vol. 27, No.3, 1975, p. 458
10 Ibid. pp. 4 - 14
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Singapore, ranked among the 'high-income' group by the World Bank, might be
considerably different from those of a developing country like the Maldives or the
Seychelles. Using Gross National Product as a yardstick creates a problem of a
different kind. It is an economic indicator rather than a social or a political indicator.
When the concept of security is used on a much wider scale than it is traditionally
utilised, this criterion then becomes a rather one-sided approach to the subject.
The most common parameter used today is the size of the population. This
interpretation of small, on the basis of population, has had its opponents who
criticise it for being too simple. Nonetheless the simplistic model often provides the
best explanation. The use of the size of the population for classifying small states has
obvious advantages. Firstly, population is considered as one of the main components
necessary for a state to exist. It is the population of the state that provides for its
defence force, its government, its work force and its society. Thus, the size of its
human resources affects the overall capacity of the state to function effectively. 12 A
small population often means that the pool of available human resources for its
defence will be small (although a large security force does not necessarily mean the
country is more secure). Economically, it means a small domestic market and a small
work force. Politically, a small population means limited human resources for the
management of its government machinery; although it does not necessarily mean a
small political system. 13
 In the case of any hardship the majority will bear the brunt
of any ill effect whereas in a larger state this may only affect a minute section of the
population. While population appears to be the most useful parameter in measuring
smallness, it still raises the question of the cut-off point. Should it be 500,000, one
million, or five million or what? Whatever figure we use, the difficulty is to offer a
logical explanation of why we chose that particular figure. The United Nations and
the Commonwealth, organisations that take keen interest in the affairs of small states,
have relied on the one million mark. Still, the UNITAR study on small states claims
13 Paul Sutton, "Political Aspects" in Cohn Clarke and Anthony Payne (eds) Politics, Security and Development in Small
States, (Allen and Unwin, London, 1987), p. 7
12 Commonwealth Consultative Group,Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society, pp. 8 - 9
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that there is no 'magical value' attached to the figure and the Commonwealth also
concedes that there is no reason to consider a state with a population of one and a
half million as not being sma11. 14
 Although there is no obvious justification for the
use of the one million cut-off point, there may be a case for it when the states of the
international community are ranked according to the size of their population. When
all the independent states are ranked according to the size of their population there
are 42 states that fall into this category. If all the developing states in this category are
grouped together, there are certain similarities one could identify although it would
most probably be the same for states with a population of one to two million. Thus,
this research will include states with over one million population as small states (for
example Mauritius) as long as the main characteristics of smallness apply to them.*
The need to classify small states as a separate category is thus based on the
importance of size (in this case based on population) for the security of the state.
Size does, in effect, influence the overall functions of a state, although it may not be
enough to explain all the problems faced by the state. Smallness generates certain
special characteristics that contribute to the vulnerability of the state, and in doing so
effect the overall security environment of the state. Small size sets limits to the state's
capacity to create a security framework as well as making that security framework
somewhat different from that found in larger states. It results in limited ability to
influence, adjust, manage, deter and defend. However, there are three points that
need to be clarified. Firstly, smallness does not always have negative impacts. There
are both advantages and disadvantages. Secondly, smallness itself is not a security
problem to these states. Although some claim that "small size has attracted gangster
and other undesirable elements who seek small islands as admirable bases for their
operations", it is hard to accept that it is the size that attracted them rather than the
inherent weakness of the state due to its small size. 15
 Even if security is used in its
14 United Nations Institute for Training And Research, Small States and Territories: Status and Problems, (Arno Press, New
York, 1971); see also Commonwealth Consultative Group, Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society
* For a list of SIDS see Appendix A
15 Tony Thomdike, "Antigua and Barbuda", in Clarke and Payne (eds) Politics, Security and Development in Small States, p.
110
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most conventional form, this proves to be the situation. For example, larger and more
powerful states do not seek to control small states just because they are small but
because there are other incentives to do so. I6 These so-called other incentives may be
derived from the smallness of the states but the smallness itself may not form part of
the incentive. Secondly, the trap to claim that all small states have the same
characteristics and therefore they confront the same security problems must be
avoided. There are other determinants that influence small states such as the physical
composition of the state as well as its geopolitical setting. Hence the need to separate
small island states from small states that are part of a larger continent. When the
small developing states of the international community (i.e. those that are
independent) are ranked according to their size, it is often the case that the many of
them are island states; many are remote and located in isolated areas in terms of
geographical nearness, and some are enclaves. Each of these variables in turn
contributes to the security environment.
Security Paradigms
The Traditional Model: In international relations, security has been defined and re-
defined by both academics and politicians alike. The classical writings of
Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and others have been much concerned with the
insecurity of sovereign states. Following the Second World War the issue of national
security gained special momentum, especially during the 1950s and 1960s, when
doctrinal debates were carried out analysing 'national security'. Among some of
those who have propounded definitions of national security are Walter Lippmann,
who defines security as "a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger
of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged,
to maintain them by victory in such a war" 17 and Arnold Wolfers, who linked
security to "the ability of a nation to deter an attack or to defeat it". 18 Ian Bellamy
16 Jonathan Alford, "Security Dilemmas of Small States", The Round Table, 292, 1984, pp. 377 - 382
17 Cited in Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era, 2nd
edition, (Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991), p. 16
18 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: essays on international politics, (The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1962)
p. 150
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claimed in 1981 that "security itself is a relative freedom, from war coupled with
relatively high expectations that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that
should occur". 19
 Although many international security theorists have attempted to
define security, there is no agreed definition of the concept. However, these
interpretations of security reflect a common assumption based on the realist tradition
that the nation-state is the main unitary actor in an anarchic world and that all states
seek, or would have to seek, to enhance their power. In this 'billiard ball' scenario,
security is very much a capabilities' concept inevitably linked to power. As Buzan
states, "Realists tend to see security as a derivative of power." 20 Although power is a
difficult concept to define in this context it is safe to assume that power is linked to
some kind of military action or military influence. National security is therefore
defined in terms of military power. The state that is powerful in relation to others, or
is perceived to be powerful, will have achieved, or is on its way to achieve, security.
Similarly, the security problem of a state is the problem of physical protection of the
state from external military threats from other states. Thus, as far as traditional
realism goes, security relates to the actual security of the state qua state, mainly
from external threats. This approach may have been relevant in the aftermath of two
world wars but security is a dynamic concept and there have been changes since then.
The Third World Approach: In the 1960s and 1970s a new trend emerged that
questioned the relevance of the application of the traditional definition of security to
the developing countries. Third World security analysts argue that for Third World
countries it is not just military security problems arising from external threats that
was their immediate problem but security threats arising from within their own
national boundaries. 2i
 They argue that the main problems faced by Third World
countries are due to non-military threats such as domestic unrest, ethnic strife,
19 Ian Bellamy, "Towards a theory of international security", Political Studies, Vol. 29 No. 1, 1981, p. 102
20 Buzan, People, State and Fear, p. 2
21 See Jasjit Singh and Thomas Bemauer (eds), Security of the Third World Countries, UN Institute for Disarmament and
Research, (Dartmouth Publishing Co. Limited, 1993); also Brian L. Job (ed), The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of
Third World States, (Lynne Reinner Publishers, Boulder and London, 1992); also Caroline Thomas, "New directions in
thinking about security in the Third World" in Ken Booth (ed.), New thinking about strategy and international security,
(HarperCollins Academic, London, 1991), pp. 175 - 197
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economic underdevelopment, etc. Further, Azar and Moon have also challenged
traditional thinking by identifying a different set of parameters that makes the
traditional definition of security difficult to apply to Third World developing
countries. According to them, the security conditions in the Third World differ from
the West on two counts: their political cohesion and their security environments.22
These states are caught in a complex of local, regional, and previously, superpower
rivalry, such that their external security environment is substantially different from
those faced by the developed world. Added to this, they are resource poor and lack
the means to accumulate the power needed for their physical defence. Domestically,
they have fragile political systems. These attributes have differentiated these states
from the more developed world.23 Hence, their conception of national security may
be somewhat different from that of the developed world. For these states, their core
interests and values are not restricted to the specific security of the state, but the
domain of security is much broader. Their struggle for economic development has
meant that economic security forms a vital part of their problem. The economic role
of security is also vital due to "its extensive spill-over effects on other national
values" such as social harmony and political stability. 24 Thus, together with political
and territorial security, other areas such as the economy and society play an important
role in the national security of these developing states. Yezid Sayigh, in his paper on
security in the developing countries, subscribes to this view. He too highlights the
distinctive attributes of developing countries and their contribution to the concept of
security. They include social and economic criteria, the conflict between the nation
and the state, the vulnerability and the penetrability of the political and economic
systems, their self perception and the perception of others and their position within
the international community.25
22 Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon (eds), National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External
Threats, (Edward Elgar, London, 1988)
23 Ibid. p. 279
24 Ibid. p. 281
25 Yezid Sayigh, "Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries", Adelphi Papers 251, (International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1990), p. 6
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Application of theories to SIDS 
In the case of SIDS, it is extremely difficult to apply the 'traditional model' of
security based on the realist paradigm. When it comes to power politics the SIDS do
not fit into the pattern of states that sees international politics as a 'struggle for
power'. For SIDS, security may mean protection of its territory from external threats
but it is not the sole underlying purpose. SIDS do not posses the power or the concept
of power as used by these theorists. As such, enhancing power in relation to others
to enhance their security does not easily fall within their capabilities. Thus, in the
traditional approach the SIDS represent power vacuums. As for the Third World
model, SIDS are a part of the Third World. They share common attributes of
underdevelopment. Most of these small states are extremely exposed in many areas.
Militarily, they are weak and sometimes rely on some kind of patron-client
relationship often with their former colonialist masters. Their economies are highly
dependent on external sources, both for trade as well as aid, and peripheral. However,
their size and their physical make-up, being islands, have also added another set of
variables to those of the developing countries in general. The size of the state
generates certain characteristics that can indirectly and in some cases directly become
a causative factor in creating security problems. Even in the traditional military
sense, the smallness of small states sets limits to the capacity of the state to acquire a
large military force. A limited population also restricts the number of people
available for the political administration; therefore, the resulting pool of talent for the
purpose of governing and policy making bodies is limited. It also leads to limited
numbers available for economic activities. They have limited natural resources and
often rely on one or two primary products for exports. Their domestic markets are
extremely narrow and skilled labour in short supply. 26
 Politics is carried out on a
rather personal level with the role of individuals taking a forefront. 27 Their political
system is highly susceptible to outside interference and pressure. At the same time,
the societies of small states are fairly coherent and often homogenous ethnically.
26 Percy Selwyn (ed.), Development Policy in Small Countries, (Croom Helm, London, 1975)
27 Cohn Clarke, "Third World small states: fragile and dependent", Third World Affairs, 1987, pp. 207-215
14
Lowenthal identifies three socio-cultural traits found in small states viz.,
conservatism and adherence to tradition; the careful management of enforced
intimacy, and a pervasive concern with autonomy. 28
 However, in multi-racial states,
there is often social tension among the members of the society. Thus, there are
certain attributes associated with these states and they are not all scaled down
versions of larger developing states. Even in such a case, the fact that these states are
small magnifies the features and makes them more prominent. As Clarke puts it,
"Smallness simply makes the pluses and minuses more crucial, more obvious".29
Furthermore, not everything that happens in large developing states happens in a
minor version in small states. On the contrary, they often have far more in common
with small territories that are not independent states. 30 This has resulted in small
independent states and small territories that have yet to gain their independence being
grouped together. However, one must be careful in doing so, especially when dealing
with security issues. They may have common characteristics on the basis of their
smallness, but quite often the security environment of small independent states is
substantially different from the small dependent territories. This is so because the
latter are under the security umbrella of a metropolitan power while the former
usually have to manage their problems on their own. The Falklands crisis is a clear
example. Some may claim that some independent small states do in fact have
defence agreements with some larger power, such as the Comoros with France. This
is, again, narrowing the concept of security. Although these small states may have
military security contracts with another, and therefore may be in the same boat as a
small dependent territory, there are other areas of security that will have to be taken
into consideration, e.g. political and economic aspects of security. In such cases the
situation in dependent territories is often quite different.
28 See David Lowenthal, "Social Features", in Clarke and Payne (eds) Politics, Security and Development in Small States p.
35
29 See Clarke "Third World small states: fragile and dependent"; also Barry Shaw "Smallness, Islandness, Remoteness and
Resources: An analytical framework", Regional Development Dialogue, Special Issue, 1982
30 Ibid.
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Besides, the fact that SIDS are islands adds another dimension to their
security. Although the influence of physical parameters on security is not unique to
islands (mountain ranges and rivers can equally affect the physical security of any
state), the islandness of SIDS does not relate just to the physical concept of security.
Island states, and specially archipelagic states, by the very nature of physical
separation of different parts of the country by water, have certain attributes that, in
themselves, are unique to them. Each island society is physically separate and has
created a sense of belonging to these separate blocks of land. Thus, the remoteness of
these islands in many cases, their maritime features, their insularity and their
environmental fragility adds to the wider concept of security problems faced by other
developing countries. This last feature is especially true of SIDS. Environmental
security forms an important part of their security and is not just linked to their
economic development. In certain cases, such as in the low lying island countries like
the Maldives and Kiribati, their very existence is threatened by the problems of
global warming and the subsequent sea-level rise. For these SIDS environmental
security forms a very significant part of their overall security scenario. Therefore, the
domain of security and its application in relation to SIDSare probably different from
those that are advocated by the followers of the Third World model.
Contemporary thinking on security
In the 1970s and 1980s the concept of security underwent some change to
include the economic aspects of security. Economic security became a part of the
security concept, especially after the oil shocks of the 1970s. This is no surprise as
economic security influences the country's ability to defend itself in the traditional
sense. Furthermore, economic policy instruments can be used for aggressive purposes
such as trade boycotts and economic sanctions. 31
 Some have indeed expanded
security threats to "include internal rebellions, from blockades and boycotts to raw
material shortages and devastating 'natural' disasters such as decimating epidemics,
catastrophic floods, or massive and pervasive droughts". 32
 However, with the end of
31 See Vincent Cable, "What is international economic security?", International Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2, 1995, pp. 305 -324
32 Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining security", International Security, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1983, p.133
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the Cold War the desire to broaden the scope of security has gained momentum
among security analysts. 33 It is based on the assumption that the concept based on the
traditional model or indeed, expanded to include economic security, is still too
narrow. Rosenau claims that, "As human affairs become ever more complex and
interdependent, security is no longer a simple matter of maintaining military
readiness or effective international alliances". 34 The emerging trend is to include
other issues "which is not synonymous with military problems but which
encompasses a broad agenda of threats (economic, environmental and human rights)
which prevent people and groups living full and free lives".35 Some of these include
threats from narcotics and narco-terrorism, organised crime, overpopulation, poverty,
environmental problems, etc. 36 The main difference in this broadening of the concept
is that unlike the traditional concept these threats often do not arise from one state
against another. Some are within national boundaries, some threats come from non-
state actors such as drug cartels, and some transcend national boundaries such as
environmental problems. Issues such as overpopulation and poverty may at first seem
to be confined to national boundaries. However, impoverished people can lead to
political instability and violence that often have spill-over effects across the
boundaries, especially in the form of refugees. The threat from narcotics has its affect
on the societies as well as the economies of the states. Additionally, environmental
security issues have gained currency among security analysts. 37 They argue that
environmental issues affect the concept of security directly as a source of conflict as
well as that international conflicts affect the environment. Among the environmental
threats include ozone depletion, global warming and the subsequent sea level rise,
33 See Buzan, People, States and Fear; also J. Ann Tucker, "Re-visioning security" in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds),
International Relations Theory Today, (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995), pp. 175 - 197; also Seyom Brown, "World interests
and the changing dimensions of security", in Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas (eds), World Security: Challenges for a
new century, 2nd edition, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1994), pp. 10- 26
34 J. N. Rosenau, "New dimensions of security: The interaction of globalising and localising dynamics", Security Dialogue,
Vol. 25, No. 3, 1994, p. 255
35 Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, "Contending Philosophies about security in Europe" in Colin McInnes (ed), Security
and Strategy in the New Europe, (Routledge, London, 1992), p. 4
36 See K. Subramanyham, "Non-Military threats to security" in Singh and Bemauer (eds), Security of Third World
Countries, pp. 37 - 55
37 See Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "On the threshold: Environmental changes as causes of acute conflict", International
Security, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1991, pp. 76 - 116; also Lothar Brock, "Security through defending the environment: an illusion?" in
Elise Boulding (ed.), New agendas for peace research: Conflict and security re-examined, (Lynne Reinner Publishers,
Boulder and London, 1992), pp. 79 - 102
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decline of renewable resources, pollution, soil degradation, etc. Environmental
degradation affects almost all aspects of life and transcends national boundaries.
Although environmental issues have directly led to occasional conflicts, Jessica
Tuchman Mathews states that "its impact on the nation's security is felt in the
downward pull on economic performance, and, therefore, on political stability". 38 As
such, there is growing consensus that the concept of security needs to be applied on a
wider scale.
The concept of security in relation to SIDS 
As such, the attempt to broaden the definition of security is vital when it
comes to the security of SIDS. For SIDS, the scope of security covers a wide area and
not just military or developmental issues. Political, societal and environmental
aspects are equally important for SIDS as security issues. This is also true of small
states in general. SIDS are almost always on the receiving end of security problems
and this has raised issues such as the viability of these states. Many have questioned
the very existence of small states and, indeed, whether they should or can exist.39
The answer to the above is that the issue has now gone beyond this hypothesis. Small
states have existed in the past and they do so now. Therefore, the question of viability
does not form part of the security of these states as it is used here. Small states, and
in this case SIDS, are very much part of the international community and therefore
the analysis is based on the security or rather security problems of the existing
sovereign states.
Once more, the attempt to define security in relation to SIDS, or rather small
states, has resulted in many definitions being brought forward. The Commonwealth
Consultative Committee in its report on the vulnerability of small states resorts to a
working definition of security as,
38 Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining security" in Foreign Affairs, Vol.68, No.2, 1989, p.166
39 See Mike Faber, "Island Micro-States: Problems of Viability", The Round Table, 292, 1984, pp. 372 - 376
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'The absence of threat to the capacity to govern, protect, preserve, and
advance the state and its people consistent with the principles of respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states."4°
The main argument against such a definition is that security in this case cannot be
achieved until there are no threats. Roberto Espindola in his attempt to formulate a
definition of security more appropriate to the small states suggested security "as the
ability of a state to avoid or overcome any violent threat to its territorial integrity,
politico-economic independence or institutional arrangements". 41 The main problem
with both these definitions is that they emphasise just one element of security, e.g.
the threat factor. It is not in question that 'threats', both actual and perceived, form a
vital part of a security problem. The question is 'threat to what'? From what? From
the various interpretations of security it can be understood that the 'threat to what' is
to some basic core-values or core-interests that exist within the state. Although
security may be interpreted in this sense, the underlying significance of the concept
relates to core values and core interests of the nation-state. Values imply the
normative underpinning of the existing social and political order while interests are
what is deemed essential to the preservation and advancement of the state. Whether
the threat be to its existence as a sovereign body, to its independence and territorial
integrity, to its polity, economy, society, or environment, the core-values and core-
interests that exist within these areas have to be protected and preserved. What the
threat is from is more difficult to comprehend. The most common source cited is that
of external sources, yet the threat to the security of the state very often come from
within the state. This is often the case in SIDS. In the traditional sense, threats are
very much military threats from outside where one state uses armed aggression
against the other. While many have outlined the strategic importance of islands, it is
very rarely that another power has invaded a SIDS in recent times. This is not to say
that no external threats exist as far as SIDS are concerned. They do and the Grenada
experience highlights this fact. However, the issue is not the total absence of
40 Commonwealth Consultative Group, Vulnerability : small states in the global society, p.7
41 Roberto Espindola "Security dilemmas" in Clarke and Payne (eds), Politics, Security and Development in small states, p.
64
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external threats but that domestic threats may be more often and common. The
domestic political systems are open and a wide range of issues such as corruption and
lack of political legitimacy in the face of ethnic and social problems can become
security threats. However, it must be stressed that the external and internal threats
can often be linked and as such, in many cases, are difficult to categorise as
specifically domestic or foreign. Similarly, security threats that exist in military,
political, economic, societal and environmental areas could apply to more than one
area. For example, a problem such as a group of mercenaries trying to overthrow the
government with the backing of a neighbouring state could very easily be military as
well as political in nature. This has also raised the issue of differentiating between
economic security and developmental aspects. Developmental issues pertinent to
these states may on the surface relate to the issue of security if it is applied on a wider
basis. Indeed, it is difficult to separate the developmental problems faced by these
states and the security of these states, especially in relation to their economic
security. The concept of economic security in its broadest sense covers a vast area,
from the individual access to the means to satisfy his/her basic needs to the state's
access to resources for its development. Economic security problems are thus very
easily synonymous with developmental issues and as such it is absolutely essential to
draw a clear distinction between them if the concept of security is to have any useful
analytical meaning and if one wants to avoid being dragged into the wider issue of
development. One way of overcoming the problem is to analyse the economic
vulnerability of the state and the threats to its economy without going into the details
of the wider developmental issue.
eAr .a\N-IN\c
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to whom There is no agreed consensus as to what is the unit of analysis in the case
of security. Is it security for the state as a separate body from the individuals who
constitute the state, or is it security for the individuals, or is it for those governing the
state, or maybe a combination of all the above? In many instances, especially in the
developing world, national security has been synonymous with regime security.
Another major question in the analysis of security is the question of security
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Many times the mantle of national security has been used to protect the actions of the
regime in power and, in certain cases, threats to national security have been
fabricated in order to carry out unpopular policies to keep the regime in power. This
has attracted criticism from Western security analysts and, in some cases, rightly so.
In SIDS, however, the situation is more difficult to differentiate. Threats to the
regime in power in many cases can affect the security of the country as a whole. For
example, a coup that is aimed to overthrow the government in power can affect the
rest of the country even though its objective may be otherwise. Due to their small
population, and in many instances close-knit communities, the people rely on the
government for most things. A problem for those in power can ultimately become a
problem for the people and create political and social disharmony among the general
public. However, this may not be the outcome in each and every case, and therefore,
in analysing threats, each case needs careful examination.
The threat factor is not the only element of a security problem. There is a
second element that appears to be of equal significance, i.e. vulnerability. If the state
is inherently vulnerable then it could drastically add to its security problems. The
ability of the state to withstand threats (internal as well as external) will depend not
only on how serious the threat is but also on how vulnerable the state is to that
particular threat. For example, if a society is made up of different ethnic groups and
there is no unity and harmony among them, then the society could be very vulnerable
to say, outside influence. Any threat from outside sources could very easily disturb
and disrupt the social fabric of the particular state. It is the combination of both threat
and vulnerability that lead to the creation of security problems. Although the
concepts of threat and vulnerability form the major components of a security
problem, it is unlikely that a state exists without any threats facing it or that it is
totally without any vulnerabilities. Therefore, some are more vulnerable than others
and some face more threats than others. The correlation between threats and
vulnerability can be outlined in the following four scenarios.
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State A:
Low vulnerability
Low threats
... Minimal security problems
State B: High vulnerability
Low threats
... Latent or potential security problems which are more systemic than
specific
State C: Low vulnerability
High threats
... Specific security problems which relate most to the nature of threats
State D: High vulnerability
High threats
... Total security problems
VULNERABILITIES
T
H
R
E
A
T
S
HIGH LOW
HIGH
State D State C
Total Security
Problems
Specific Security
Problems
LOW
State B State A
Systemic Security
Problems
Minimal Security
Problems
From the above, the ideal situation to be is that of A. However, it is rare that
any state will find itself in this position at all times. In the case of B, the problem is
more systemic. The state is vulnerable but actual threats are low. Thus the security
problems are more potential than specific. Therefore, to enhance its security it needs
to reduce its vulnerability. In the case of C, the state is not vulnerable but faces actual
threats. The problems are there but the state is capable of standing up to the threats
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due to low vulnerability. The worst case scenario is that of D. High vulnerability and
multiple threats mean that it has problems that are both systemic and actual. In the
case of the SIDS they are both vulnerable and they face threats. However, the security
of any individual SIDS needs to be analysed in its various domains before one can
categorise it into any particular scenario. As security problems are never static, states
can move from one scenario to the other as their vulnerabilities and threats as well as
their perception of the problems change with time.
As such, in an international community no longer dominated with just the
physical existence of sovereign states it is vital that the concept of security is applied
on a broader basis, especially with regard to SIDS. However, security problems
cannot be analysed without careful examination of its main components i.e.
vulnerability and threat. In many instances, it is these two elements that makeup the
whole of the problem. The following two chapters will analyse the vulnerabilities of
SIDS and the threats confronting them.
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Chapter II
VULNERABILITY
The security problems of any state consist of two major components, i.e.
vulnerabilities and threats. The concept of vulnerability is difficult to measure or to
quantify. Yet, in order to identify and analyse their security problems it is vital to be
able to identify the vulnerabilities, assess the relationship between vulnerabilities and
threats and, even more importantly, to examine the root cause of vulnerabilities in
relation to the characteristics of SIDS. This chapter will attempt to identify such
vulnerabilities for SIDS and will attempt to explain why they are so.
Identifying Vulnerabilities
Vulnerability in its simplest form means the state is without protection, i.e.
easy to attack, damage and destroy; that it could also be easily influenced and
manipulated; and it may have to rely on others to carry out the functions that it is
normally expected to do on its own. Most of the literature on SIDS stresses their
vulnerability or rather, vulnerabilities. All of them, more or less, agree that small
states, let alone island developing states, are extremely vulnerable. However, like all
propositions they are not without their sceptics who question the seriousness of the
vulnerabilities faced by SIDS. Lemon argues that although they are vulnerable, their
vulnerabilities are "derived more from the realities of the past", than the present
situation.' While commenting on the Grenada crisis, he questions whether their
sovereignty is "actually infringed more often and more seriously" than that of larger
states.2 However, he misses a point there. Vulnerable states are not just those whose
sovereignty has been "infringed" or might be infringed. Vulnerabilities of SIDS are
not exclusive to their sovereignty, but it also covers the whole military, political,
economic, societal and environmental sectors.
I Anthony Lemon, "Political and Security Issues of Small Island States", in D. G. Lockhart, D. Drakakis-Smith, J. Schembri,
(eds) The Development Process in Small Island States, (Routledge, London, 1993), pp. 48-54
2 Ibid.
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In order to identify and assess the vulnerabilities of SIDS, UNCTAD has
attempted to create an index for ranking states according to their economic
vulnerability. It attempts to measure the "lack of economic resilience arising from the
relative inability of a country to shelter itself from forces outside its control". 3 The
index was created using three variables: exposure to foreign economic conditions,
insularity and remoteness, and proneness to natural disasters. The exposure to foreign
economic conditions is derived from the degree to which an economy depends on
foreign trade (imports and exports) and the degree to which an economy depends on
a narrow range of exports. Insularity and remoteness are measured by using two
variables; the ratios of FOB/CIF and the ratio of freight costs to exports proceeds.
Disaster proneness is measured in terms of financial costs in relation to the GDP.4
However, the index is of limited use since it identifies only economic vulnerabilities.
It is an extremely complicated task to measure vulnerabilities in the other sectors. For
example, how does one measure military or political vulnerability? They are difficult
to quantify. Another framework has been proposed by Sutton and Payne, of which
the major characteristics of smallness that pertain to SIDS are identified as
islandness, weakness, openness and dependence. 5
 This framework will be used as a
basis to identify the vulnerabilities of SIDS but will be applied to different sectors of
the state i.e. its military, political, economic and social systems.
Islandness and SIDS
For many of us, islands have always conjured up images of paradise.
However, reality can be different, especially if you happen to be an inhabitant of
one. And when it comes to the definition of an island there does not appear to be a
satisfactory one. Islands are usually described as "an area of land completely
surrounded by water." 6
 If so, there is no reason to categorise Greenland as one and
3 UNCTAD, Preliminary Study on the Construction of an index for ranking countries according to their economic
vulnerability, Group of Experts on Island Developing Countries, (Geneva, 1992)
4 Ibid.
5 See P. Sutton and A. Payne, "Lilliput under Threat: The Security Problems of Small Island and Enclave Developing States"
in Political Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4, December 1993. They also include enclaveness and resilience as characteristics of small
states. However, these two features are omitted as enclaveness is outside the scope of this thesis and resilience ise.pot an
I
,nry
example of vulnerability.
6 John B. Wittow, The Penguin Dictionary of Physical Geography, (Penguin Books Ltd., London 1984), p.281
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exclude Australia or even Antarctica. In such a situation the only way to stop from
getting into terminological confusion is by agreeing with the common thinking that
everyone knows an island when they see one. However, today an island is more
than just a physical concept. In international law an island has a specific place.
According to Article 121 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
an island is a "naturally formed area of land surrounded by water which is above
water at high tide". 7 Furthermore, the UN system has identified island states as a
separate category. Additionally, in 1992, UNCTAD carried out a research regarding
the specific problems of island developing states. UNCTAD identifies island
developing countries as "a diverse group of countries with different natural resource
endowments, different geographical situations in relation to major markets and
different land and sea areas". 8 Today, island states, or rather SIDS are recognised by
the international community for some purposes as a separate category of states.9
Although islands or rather island states have been accepted as a separate
category by major international bodies, some among the international elite,
especially those in the field of development analysis, are rather sceptical of the value
of islands as a separate category in their analyses. It has been claimed by many that
islands or 'islandness' is not a useful analytical concept. Their argument is based on
the hypothesis that characteristics that pertain to SIDS arise mainly from their
smallness rather than their islandness. 10 Therefore, the vulnerabilities of SIDS are a
result of the fact that they are small states and not island states. This school of
thought is mainly concerned with the development problems of SIDS and therefore
the characteristics of islands listed conform to their interests and agendas. The main
characteristics of islands are stated as diseconomies of scale, limitations in natural
resource endowments, dependence on a very narrow range of tropical agricultural
7 Article 46(a) and (b) of UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
8 UNCTAD, "Specific Problems of Island Developing Countries"- Working Paper, Group of Experts on Island Developing
Countries, (Geneva, 1992)
9 Agenda 21 of UNCED, also the Programme of Action, Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island
Developing States, Barbados
10 Edward Dommen, "Some distinguishing characteristic of island states", World Development, Vol. 8, No. 12, December
1980, pp. 932 - 944. See also David Pitt, "Sociology, Islands and Boundaries", World Development, Vol. 8, No. 12,
December 1980, pp. 1051 - 1059; Barry Shaw, "Smallness, Islandness, Remoteness and Resources: an analytical
framework", Regional Development Dialogue (Special Issue) 1982, pp. 95 - 109
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products, distance from markets and high external transport costs, serious balance of
payments' problems, narrow range of local skills, limited access to capital markets,
heavy dependence on aid and external institutions, proneness to certain types of
natural disasters and a highly fragile natural ecology. 11 Diseconomies of scale exist as
a result of small domestic markets, low incomes and low purchasing power. It is
further exacerbated by the remoteness of many SIDS. Dolman states, "In small
islands diseconomies of scale are not linear but increase exponentially as a
consequence of isolation". 12 The natural resource base of islands is extremely narrow
and their economies are often dependent on one or two primary products. This has
further led to a heavy dependence on imports. In some cases even the most basic
products have to be imported. Furthermore, the attempt at economic development has
often led to severe depletion of non-renewable resources, for example, phosphates in
Nauru. The isolation of many SIDS has also led to high transport costs. This is also
true of inter-island transport in archipelagic states. Additionally, they often lack
access to capital markets and have difficulties in obtaining finance. This creates
heavy dependence on aid and assistance from outside. It is true that many of these
features could be found in small developing states and, therefore, are not necessarily
exclusive to island states. Thus Selwyn in his work on islandness concluded that,
"The biological peculiarities of islands are an insufficient foundation for any
plausible social or economic theory." 13 Dolman subscribes to this view and claims
that "what makes the small island different is the concentration and severity of the
constraints". 14 If there is a case for "islandness" or something that is
exclusive to islands that helps to analyse the vulnerability of island states,
then the argument for it is rather weak on the surface. Even if one
regards the physical nature of islands there are many variations.
They differ in size; some have large surface areas while others are mere
11 Antony J. Dolman, "Paradise lost? The past performance and future prospects of small island developing countries" in E.
Dommen and P. Hein (eds), States, Microstates and Islands, (Croom Helm, 1985), p.41 - 42
12 Ibid. p.42
13 Selwyn compares physical and economic features of Mauritius with Swaziland in "Smallness and Islandness", World
Development, Vol. 8, December 1980, p. 950
14 Dolman, "Paradise lost? The past performance and future prospects of small island developing countries" p. 42
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sand cays. Some islands are volcanic whereas there are others that are coralline and
barely rising more than a few metres above sea level. Some are single islands while
others form part of an archipelago spreading over tens of thousand square kilometres.
The political status of the islands is different as well. There are 26 independent SIDS
based on the one million cut-off mark while there are others that are dependencies,
some others belong to continental powers and some are uninhabited. Thus it is very
difficult to claim the concept "islands" or "islandness" as pertaining to all the types of
islands. Nevertheless, it is vital that we seek common ground on the basis of
"islandness" if 'islands' are to have any analytical value. (For the purpose of this
thesis the concept of islands as a separate category will be restricted to small
inhabited islands as large island states such as Indonesia may have different attributes
to small ones.) Under these circumstances there could be certain features common
to small islands that does not necessarily arise from their smallness or their
underdevelopment. They are remoteness, maritime features, environmental fragility
and insularity.
Remoteness 
Many SIDS are remote. They are remote in terms of distance in kilometres as
well as in terms of communication and transport links. So by virtue of their
geography many SIDS are near to nowhere. Remoteness creates a dependence on
transport and communication that has a rather high position on the list of priorities
for these states whereas in a small continental state this may not be the case. Markets
are therefore distant in terms of kilometres as well as transport links. Unlike small
continental states, everything from outside has to arrive by sea or by air leading to
huge expenses. Thus remoteness increases the cost of transportation. For example, in
Sao Tome and Principe, from 1982 and 1984, transport costs accounted for 31 % of
the value of imports. 15 Besides, the growth of container and bulk transport have
increased the expenses as the volume of trade in SIDS is rather small. This is more
15 Philippe Hein, "Economic Problems and Prospects of Small Islands", in W. Beller, P. d'Ayala and P. Hein (eds)
Sustainable Development and Environmental Management of Small Islands, Man and the Biosphere Series, (UNESCO, Paris
and The Parthenon Publishing Group, 1990), p. 39
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prominent in independent SIDS than dependent territories that do not have
geographical proximity to their metropolitan powers as the resources of the
metropolitan power are often utilised to assist and develop the dependent islands
rather than the islanders bearing the costs. For example, the government of France
supports and finances major developmental projects in Reunion. However, that is
not the major issue. The fact that many of these islands are remote creates
vulnerabilities that have, in many cases, become a dominant feature of these states,
especially in their security environment. Furthermore, international gatherings may
be inaccessible to the SIDS in terms of the costs that has to be incurred in reaching
them. Even their calls for assistance in emergencies can occasionally delay in being
answered and help to reach them. Remoteness has also brought a certain strategic
value to small islands. They have been venues for testing of weapons of mass
destruction or of noxious chemicals; for example nuclear weapon tests in Bikini,
Muruora, Eniwetok, etc. Further, islands are convenient for the situation of satellite
and other electronic transmission receiving stations. They have been used for bulk
handling and refining, transhipments and treating of noxious or dangerous fuels as in
the Canary Islands. Islands have been used for other purposes as well such as for
preservation of plant and animal species, e.g. nature reserve in Norfolk Islands, bird
sanctuary on Henderson Island in the Pitcairn group and Aldabra in the Seychelles
group. Remoteness often affects the very status on these states. While remoteness
may create certain problems for these states, it is paradoxical that it also may
contribute greatly to their separate sovereign existence. If they had been contiguous
to large states many of the small island states might not exist as sovereign entities
today; for example Zanzibar which is now part of Tanzania.
Maritime Features 
The most distinguishing feature of islands is the pervasiveness of the ocean.
This has resulted in these states having a high dependency on the seas for their
livelihood as well as transport. Under the new UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
1982, many small islands have acquired exclusive economic rights over vast areas of
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ocean, some in excess of 500,000 square kilometres. The implications of these rights
are numerous. They have brought potential new resources to these islands. Among
them are fisheries and other living resources, marine minerals such as placers,
polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulphates, phosphorite nodules and marine energy
resources such as offshore oil and gas, and other forms of power. I6 However, new
problems have been created with it. Firstly, the exploitation of the sea and seabed
requires high levels of capital, technology and expertise. These are not available to
the majority, if not all, of these SIDS. Secondly, it has added to the problem of
monitoring and surveillance. Although the surveillance of the territory of a small
state may not be such a formidable task or even that of the land area of a small
island, the situation is somewhat different in the case of the surrounding waters. One
could argue that this will be true of coastal small states yet the difference is that
island states are totally surrounded by water and not on one or two sides. The SIDS
often lack the technology and other resources to monitor and protect these extensive
maritime areas. Therefore, it is often the case that while these SIDS cannot realise the
advantages of exploiting their own resources, other states- often do so at their
expense. Poaching in their EEZ is one such example..
Maritime features affect them politically and militarily too. Unlike
continental states they have no common land borders with their neighbours. They are
distanced by the sea from the political events of neighbouring state. As such, in
certain cases, it is an advantage. However, in some cases islands provide the ideal
location to establish naval bases of larger powers. Although today foreign naval bases
are hardly found in independent small island states they are still located in dependent
territories, some which have created substantial controversy, e.g. the US military base
in Diego Garcia where the island population was expelled to set up the base. In this
situation it is not the smallness of Diego Garcia that led to the establishment of the
US naval facilities even at the expense of expelling its population. Although the
strategic position of Diego Garcia does influence the establishment of the base, the
16 Antony J. Dolman, Small Island Developing Countries and the developmental potential of the Exclusive Economic Zones,
UNCTAD/5T/LDC/7, 27 March 1986
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foremost consideration was undoubtedly that of being an island or rather a group of
islands where the fleet could have easy access. Even in the case of armed aggression
by foreign sources SIDS are highly difficult to defend. They cannot withdraw inside
their territory and maritime defence becomes a priority. Many SIDS do not have a
large army or a navy and have to rely on small coast guard units for coastal
protection. .
Environmental fragility
Island environments are different from mainland states. They are extremely
fragile and islands are open to waves on all sides. Many are prone to natural disasters.
Cyclones and hurricanes are common to many SIDS. According to the working paper
by UNCTAD on Specific Problems of Island Developing Countries 13 among the
25 most disaster-prone countries in the period January 1970 to 1989 were island
developing states." The impact from such natural disasters is devastating for islands.
They cause extensive material damage and in certain cases human lives are lost. For
example in 1982, a hurricane in Tonga destroyed 90% of the banana crop, the main
export product. Moreover, SIDS prone to natural disasters have extremely high
insurance costs.
Other environmental concerns include the saline intrusion into freshwater
lenses. The limited water retaining capacity of islands makes many of them sensitive
to drought. The negative effects of ground water toxicity due to nitrification may
assume particular significance in islands because of the small size of freshwater
supplies and the rapid movement of water within them. Their people, their tropical
flora and fauna are often vulnerable to outside forces. This has often resulted in
catastrophic results as in the case of Mauritius in the 1860s when one fifth of the
population was killed when malaria was introduced. 18 Many endemic species have
vanished. Coconut plantations were damaged with the introduction of the rhinoceros
17 UNCTAD, Specific Problems of island developing states, Group of experts on Island Developing Countries, 14 - 15 July,
1992
18 Philippe L. Hein, "Between Aldabra and Nauru", in Beller et al (eds) Sustainable Development and Environmental
Management of Small Islands, p.58
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beetle. An epidemic of swine fever wiped out the entire pig population in Sao Tome
and Principe in 1978. 19 Besides, waste treatment and disposal are a serious problem
in many small islands where it affects the marine environment and aquatic resources
on which the economy depends. The islands lack the space and effective measures to
dispose of garbage and sewage which often leads to pollution of their beaches and
rivers. Further, the 'crown of thorn' starfish has led to the depletion of coral on many
coral reefs. Even among the volcanic islands soil erosion is a serious problem. Low
lying island states are extremely vulnerable to climatic change and the predicted rise
in sea level due to global warming could result in the disappearance of some of these
states such as Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Maldives. The Administrator of UNDP, James
Gustave Speth, warned that, "The risks associated with global climate change and sea
level rise are very real and, if current patterns of energy use continue, these risks will
move from projection to reality in the decades ahead." 20 Furthermore, this could also
lead to an increase in the frequency of storms.
Insularity
One of the most disputed features connected with SIDS is their insularity.
Those who advocate this as a unique characteristic of SIDS claim that due to their
geographical, political and cultural isolation the inhabitants of these islands have
evolved a unique sense of 'belonging' to the islands and thus retain a strong sense of
allegiance to their islands that is not found elsewhere. 21 They are keen to maintain
their traditions and culture. Doumenge claims that unlike continental areas, where it
is aimed to improve geographical integration, the situation is the opposite in the case
of islands "with the increasing number of barriers and partitions being raised in order
to preserve a particular environment which is unique from the physical, biological
and human points of view", and goes on to add that the inhabitants of island are
19 Ibid. p.59
20 Quoted in Geoffrey Lean, "Early Warnings from Small Islands", Choices: The Human Development magazine, Vol. 3, No.
3, September, 1994
21 See Stanley A. de Smith, Microstates and Micronesia: Problems of America's Pacific Islands and Other Minute
Territories,(New York University Press, New York, 1970), p. 57
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always keen to assert that they are "completely different" from their neighbours.22
This view is reinforced by Lowenthal, "I see islands as special and different, unlike
continental areas in their societal, cultural and psychological make-up".23
Additionally, Patrick Nunn claims that "Many islanders regards islands differently.
Island societies are commonly more tightly knit and self-contained, indeed more
insular, than their continental counterparts."24
This hypothesis is challenged by its opponents who claim that 'social islands' can
exist in continental areas as "small groups of people who consider themselves in
important symbolic and behavioural indicators separate from other groups".25
Sceptics assert that when it does exist the 'separateness' of islanders is no different
from that found in other small communities elsewhere. They further dispute it by
claiming that this 'separateness' of islanders does not hold ground when applied to
many island dependencies where there is a lack of nationalist demand for
independence. However, the insular nature of islands does not necessarily have to
mean that all island dependencies have to desire independence from their
metropolitan powers. In the case of the Netherlands Antilles none of the five islands
wants independence from Netherlands but at the same time there has been
fragmentation among the Federation. It is more of a psychological concept than a
political one. Although insularity may not be an element of vulnerability on the
surface this psychological distinctness has often found its way into the political
system and fuelled separatist tendencies, especially in archipelagic states. Although
'islands' may be found in continental countries where the communities are divided by
intervening land masses, insularity can be much more pronounced when the physical
separation of land is by water masses. This may be due to the existence of clearly
defined boundaries and therefore the feeling that "I belong to this particular
territory" unlike continental areas, where although the territory may be
22 Francois Doumenge, "The viability of intertropical islands", in Dommen and Hein (eds) States, Microstates and Islands,
p,102
43 David Lowenthal "Small Tropical Islands: A General Overview" in Hintjens and Newitt (eds) The Political Economy of
Small Tropical Islands: The Importance of being Small, p.19
24 Patrick D. Nunn, Oceanic Islands, (Blackwell, Oxford, UK and Cambridge, US), 1994, preface
25 David Pitt, "Sociology, Islands and Boundaries", World Development, Vol. 8, No. 12, December 1980
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28 See David Hamilton-Jones, "Problems of inter-island shipping in archipelagic small island countries" in Hintjens and
Newitt (eds), The Political Economy of Small Tropical Islands, pp. 200 - 222
29 Fred Constant, "Alternative forms of decolonisation in the East Caribbean: The Comparative Politics of the Non-Sovereign
Islands", in Hintjens and Newitt (eds), The Political Economy of Small Tropical Islands, p. 61
26 UNCLOS, Part 4, Article 46(b)
27 Ibid. Article 4(a)
separated by say a mountain range, there are no clear cut-boundaries and therefore no
particular physical border where one 'island' stops and the other begins.
Archipelagic States: 
The vulnerabilities of island states are further compounded in archipelagic
states. An archipelago is defined by the UNCLOS as,
"A group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and
other natural features which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and
other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or
which historically have been regarded as such."26
An archipelagic state is described in UNCLOS as "a state constituted wholly by one
or more archipelagos and may include other islands".27 Within an archipelago,
islands could be scattered over a vast expanse of water; for example the islands of
Kiribati spread over five million square kilometres. Consequently, transport and
communication links are often rather difficult, even within these states. In many
instances it may be relatively easier to travel from the island capital of a state to a
neighbouring state than from the outer islands to the capital. Remoteness also lends
itself not just to high transport costs but also to problems of national integration
within archipelagic states. 28 It is often the case that the outer islands or the periphery
is so difficult to reach that the inhabitants often feel that they do not really belong to
one country, resulting in their loyalty being devoted to their individual island rather
than the nation as whole. Closer economic ties are difficult to achieve between
islands due to this sense of what Fred Constant has termed "island chauvinism".29
Besides, in archipelagic states the electricity and water distribution networks have to
be established separately for each island, incurring heavy costs.
34
Archipelagic states often have huge EEZs. This adds to the problem of
monitoring and surveillance. Furthermore, it also adds to military problems as in the
case of archipelagos it is almost impossible to station troops on most of the islands or
even atolls. The insular nature of island societies is felt strongly in archipelagic
states. Lack of unity among the various islands has led not only to a sense of being
physically separate from other island communities but also to a distinct feeling of
being 'different' from others. It is highly probable that it is this sense of separateness
that has had a very strong influence in the secessionist tendencies so common to
island states. Examples are the separation of Gilbert Islands (Kiribati) and Ellice
Islands (Tuvalu), the breakaway of Anguilla from St. Kitts and Nevis, Mayotte from
Comoros, and the disintegration of the Federated States of Micronesia. Other
attempted secessions include the Espiritu Santo experience in Vanuatu prior to its
independence, the attempted breakaway of the Suvadiv atolls in the Maldives and
Rotuma in Fiji. Furthermore, Rodrigues voted against independence as part of
Mauritius and tensions between Trinidad and Tobago are further examples. Some
assert that in most cases these islands are ethnically and culturally different and that
they may have been brought together because of their colonial past; and thus their
secessionist tendencies are no different from those found in other multi-ethnic
countries. In the case of the Maldives, the Suvadiv atolls are ethnically similar to the
rest of the country and have always been so. There may be an economic motive to
secede behind many of these attempted secessions but in many instances this acts as a
catalyst to the already existing lack of unity and cohesiveness between the various
islands and the sense of distinctness felt by the people of individual islands.
Weakness, Openness and Dependence of SIDS
Weakness in a state is traditionally associated with military capacity and this
factor is often used to denote weak power. A weak power or militarily weak state
could be identified by its lack of capability to defend itself from threats without
outside assistance.30 At the very least, defence denotes planning and a readiness for
30 Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System, (Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1981), p. 53
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action against an offensive and at the most, planning for pre-emptive action against
all foreseeable threats. 31 It is the limited nature of their power that separates weak
states from strong ones. Power, itself, is a rather elusive concept. Military power has
often being referred to as 'the capacity to kill, maim, coerce and destroy', but in the
case of SIDS it is not the projection of power abroad that forms the crucial basis of
military power but the capability to defend themselves.32 In many cases, power is
simply taken to be the sum total of the state's capabilities. 33 In the case of SIDS, it is
clearly the lack of military capability that creates security problems for the majority
of them.
The core of any defence structure is composed of human resources, hardware,
and command and control (or in other words organisational capability). It is the
human resources that provide the personnel for its armed forces and all its support
facilities, i.e. intelligence gathering, etc. The hardware is not just the military
weaponry but it also includes defence establishment and infrastructure. The
command and control are one of the essential parts of a defence strategy. Even if a
state possesses a large fully equipped armed force, it still needs to be organised and
controlled, and effective defence policy-making is crucial. In SIDS all three
are limited. Even though a large armed force is not necessarily a guarantee of
security, a small	 population,	 nevertheless, means	 limited and	 more
importantly, exhaustible numbers available	 for	 the armed forces. Some
only maintain a small police force or para-militaries for domestic crises. It
also means that the personnel recruited into the military may be
required for other areas such as economic development. SIDS also find it
difficult to train their forces from their own resources due to the lack of necessary
means. Other factors such as low-levels of education hinder the effective
31 Buzan, People, States and Fear, p.297
32 John Garnett, " The role of military power", in Richard Little and Michael Smith (eds) Perspectives on World Politics,
(2nd ed), (Routledge, London, 1991), p. 69
33 John Stoessinger, "The anatomy of the nation-state and the nature of power", in Little and Smith (eds), Perspectives on
World Politics, p. 27
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development of their armed forces and thus, eventually, the forces are not only
minuscule but ill-trained. The forces have to carry out a number of tasks themselves
and cannot be specialised in any particular field. In many instances, the armed forces
are lumped together and cannot be divided into the traditional divisions found in
developed countries. While this may or may not be what is necessary for small island
developing states, the multiple tasks that have to be carried out by a small group
ultimately result in them having to be jacks of all trades but masters of none. While
this may be true of the majority of the small states, in the case of archipelagic states
it adds another dimension to the problem. They cannot have a military presence on
every inhabited island or even on the majority of the islands.
Due to their limited financial and technological resources it is impossible for
these states to produce their own weapons. Similarly, they find it extremely difficult
to purchase modern up to date equipment and they also face difficulties in finding
spares for the limited amounts they have. Besides, foreign weapons are designed for
the producers own needs and may not be suitable for the SIDS. Military
establishments are costly to construct and maintain and the few that exist are usually
concentrated in their capitals. Compared to small states, this is an added problem to
island states, especially archipelagic states where the military establishments may be
concentrated on one or few islands and the rest of the islands may have to depend on
mobile units for their defence. In island states their security area is not just limited to
a small land area. Their maritime zones increase their security spheres and stress
their limited forces. They lack the means to defend their territorial waters and often
rely on a few coast guard vessels that are also involved in search and rescue of lost
parties at sea. Maritime security capability is costly. Fast patrol vessels necessary for
effective policing of their waters are expensive to purchase and maintain and so are
often beyond the means of SIDS. Their skies are open and violations of their air
zones cannot be prevented apart from warning the violators. In many instances this is
not done, especially if it is by a larger power as the case often is. The weakness of
SIDS also lies in their difficulties in forming effective defence policies and strategies.
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How threats are perceived, detected and assessed, resources allocated and
mobilised, and responses selected and implemented form a vital part of the security
system. The defence policies of SIDS are often reactionary. Due to the lack of
trained personnel they often have to rely on foreign expertise to train and organise
their defence forces. The danger of using foreign experts lies in the state being unable
to command the loyalties of outsiders. While friendly states often provide assistance
in this field, their ulterior motives are often difficult to assess.
,
The defence capability of a state is also influenced by the geographical terrain
it has to defend. In SIDS they lack the space to trade for time. However, this is not
unique to island states but all states of small territorial size. In the case of island
states it has been claimed that geography works to their advantage as it is very
difficult to "gobble up islands". 34 However, this may not be the case in archipelagic
states. In such situations, the outer islands are often highly dependent on the capital
city or capital island. Hypothetically, once the capital falls the domino theory could
apply to the rest; they could follow through without a shot being fired. All these
assumptions, of course, depend on the aggressor, which in this situation is taken to
be another more powerful state or aggressors sponsored by another state. The
question of the probability of this happening, i.e. the threat factor, will be dealt with
in subsequent chapters. The question of SIDS having to defend themselves against
other SIDS is a different issue. The probability of this situation may be minuscule as
their war-making capability is even more limited than their defence capability.
One of the most cited threats to SIDS is that of coup attempts led by
mercenaries. In his analysis of the vulnerability of states to such type of armed
aggression, Gerry Thomas identifies certain characteristics among which he includes
a) a geography favourable to quick strike, i.e. small territory with a capital city
easily accessible from the ocean and b) ill-trained, inadequate and poorly-equipped
34 Jonathon Alford, "Security Dilemmas of small states", The Round Table, 292, 1984 'pp. 377-382
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armed forces.35
 Thus, SIDS appear to have an extremely conducive environment for
this type of military problems. The other characteristics include the strategic
importance of the state to a larger power, a rich overseas population, and control of
the political system by one or few. These other characteristics, which will be
discussed later, are also not alien to SIDS. The possibility of this threat factor will be
analysed in the following chapter.
Weakness is not only associated with the military in SIDS. They are weak
politically too. Political weakness is difficult to quantify. It is hard to find a common
yardstick to measure the weakness or the strength of the political system. Political
weakness of SIDS is associated with their open political systems and is commonly
analogous with their dependence on other states. Therefore, in their political systems,
all the three determinants operate. The necessary conditions for the successful
existence of a political system are difficult to delineate. However, it has been
suggested that there are certain essential preconditions. They are that there should
be sufficient 'qualified' people to provide a parliamentary government and opposition,
the existence of sufficient financial and human resources to maintain a competent
and impartial bureaucracy, diplomatic representation abroad and for its defence and it
should 'be of sufficient size to ensure a voice' in international affairs.36
However, it is still a complex task to identify what constitutes 'sufficient
qualified people, resources and size'. The majority of the political systems of
existing SIDS have evolved out of colonial experience intertwined with local
peculiarities. Many follow a Western parliamentary system modelled to suit their
own particular needs. The Commonwealth Caribbean has adapted this system and the
Queen is the Head of State of eight of them. In the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, the
Westminster model is again followed by many as a basis of their political systems
with their own adjustments. Some continue on a more traditionalist pattern of
36 R. J. May and S. Tupounina, "The politics of small island states", in R. T. Shand (ed.), The island states of the Pacific and
the Indian Ocean: anatomy of development, Development Studies Monograph, No. 23, (Australian National University,
Canberra, 1980), pp. 419 -435
35 Gerry Thomas, Mercenary Forces in Modern Africa, (Westview, Boulder, Co., 1984), pp. 125-127
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governing their states e.g. Maldives, Western Samoa, Tonga, etc. In some cases the
absence of an organised opposition is noteworthy. Those who have opted out of multi
party systems have appeared to have done so for differing reasons. For example, the
political situation of the Seychelles was different from the Maldives in the sense
that the latter is a parliamentary democracy where the members are elected to the
parliament as individuals, while the former has been a one party socialist state until
1992. Others with no parties include Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga and Tuvalu.
While at a first glance the SIDS may appear to be politically rather different,
there are certain weaknesses and openness of their political systems that are common
to all or majority of the states. The main characteristics are (a) lack of human and
financial resources for the government to carry out their political functions, (b)
personalisation of the politics, (c) national needs appear to be more important than
national interests, (d) low levels of national identity and (e) inability to influence
events outside their own territories
Due to the small population, manpower for the management of the
government structure is limited, especially trained personnel. The lack of suitable
people results in a few individuals having to assume multiple roles. The political
leadership itself consists of a small number of people having to perform different
roles in various depai tments. They are brought into constant contact with each other
in their numerous roles. In such cases rational policy evaluation is difficult to
achieve. Conflicts of interest and overwork are the main threats that may affect their
work. This often affects the wider security role. The capacity and the ability to make
rational and effective policy making forms a vital element of security. 37
 Threats to
the security need to be detected, information needs to be gathered, and resources and
capabilities to counter the threats need to be mobilised and allocated. However, in
SIDS it could be difficult to undertake the above processes effectively thus increasing
their vulnerability.
37 Azar and Moon, (eds),National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats, (Edward
Elgar, London, 1988)
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In SIDS it is not surprising that a few dominate politics. Politics and the
government become associated with the few people at the top, or in a multi-party
state, an "all-embracing Party dominance". 38 In small states this personalisation of
politics has also resulted in rigid social and political ascription. The smallness of the
population results in people having to be in close contact with each other constantly
and intensifies the divisions. As Thorndike cites from the Antiguan experience
between 1967 and 1981, "Antiguan was pitted against Antiguan, household against
household, resulting in an extraordinary degree of polarisation". 39 It is also the case
that the few who dominate the political scene tend to stay there. This may not always
be due to a strong desire to consolidate their power but also due to the fact that they
may be the few 'qualified' people capable of ruling the state; or rather spreads this
belief among the local population that they are a necessary part of the political system
that might collapse without them. The lack of political parties based on strong
convictions and principles rather than individual personalities tend to assist those in
power.40 In some cases, this has led to the non-existence of opposition parties or even
if they do exist the practice of joining the system by the opposition leaders could
occur. In many cases the SIDS declare themselves as democracies, but often the
process of democracy is tailored to suit their own particular needs. An example is the
election of the President in the Maldives where no party system exists. The members
of parliament, who are elected as individuals (apart from eight members nominated
by the President), nominate the President by secret ballot but no campaigning is
allowed and the members are barred from discussing about their choice of candidate
for the presidency. It is hardly surprising that in such a situation they all appear to
vote for the same individual every time (almost 99% in the elections up to 1993), the
incumbent President, a method that can, perhaps, best be called 'election by divine
inspiration'.
38 Tony Thomdike, "Antigua and Barbuda", in Clarke and Payne (eds), Politics, Security and Development in Small States,
3§110Ibid., p.104
40 See C. E. Diggines, "The problems of small states", The Round Table, No. 295, 1984, pp. 191 -205
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The lack of personnel has also resulted in close links between the executive,
the legislature and the judiciary. Although they may exist as separate institutions the
ultimate decisions may be made by the same few at the top. Lack of political
legitimacy can and does undermine the overall security situation. This domination of
the leadership by few individuals, and the difficulties associated with bringing
change, may become an active ingredient in the recipe for violence. The political
climate becomes conducive for coups, assassination attempts and the notorious use of
mercenaries. This is not to say that there is violence and political turmoil in all SIDS.
On the contrary, the majority of them appear to be politically rather stable. However,
the reality behind this political stability may be rather deceiving. In most SIDS,
stability is achieved more due to the acceptance of the system because of the desire to
avoid open confrontation rather than the legitimacy of the politics; what Lowenthal
calls "managed intimacy". 41 It is claimed that the people of small states learn to live
together in harmony whether they like it or not and attempt to minimise overt
conflict, mute hostilities and contain disagreements. Even in the case of the
opponents of the government, they are often reluctant to openly contradict those in
power as they may be linked to each other in myriad of other relationships, including
familial. Besides, the government can exert pressure on its opponents by numerous
indirect means as it is often the case that everyone is dependent on the government
for something.
Another phenomenon in SIDS which contributes to vulnerability is that very
often their national needs play a more crucial role than their national interests.
National needs are used here to denote the essential necessities that a state has to
provide and fulfil. This dominance of needs over interests has resulted in the SIDS
having to turn to the outside for help. For example, in order to overcome their
domestic vulnerabilities, many have turned to foreign expertise and help. Short term
consultants are brought in to fill in for local shortages and this does benefit the state;
but the danger of unscrupulous elements coming into the state cannot be halted.
41 David Lowenthal, "Social Features", in Clarke and Paynes, (eds), Politics, Security and Development in Small States, p.39
Atz
42 James A. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, (Frances Pinter, London, 1980), pp. 147 -48
43 Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System, p. 136
44 Azar and Moon, (ed.), National Security in the third world; See also Norman MacQueen, "Island South Pacific in a
changing world", The Pacific Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1993
Individuals or organisations of dubious nature could exert a lot of influence that may
not always be beneficial to the state. Even if the assistance is sought from other states
and international organisations, conflict of interest could occur and the SIDS may be
unable to promote their own interests and desires. In such circumstances, the political
weakness is not just domestic but more so in relation to other states. They find
themselves dependent on their neighbours and friends and even international and
non-governmental bodies for aid and assistance and thus unable to influence them.
Their political system becomes penetrated, i.e. others participate directly in the
"allocation of its values or the mobilisation of support on behalf of its goals". 42 In
the extremes of circumstances, their own sovereign independence becomes
questionable as they become more and more dependent on their allies; as in the case
of the Comoros where the French have even paid the salaries of the Comoran civil
servants. In such situations their political systems appear completely penetrated and
they are forced to make decisions as if a "foreign state were participating in its
decision-making process".43 Although some may question whether some of these
entities should be states with full sovereign powers this is not the main issue. The
fact is that these states are sovereign and the aim should be to reduce their
vulnerability so that they can be less dependent on their allies; that their political
systems cannot and need not be penetrated by foreign powers.
In multi-island states and states with ethnic minorities, national identity and
national character could play a secondary role to local and tribal identities and
loyalties. Integration could become a problem and increases the political openness
and weakness of the state. Integration of diverse social groups into a "unified political
force" forms a vital part of the security infrastructure of a state as disintegration and
disunity invite threats. 44 In relation to SIDS, this issue is rather two sided. On the one
hand, inhabitants of SIDS are fiercely independent and cling strongly to their
independence. This however, extends to the individual islands and ethnic groups.
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Many SIDS have been forced by colonialism to accommodate diverse ethnic,
cultural, linguistic and religious groups. Commonly shared national values play a
secondary role and each island or ethnic community acquires their own identity and
values that becomes predominant over national values and loyalties. Vanuatu for
example, has more languages per capita than any other state among a population of
150,000 scattered on forty islands over an area of 12,190 square kilometres; and
among the Cape Verdeans it has been claimed that anyone who knows "more than
two islands are rare". 45 It is not just colonial legacy that has enhanced this problem.
In order to stimulate investment from abroad many of the states have given
citizenship to foreign nationals while others face the daunting problem of the illegal
sale of their passports which brings unscrupulous individuals into their territory.
Even in the so-called ethnically homogenous states such as the Maldives, this effect
of "islandness" is common.
Furthermore, their inexperience in dealing with foreign affairs and, in general,
the international community contributes to their weakness and dependence. Due to
their small size and isolation the ability to determine their international environment
is almost non-existent and they are at the mercy of others, both allies and adversaries.
Even if they wish to play an active role, their capabilities will determine the range of
activity they can engage in. This in most cases is rather limited. They lack the human
and financial resources to establish and maintain diplomatic missions in many
countries and, even when they are represented in international organisations, their
influence is rather limited. Even in their own countries, the foreign affairs
establishment is often unable to cope with the wide range of international events. The
diplomats often lack experience and training and are unlikely to relate back to the
government with accurate and useful information about the events in the countries
they are stationed in. In the case of those states that are remote and insular, the
physical distance often has a bearing upon their policy-making, reflecting their
"distance" from other international events. Thus, their role in the international
45 Cited in John Connell, Sovereignty and Survival: Island Microstates in the third world, (University of Sydney, 1988), p.4
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community is directly linked to their size as well as, in certain cases, their remoteness
and insularity. The literature on the foreign policy making process of SIDS all stress
their weakness and inability to influence the international environment. According to
Searwar, in a preliminary study of the small CARICOM states their "high degree of
permeability and the existence of elements of penetrated sovereignty" are evident.46
They become more objects than actors in the international arena. 47 This inability
contributes to their vulnerability to outside threats as maintaining a high reputation or
usefulness to the international community may raise the political costs to an
aggressor. In such a scenario, the security of the country also becomes a function of
its usefulness to the outside."
In general, a politically weak, open and dependent state may lack the
organisational capability, strength and momentum to withstand political threats and
pressure. With regard to external relations, the system is easily penetrable by
undesirable elements, be they from foreign governments or non-governmental bodies.
Political fragmentation exists not just within the government structure but among the
society as well. National identity and national character could play a secondary role
to local and tribal identities and loyalties. Their political institutions have limited
capabilities both domestically and externally.
Weakness, openness and dependence therefore appear to be key factors that
contribute to the vulnerability of SIDS. Yet, it is not their military or their political
systems where the effect is most seriously felt. It is in the economy of the state. Their
economic vulnerability often forms the basis of their vulnerability in the other
sectors.49 UNCTAD identifies a vulnerable economy as one that is exposed to
external vicissitudes that cannot be contained and has little resilience or capacity to
46 Lloyd Searwar, Studies in the management of the foreign policy of the small states - An analytical framework, University
of West Indies, Trinidad, 1988, p.12
47 See K. J. Holsti, "National role conceptions in the study of foreign policy ", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 14, No.
3, 1970, pp. 233 - 309
48 See Johan Galtung, "There are Alternatives: Four Roads to Peace and Security", Spokesman, 1984
49 See Roberto Espindola, "Security dilemmas", in Clarke and Payne, (eds), Politics, Security and Development in Small
States,p. 65
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absorb the detriment caused by the shocks. 50 However, a vulnerable economy can
also be one that is exposed to domestic upheavals and difficulties and not just
exposed to external stimuli. The economic role in national security cannot be over
emphasised, as the survival of every nation involves its economic security. Persistent
economic problems affect national values and morale and trigger unrest, domestic
disintegration and disunity. This could aggravate the security environment by
precipitating aggression by adversaries. 51 As far as traditional economic theories go,
the size of the territory and the domestic market affect the state's economic
performance. Thus, SIDS with their small populations (potential domestic market)
and small land areas are at a disadvantage. Islands have limited space and, due to
their small territorial size, their natural resource base is extremely narrow. They
depend on a few primary commodities with a high degree of specialisation.
Agricultural economies produce one or two primary export products such as sugar in
Mauritius, ylang-ylang in the Comoros, vanilla in Tonga, etc. While many do enjoy
special advantages through bilateral and multilateral agreements, it also depends on
the type of crop produced. Sugar producers such Fiji and Mauritius enjoy favourably
priced contracts while copra producers have few advantages. 52 While a service
industry such as tourism may, at first glance, seem ideal to SIDS with their naturally
beautiful beaches, warm climates, etc. it still depends on other factors such as
domestic stability and more on factors beyond their control. For example, recessions
in the states where the tourists come from could seriously diminish the arrival of
tourists. They also have to take into consideration factors such as environmental
changes that may result directly from tourism itself, such as erosion of reefs due to
careless scuba diving, etc. Small size also means dependency on others unless there
are locational advantages that can be exploited which, in certain cases, can be
enhanced by infrastructure. The fact that they are island states (single or multi-island)
and because many of them are remote adds to the costs of transportation. In addition
50 See UNCTAD, Preliminary Study on the Construction of an index for ranking countries according to their economic
vulnerability, Group of Experts on Island Developing Countries, Geneva, 1992
51 Azar and Moon, (ed.),National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats, p.281
52 See John Connell, "Island Microstates - Development, autonomy and the ties that bind", in Lockhart et al, The
Development Process in Small Island States, pp. 117 - 147
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to these, islands are often extremely exposed to natural disasters and they suffer from
environmental degradation.
One of the most common features of SIDS is the openness of their
economies. Openness of the economy can be measured by the ratio of imports to
GDP. Other factors that reflect the exposure include the degree to which the
economy depends on a narrow range of exports, imported technologies and how
much of a price-taker the economy is. 53 A high degree of reliance on foreign trade,
thus, makes them extremely exposed. While almost all SIDS have some sort of
preferential access to international markets, they are still sensitive to price
fluctuations and cannot influence the international markets. They have to "cultivate
the goodwill" of their partners. 54 Because they export few commodities to few states,
it becomes very easy for the importing state to impose on the SIDS in other areas as
well. In order to overcome their economic problems they have to rely heavily on
developmental aid. Developmental aid is available to most SIDS. Dependence on aid
as well as trade from abroad adds another dimension to their security. The SIDS
cannot afford to antagonise their donors as well as trading partners. In many cases the
aid is tied to the donors' interests. Growing dependency on other states eventually
means some loss of their independence.
Summary
SIDS appear to be extremely vulnerable. However, there are states that have
been able to maximise locational advantages by following pragmatic policies to
reduce their vulnerabilities such as Singapore. The above framework is useful in
identifying their vulnerabilities. However, it does not measure how vulnerable the
states are. While an economic vulnerability index has been formulated by the
UNCTAD, military and political vulnerabilities are difficult to measure. Militarily,
four areas have been underlined that are relevant to the vulnerability of SIDS. The
53 UNCTAD, Preliminary Study on the Construction of an index for ranking countries according to their economic
vulnerability, Group of Experts on Island Developing Countries, Geneva, 1992
54 Edward Dommen, "Reflections on the security of small island countries", Journal of World Trade Law, Vol.20, No. 1,
1986, pp. 110- 117
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strength of the armed forces and the number of military establishments and
equipment can be quantified. However, the level of training, of morale within the
armed forces, command and control, and the effects of the geographical terrain, are
difficult to measure. Hypothetically, one could argue that to monitor and secure a
certain area of territory, for example, maritime areas, the state will require a certain
number of armed forces and equipment. For example, according to Harden, for
effective policing of the EEZ, the state requires surveillance aircraft, patrol vessels
and fast armed craft for interception and arrest. For the sake of argument, one can put
a minimum figure on them based on the territorial size they have to survey. However,
how effective or ineffective the forces are in carrying out their tasks cannot be
standardised. Similarly, political vulnerability is equally, if not, more difficult to
measure even if the threat scenario is used. While incidents of coups d'etat or
political unrest and civil strife can be quantified during a given period of time, other
types of political threats are difficult to identify, especially when it involves other
states. Uncertainty in this sense adds to their insecurity and confirms vulnerability.
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Chapter III
THE THREAT SCENARIO
(With insights into the Caribbean and the South Pacific)
Many have sought to identify threats to the security of SIDS in numerous
forms. International institutions, governments and individuals, all have identified
different types of threats to SIDS. The question is how far are these threats real? Are
they relying too much on history in predicting threats to the SIDS? Or have they
identified merely potential threats that may or may not become actual threats some
time in the future? Among the international bodies concerned with the security of
small states, the Commonwealth is one organisation that takes an active role in
bringing the problems on to the international agenda. The Commonwealth has 24
SIDS among its member states and therefore, is rather concerned with the security
and survival of these states. The Commonwealth identifies three basic types of threat
to the SIDS viz, military, political and economic threats. 1 The UN, in its turn, have
specifically identified threats relating to mercenary attacks and foreign interference in
the UN General Assembly Resolution 44/51 on Protection and Security of Small
States that was adopted in December 1989. Another study on small state security, one
by the David Davies Memorial Institute, also emphasises the threats from
mercenaries and subversive elements, coups and instability, threats to maritime
security as well as threats from superpower rivalries. 2 In order to create a basic
framework, these threats could be categorised using a framework of security relating
to military, political, economic, societal and environmental sectors, and these threats
can be analysed drawing insights from the situation in the Caribbean and the South
Pacific. However, only threats, potential and actual, will be discussed and
vulnerabilities of the states will be mentioned only where necessary.
1 See Commonwealth Consultative Group Vulnerability:Small states in the Global Society
2 See Sheila Harden, Small is dangerous: micro-states in a macro-world (Frances Pinter, London, 1985)
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The Caribbean and the South Pacific are the two regions that have the highest
concentration of SIDS. There are ten SIDS in the Caribbean and nine SIDS in the
South Pacific, if one includes Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago in the Caribbean and
Papua New Guinea (PNG) in the South Pacific. Although Jamaica, Trinidad and
Tobago and PNG are not SIDS, if the one million population limit is applied,
nevertheless they will be included when analysing the SIDS due to their regional
identification with the other Caribbean and South Pacific island countries.
In the Caribbean, the similar colonial history and close geographical
proximity of the SIDS has enabled them to form a separate Caribbean identity.
However, the security environment of the SIDS is dominated by the influence of the
US. Many regional bodies have been established to address the problems of the
SIDS, among which include CARICOM (Caribbean Community) and the OECS
(Organisation of the Eastern Caribbean States). In the South Pacific, the islands are
remote and relatively distant from one another with the result that some outer islands
may be closer to neighbouring states than to their own capitals. The islands can be
divided into three main ethnic groups; the Polynesian, Micronesian and Melanesian.
Although they appear to be widely dispersed, they have created a regional identity
due to ethnic similarities and colonial experiences. They have fostered links through
regional groupings among which the most important is the South Pacific Forum that
includes their two larger neighbours, Australia and New Zealand. The South Pacific
Forum acts as a meeting place to discuss common problems on an annual basis. Its
administrative branch, the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (SPEC)
provides economic and legal services. Other regional groupings include the South
Pacific Commission and the Forum Fisheries Agency. While they do not relate
directly to security, they nevertheless provide a place for the SIDS to voice their
concerns.3
3 Australia's Relations with the South Pacific, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia Joint Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, (Australian Government publishing service, March 1989) p. 156
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Identifying Threats 
1. Military threats
Military threats will be defined as those events that involve armed aggression
or those instigated by military sources such as the armed forces. Military aggression
threatens all components of the state. It can effect the physical and sovereign
existence of the state, with high costs in terms of economic and human resources.
Military threats can be categorised into two groups; those involving outside forces,
i.e. other states and non-state actors; and those which are purely domestic in nature
i.e., military coups and domestic unrest involving the armed forces of the state.
Nevertheless, in many cases, armed aggression that may appear to be purely
domestic in nature can have an external source supporting it. Similarly, an overthrow
of the government may also involve military forces, although actual armed
aggression may not take place.
a) Armed invasion or aggression by other states: 
The most dangerous military threat to any state, SIDS or otherwise, is that of
armed aggression from another state that violates its territorial sovereignty. Military
occupation by an aggressor, even if it is only for a limited period of time, can cripple
the state, both physically and mentally, destroying the physical infrastructure of the
state as well as destroying and disrupting the lives of the people. The
Commonwealth Secretariat claims that military occupation or "territorial violations"
can arise "from territorial claims or the pursuit of hegemonial ambitions or spheres of
influence by a superpower, regional power or neighbouring power". 4 This may seem
quite real in the wake of the Grenada crisis in 1983. As outlined in the previous
chapter, SIDS have limited means of defending themselves militarily. In such a
situation, it will not be difficult for another power to invade and occupy SIDS or a
part of it, on purely military grounds. It has been claimed that islands, due to their
remoteness and the fact that they are surrounded by water, are difficult to approach.
However, their capability to monitor their maritime zones are rather limited and it
4 Commonwealth Consultative Group,Vulnerability:Small states in the Global Society, p.24
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5 On the military strength of the states, see l yelaw Lloyd Griffith, The quest for security in the Carribbean: problems and
promises in subordinate states, (M E Sharpe, Inc., New York, 1993) pp. 50-80
6 Australia's Relations with the South Pacific, p. 150
7 See Steve Hoadley, Security Co-operation in the South Pacific, Working paper No.41, (Peace Research Institute, Australian
National University, Canberra)
might take only a few vessels or a few planes of the invading air force to bring them
to their heels.
It was the US invasion of Grenada in 1983 that highlighted the security
problems of SIDS and which brought it onto the international agenda for the first
time. Fortunately, it is the only incident of its kind in the Caribbean in the last twenty
years and the 6000 US troops, supported by token support from six of the SIDS in the
Caribbean, was categorised as a rescue mission by the people of Grenada. Yet, the
rest of the world watched sceptically at this use of force by the United States against
one of the smallest states in the international community. The defence forces of the
Caribbean SIDS are small although many maintain some form of a security service.
Grenada has a considerable force relative to other SIDS and, in Barbados, attempts
have been made to fully train their military and para-military forces. 5 However, in
most SIDS, the armed forces' main objective is to police their maritime zones and to
maintain domestic law and order.
Fortunately, there has been no Grenadian equivalent in the South Pacific. At
present, an unprovoked attack on any of the SIDS by an external power is rather
slight and none is foreseen. However, in the unlikely event of an attack, the defence
capabilities of the Pacific SIDS are limited. Only PNG, Fiji and Tonga maintain
defence forces (3200 on PNG, 2500 in Fiji and 250 in Tonga.) 6 Vanuatu maintains a
small para-military force and the rest have only police forces to maintain domestic
law and order as well as coast guard units. Australia and New Zealand maintain
defence arrangements with the various SIDS although none is in the form of a formal
agreement. 7 The main component of this is the Defence Co-operation Programme
under which training and other assistance are given to the SIDS. New Zealand has
defence agreements with Western Samoa and Fiji under which training and advice
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are given. Australia and New Zealand also carries out reconnaissance flights over the
South Pacific as part of detecting possible problems.
b) Armed aggression by non-state actors, i.e. mercenaries, terrorists etc.,
In SIDS, this type of military threat appears to be more real than aggression
by other states. Both the Commonwealth and the UN highlight the danger of
mercenaries to SIDS. Many have, indeed, experienced aggression involving outside
forces such as mercenaries, backed by local dissidents as well as foreign powers.
Most literature on SIDS stresses the danger of mercenaries and terrorists who could
over-run their defence forces without great difficulty due to their military as well as
political vulnerability. 8 As the former Secretary General of the Commonwealth
commented, "It takes only twelve men in a boat to put some of those governments
out of business". 9 Roberto Espindola claimed that a small island state can easily
succumb to "a well-armed, company sized group of trained guerrillas or
mercenaries".10
Hypothetically, the situation appears grim. Militarily, the SIDS are in a
difficult position to defend themselves on their own. A well-organised mercenary
force with modern equipment and training can be a serious menace. In most cases,
the attack takes place against the government and due to the personalised nature of
the politics in SIDS, once the Head of Government goes, the whole government may
well fall. While it is common that importance is often given to the personal security
of the Head of State or Government in the SIDS, the quality of the security provided
falls below par with the kind of security provided for the Heads of States in most
countries. Many claim that islands have a natural protection due to the surrounding
waters, and it "is less easy for outsiders to infiltrate or invade them than it would be
with countries that have land frontiers"." In reality, this is somewhat exaggerated. In
8 See Roberto Espindola, "Security Dilemmas" in Clarke and Payne (eds), Politics, security and development in small states
9 Sir Sridath Ramphal, former Secretary General, Speech given at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference at
New Delhi, 1983
10 Op.cit
11 Hintjens and Newitt (eds), The Political Economy of Small Tropical Islands, p. 7
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fact, SIDS can be easily approached by sea, especially as many of them lack proper
surveillance of their maritime zones. For a group of mercenaries to land on an island
and gain a beachhead may not be too difficult, especially if it has some local backing.
Mercenaries were successful in overthrowing the government of the Comoros in
1978 and again in 1989, and numerous unsuccessful attempts were also
undertaken. 5 'Mercenarism' was experienced by Sao Tome in 1988 when forty-six
armed men landed by canoes and fishing boats, and in the Maldives in 1988 when the
invading forces approached the islands, once again, by boat. In the case of Dominica
in 1981, US federal agents arrested the mercenaries before they could sail to the
island. The organisers of the 1981 attack on the Seychelles had originally planned to
arrive by sea but the plan was later abandoned due to lack of sufficient funding. In
many instances, importing of weapons into these countries appears to be relatively
easy task. Customs officials are poorly trained and many lack the modem equipment
used in the developed world to detect contraband. Similarly, an advance group may
get into the country through lawful means as many SIDS openly welcome tourists
from most parts of the world. Both the immigration and the customs officials are
often extremely generous and welcoming to tourists in order to attract more. Further,
experience shows that terrorism may be a similar problem. Due to the limited nature
of the security services, international terrorists may find it easy to operate on SIDS,
and use them as a base to carry out their operations elsewhere.
Although mercenary involvement has been low in the Caribbean, it has not
totally escaped. Two mercenary threats were uncovered in Barbados in 1976 and
1978, both of which were dealt with effectively before they could take place, with the
assistance of intelligence sources from France and Britain. In 1979, allegations were
made that mercenary support was being sought to restore the ousted Grenadian Prime
Minister Eric Gairy. In Dominica, in March 1981, the government announced the
discovery of a plot to overthrow the government involving American and Canadian
mercenaries. The plan, which was code-named "Operation Red Dog", involved the
5 On mercenary attacks in Comoros and Sao Tome see Malyn D D Newitt, "The political perils of being a microstate: Sao
Tome and Comoros since independence", in Hintjens and Newitt (eds), The Political Economy of Small Tropical Islands
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overthrow of the Prime Minister as well as installing some of the mercenaries in the
government. 13
 Terrorist incidence has also been relatively low. One of the main
incidents occurred in 1976 when a Cuban airliner was blown up soon after take-off
from Barbados by an anti-Castro terrorist group. However, this incident bore no
relationship to the fact the Barbados was a SIDS and it could have happened in a
larger state. Domestic incidents include the political killing of people by the Gairy
regime in Grenada. Other types of subversion are often linked to the drug traffickers.
Finger-pointing has also been directed towards other groups linked with Cuba, Libya
and even the CIA but so far no real evidence has been found. In the South Pacific,
'mercenarism' is yet to affect the SIDS. There are no known cases where mercenaries
were involved either in the overthrow of a government or on behalf of external
actors. The Fijian coups were purely a domestic affair and even in the recent
Bougainville secessionist attempt, there is no evidence that any mercenaries were
involved in the fighting.
c) Presence of Foreign Military bases: 
Some have also identified the presence of foreign military and naval bases on
the territory of SIDS as a threat to these countries. They claim that this would be a
particular threat "if the facility serves a nuclear purpose". 6 It is claimed that because
of their strategic locations, SIDS are very attractive to foreign powers as military
bases for their air and naval fleets or as monitoring stations. Even though the
presence of a foreign military power could at times act as a deterrent to potential
aggressors, it could also result in the SIDS being drawn into the conflicts of the
foreign power. In any case, the presence of a foreign power could lead to all sorts of
difficulties; they may try and influence a political decision if they believe it is hostile
to them.
13 See Griffith, The quest for security in the Carribbean: problems and promises in subordinate states, pp. 124-125
6 Commonwealth Consultative Group, Vulnerability: Small states in the Global Society, p. 24
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d) Excessive militarisation: 
The military in SIDS can become a security threat in certain circumstances.
As Sheila Harden concluded, "small states are particularly susceptible to this form of
political instability". 7
 In SIDS, coups have often involved the armed forces in one
way or the other. Some SIDS prefer not to have armed forces of any sort apart from
police forces for domestic security. Yet in some cases, SIDS attempt to face their
security problems by building up and strengthening their defence system. However,
the attempt to strengthen their defence forces sometimes results in "old risks being
merely replaced by new ones". 8
 Militsarism in SIDS relate to the military becoming
too powerful in relation to other sectors, based on the resources given to it as well as
the status and kind of positions held by its officers, and its role in the decision
making process and therefore decides to involve itself in the governing of the country
usually by replacing the existing government by force. This danger of militarisation
was highlighted by the Prime Minister of St. Vincent in 1984 when he stated that,
"the more arms we have available in the country, the greater will be the temptation to
solve our problems with a coup". 9
 It could result in a military hegemony affecting
the political as well as the social structures of these island societies. Among the
extreme end is the Comoros, a country that has survived countless number of coup
attempts by the military, the latest being in October 1992. In the Caribbean, the
danger of excessive militarisation was prominent in Grenada. The Fijian coup by
Col. Rabuka is the only case of overt military involvement in the politics of the South
Pacific.
7 Harden, Small is dangerous: micro-states in a macro-world, p. 76
s 
_
,Smallness and vulnerability of small states', paper presented by H.E. Ibrahim Hussain Zaki, Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Maldives, at the 'Workshop on security of small states' Giraavaru, Maldives, May 1991
An interview with G.Brana-Shute, "An Eastern Caribbean Centrist", Caribbean Review, Vol.4, No.4, 1985 cited in Paul
Sutton, "The politics of small state security in the Caribbean", The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics,
No.2, July 1993, p.15; on rnilitarisation see also chapters 4-6, in Jorge R Beruff, J P Figueroa, and J E Greene (eds), Conflict,
Peace and Development in the Caribbean, (Macmillan, London, 1991)
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2. Political Threats
Political threats involve those that affect both the political independence and
those that affect the organisational stability of the state. Political threats, like military
threats, could have an internal and external element. Internally, it relates to domestic
political crises such as coups, instability, secessions, etc., problems that could disrupt
the peace and harmony in the state and in some instances affect the domestic
sovereign structure of the state. Externally, political threats can emanate from
foreign influences and interference. Among such political threats are political
pressure for policy changes exercised by larger states, subversion attempts by larger
states, and attempts at extra-territorial jurisdiction. 10
 In many cases political threats
can arise from political dissidents abroad and therefore may be 'external' but these
will be categorised under internal threats as the underlying nature of the problem in
most cases relates to domestic political arrangements.
a) Coups: 
One of the common domestic political threats is extra-legal regime changes
i.e. coup d'etat and revolutions. A coup d'etat, as defined by Steven David, means,
"the sudden, forcible overthrow of a government by a small group. In its
simplest form, a coup consists of a few individuals who conspire together to try to
remove the head of state". 1 1
A revolution can be identified as one that is backed by the masses. However, in the
case of SIDS, it is difficult to separate the two. The coup might be carried by a few,
but in fact the majority might support it, even if they actively do not participate. One
of the key issues is how far is an unlawful overthrow of the government a threat to
the state? This leads us onto the important question of differentiating threats to the
state and threats to the government. In SIDS, it appears to be safe to assume that this
11 Steven R.David, Third World Coups d'Etat and International Security, (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore), 1987,
p.7
10 Ibid. pp. 25 - 26
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type of threat, that may be on the surface a threat to the government, is a threat to the
state as any political upheaval in the country can effect all sectors of society due to
the small nature of the state. Even a bloodless coup can disrupt the values and beliefs
of the people and create chaos and disharmony.
Coups in the Caribbean and the Pacific have involved both military and
civilian elements. Nevertheless, in general, the military involvement in the
government has been rare and so are non-military coups in the Caribbean. The most
notorious cases have been the one in Grenada in 1979 that overthrew the regime of
Gairy and again in 1983 the coup by the Central Committee of the New Jewel
Movement. The first coup was supported by much of the population, faced
ineffectual military resistance and had a low death toll. However, the second one
resulted in the murder of more than fifty people including the Prime Minister
Maurice Bishop. Dominica experienced two of them in 1981, one involving members
of the Ku Klux Klan and the other involving former Defence Force members (who
had been disarmed earlier as a result of reports that weapons were being traded for
marijuana). In recent times, the onset of political stability in the region was once
again disrupted by the attempted coup in Trinidad where 114 fundamentalist
Muslims stormed the government buildings and took the Prime Minister and his
cabinet as hostages. However, they had no popular support from the masses and
surrendered after five days.12
Just as the US invasion of Grenada in the Caribbean brought
vulnerability and outside intervention in SIDS onto the international agenda, Fiji
in the South Pacific highlighted the dangers of military coups in SIDS. The two
military coups led by Col. Rabuka in Fiji shocked the whole region. While it is not
necessary to go into the details of the coups, it is sufficient to say that this
involvement of the armed forces in the politics of the state created fear among
the other SIDS that a similar situation might follow; especially when there was
12 See Bishnu Ragoonath, "The Failure of the Abu Bala Coup: The plural society, cultural traditions and political
development in Trinidad", The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, No.2, July 1993
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political instability as in PNG and Vanuatu. However, it was not just political
instability that led to the coups. It was, rather, a mixture of racial and ethnic
tension between the native Fijians and the Indians combined with economic
resource disparities as well as lack of political legitimacy and leadership that led
to the coups. The PNG also faced a coup attempt in March 1990 although this was
nothing serious. Rather it was a half-hearted attempt made by the Commissioner of
Police to overthrow the government, more notoriously known as the Bar-B-
Coup, named after the function that got the Commissioner rather drunk before his
attempt. 13
b) Political instability: 
Political instability can affect the state in many ways. Ivelaw Griffith
underlines certain elements as part of political stability. 14 These are the authority of
the government, whereby the people accept the rule of the government and the
government undertake the management of the political system; the equality and
participation that relates to the rights of the citizens to participate in the politics of
the state and their ability to do so; and political legitimacy, which requires those in
power to have the ability and the right to govern. It is the lack of any of the above
elements or some of them, which leads to political instability. SIDS have different
types of political systems. However, the much favoured version is a democratic one,
often modelled to include their traditional peculiarities. The abuse of power by the
regime can result in irregularities in transition of power, corruption, nepotism and
other forms of undesirable behaviour that can create instability and disharmony
among the citizens. Due to the personalised nature of politics, the majority of the
political regimes in SIDS do not accept any criticisms from the opposition even if
they are constructive criticisms. Everything is taken at a personal level. This could
create a climate of tension and strain in the country. While most SIDS do enjoy
democratic transitions of power, the legitimacy of the government may be questioned
13 Anthony Payne, "Small State security in the South Pacific", The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics,
No.2, July 1993
14 Griffith, The quest for security in the Carribbean: problems and promises in subordinate states, p.6
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on the grounds of abuse of power. Unlike military threats and coups, political
instability as a threat in itself is difficult to delineate. It could also act as a catalyst to
other types of threats, such as foreign military interventions and coups.
In the Caribbean, almost all the SIDS adhere to a parliamentary democracy.
Elections are held on a regular basis and are fairly peaceful affairs. Nevertheless,
factional politics is a prominent feature and political instabilities arise mainly from
abuse of power by those governing the state. The Grenada crisis emphasises this
problem. In 1983 the former Foreign Minister and the then Prime Minister of the
PNG, Rabbie Namaliu claimed that domestic internal threats are the greatest security
risks to the South Pacific states. 15
 The South Pacific consists of a diversity of
political systems ranging from a kingdom, republics, to non-independent states and
freely associated states. In the past, the South Pacific's record on political stability
has been fairly good. Coups and political violence, as well as discord have been rare.
Peaceful change of government has been the norm in most SIDS. However, it has not
embraced all islands. The Solomon Islands and the PNG have confronted frequent
changes of government and shifting alliances based on controversial methods of
attaining power. Vanuatu suffers from chronic parliamentary instability. 16
 In 1988,
serious rioting occurred in the capital in protest at the government's decision to
abolish a local land corporation. Both Australia and New Zealand guaranteed their
support and the dispatch of special security police if the situation worsened. Tonga
may also face instability due to the growing discontent against power being
concentrated in the hands of a few nobles. The worst political problems are faced by
the PNG. The Bougainville secessionist movement and a border conflict with
Indonesia have continued to influence political stability in the country.
15 Quoted in Australia's Relations with the South Pacific, p. 149
16 See Luella S Christopher, CRS Report for Congress, Pacific Island Nations: Overview of trends and problems in the South
and West Pacific, July 1990, p. 11
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c) Secessions:
Island states are extremely vulnerable to secessionist tendencies. The
'islandness' factor, as discussed in the previous chapter, appears to be the key
ingredient in secessionist tendencies although it is rare that this factor alone creates
the desire to secede. There are other factors such as uneven distribution of wealth or
abuse of political power that can contribute to secessionist attempts. A political
system dominated by a few people, usually from one particular island or region of the
island, can result in an extreme sense of frustration by the others. 17 Secondly, the
sudden enrichment of a particular island or group of islands could encourage the
people to break away from the parent territory if they have no desire to share their
wealth as happened in the three southern atolls of the Maldives during the late
1950s. In the Caribbean, in the run up to their independence many of the colonies
separated to form sovereign states of their own rather than join each other. Some
have now incorporated the possibility of secession into their constitutions. Thus, the
chance of secessionist rebellions has been reduced. However, the SIDS of the
Caribbean have not escaped from secessionist attempts. 18 The breakaway of Anguilla
from St.Kitts and Nevis is one such example. In 1979 in St. Vincent, a group of
Rastafarians tried to take control of the Union Island. However, this was not a serious
attempt but a rather minor insurrection.
Secessionist attempts have not escaped the islands of the South Pacific either.
The most notorious is the attempted secession of Espiritu Santo from Vanuatu at the
time of its independence. In 1980, the leader of the Na-Griamel declared the
independence of Espiritu Santo from the rest of the New Hebrides as the independent
state of Vemarana. The rebels were allegedly backed by the French colons and US
business interests. Kiribati (formerly Gilbert Islands) and Tuvalu (formerly the Ellice
Islands) had faced similar problems prior to independence. They were under the
British as the Gilbert and Ellice Island Colony (GIEC) and in a referendum held in
17 see Harden, Small is dangerous: micro-states in a macro-world, pp. 80 - 88
18 See Gladstone E Mills, "Politics and Administration: Outstanding Issues related to Peace and Security" in A T Bryan, J E
Greene and T M Bradshaw (eds), Peace, Development and Security in the Caribbean, (The Macmillan Press Ltd., London,
1990)
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the Ellice Islands in 1974 more than 90% of the voters favoured a separate status
distinct from the Gilbert Islands. Even though this is not a classic case of one island
attempting to secede from the main island group, it nevertheless reflects the
separateness felt by islanders in comparison to other islanders. Further, in 1975, an
independence movement was formed by the people of Ocean Island (Banaba).This
again was instigated by the fact that they refused to accept the British Government's
argument that the phosphate revenues from the island should be distributed over the
whole territory of the Gilbert islands. Fiji, too, faced a secessionist crisis in 1988
when the island group of Rotuma declared their independence. However, the
rebellion was soon quelled by Fijian troops.
However, secessionist attempts have been drastically reduced now. The only
thorn in the South Pacific is the Bougainville secessionists from PNG. PNG consists
of a loose knit group of diverse ethnic communities. PNG also accused the Solomon
Islands of assisting the secessionists. According to PNG, the Solomon Islands have
been supporting the Bougainville secessionist movement in PNG. The Solomon
islands alleged that PNG has carried out commando raids on parts of the Solomon
Islands on the basis of their accusations. 19 As mentioned above, the islandness factor
is exacerbated by the fact that this island is rich in copper compared to the rest of the
country. Dissatisfaction that the share of the resources, combined with the tension
between the indigenous black population of the Bougainville and the 'redskins' from
other parts of PNG who work in the mines, led to the crisis.
d) Coercive Diplomacy: 
Pressure from abroad has been identified as one of the major political threats
both by international institutions and SIDS themselves. This kind of coercive
diplomacy can be applied directly as well as indirectly. It has been defined as a
continuing process, "With actions ranging from statements and limited economic
measures at the low end of the spectrum to full-fledged invasions at the high end."2°
20 Joseph Nye, Jr., "What new world order", Foreign Affairs 71, Spring 1992, p. 92
19 See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, March 1992, p. 38818.
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SIDS located near larger powers are extremely vulnerable to this kind of threat.
Unscrupulous interference in the domestic affairs of states by foreign powers is not
restricted only to small states, but for a small country this is especially a problem of
considerable concern. It has been claimed that many of the SIDS, because of their
strategic position, "could easily become pawns in the game of international power
politics" 21
In the Caribbean the United States is the key actor. The region is considered
as a US sphere of interest and the US policy towards the Caribbean is based on the
prevention of other actors becoming a threat to the US in the region as well as
enhancing the global power of the US through demonstrating its power in the
region. 22
 In this sense it has been said that the Caribbean is an American lake. US
intervention in the region was brought to the forefront by the invasion of Grenada.
Prior to that, the US had carried out a campaign of destabilisation in the country, to
discourage tourism and affect the political stance of the regime in power. There was
even an exercise in 'gunboat diplomacy' in 1981 when the US navy carried out
military exercises outside Grenada. The Bahamas has also faced severe pressure from
the US. The US has conducted anti-drug operations in the Bahamas without the
knowledge of the government and has pressured the governments of other SIDS to
give into their demands, especially in relation to selection of local personnel
participating in the Drug Enforcement Units. It has also interfered in the election in
the Bahamas in 1987, attempting to halt the return of the incumbent Prime Minister,
by spreading disinformation. Other powers in the Caribbean included the Soviet
Union in the past. The main ally of the Soviet Union was Cuba where there was a
Soviet military presence as part of its Cold War strategy. The Soviet Union also had
close contacts with other SIDS such as Grenada, Jamaica and Guyana but the overall
influence of the Soviet Union on the Caribbean SIDS was rather limited. Britain,
France and the Netherlands also have interests in the region. Britain has dependent
22 See Paul Sutton, "The politics of small state security in the Caribbean", The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative
Politics, No.2, July 1993 p.3
21 Harden, Small is dangerous: micro-states in a macro-world, pp. 80 - 88
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territories in the Caribbean. It also maintained a military presence in Belize and the
Commonwealth Caribbean countries receive assistance from Britain, "the preferred
option for military co-operation". 23
 The French presence in the Caribbean is also by
virtue of territorial possession but the French territories are an integral part of France
and not just dependent territories. There are around 9,000 French troops in the
Caribbean mainly to protect French interests. France also has a naval base in
Guadeloupe. The Caribbean is also important for France as it has the European Space
Centre in French Guiana. The Netherlands also possess territory in the Caribbean, the
Netherlands Antilles, and is committed to its defence. Canada also plays an important
role in the Caribbean as a major investor and trade partner and by providing aid and
assistance to the Caribbean countries although it does not have any territorial
possessions in the region. However, Canada has not applied unwanted pressure on
the Caribbean SIDS unlike the United States.
In the South Pacific, Australia is a dominant actor and thus its actions can
have severe ramification for the SIDS. Australia has been criticised as trying to play
the 'big brother' role towards the SIDS, "seeking to impose on the Pacific, the
Western viewpoint identifying with the US interests rather than with the Pacific
concems". 24
 Kiribati, in particular, was worried about Australia's criticisms about its
fishing deal with the Soviet Union in 1985. However, Australia has moved closer to
the South Pacific stance in recent years. It has put pressure on the US to negotiate
tuna fishing agreements with the region and supports the South Pacific Nuclear Free
Zone. New Zealand is another regional power. Eighty per cent of New Zealand's
bilateral aid goes to the South Pacific. France is also a country that plays an
important role in the region. Its approach to decolonisation of the French Pacific
territories has had a worrying influence in the region, especially with Vanuatu. 25
 The
24 Australia's Relations with the South Pacific; See also .1 H A Hoyle, The Security of Small Island States, Conference on the
ANZAC Connection, (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National
University, May 1984); Richard W Baker, The International Relations of the Southwest Pacific: New Visions and Voices,
Occasional paper 4, (International Relations Program, East-West Centre, Honululu, Hawaii, 1992)
25 See David Hegarty, Small State security in the South Pacific, (Australian National University Strategic and Defence
Studies Centre, Working Paper No.126, Canberra, 1987)
23 Ibid. p.7
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tension is mainly due to Vanuatu's continued support for the Kanak separatists in
New Caledonia. The French ambassador was expelled twice from Vanuatu, in 1981
and 1987, the second time for allegedly providing financial assistance to Vanuatu's
opposition parties. 26 However, relations improved later on. French refusal to halt
nuclear testing in the region is another major issue of contention between France and
the South Pacific SIDS. It has caused a severe straining of relations, especially in
recent times with France continuing to carry on with nuclear testing in the Mururoa
atoll.
The Soviet Union had increased its role and activity in the region, supporting
the region's Nuclear Free Zone treaty that was opposed by the United States.
Diplomatic relations were established with many states and fishing agreements were
signed with Kiribati in 1985 and Vanuatu in 1987. After Gorbachev's Vladivostock
speech in July 1986, asserting that the Soviet Union was to be a Pacific power, Soviet
influence increased considerably. However, it was still rather low-key and is not
significant. With the end of the Cold War the role of Russia has been even more
limited. The influence of Libya in some of the SIDS caused considerable panic in the
region in the 1980s. Libya provided assistance to a small number of Kanak
separatists in New Caledonia and established relations with Vanuatu. However, it is
doubtful whether the Libyan threat was real, as the Australian Foreign Minister
claimed that it was more "potential than actual". The other powers that play an
important role in the region are Japan, Taiwan and China. Japan is now the largest
aid donor to the islands. Their role in the South Pacific has put many of the SIDS in a
'Catch-22' situation. On the one hand, their fishing fleets continue to operate in their
EEZs, and their continuation can lead to disastrous results to the countries
economically. Yet, on the other hand, they are major aid donors and provide the
islands with vital aid necessary for their economic development. Western Samoa
accepted a major loan for port development in 1989 and the Solomon Islands were
given a contract to construct a new fishing project by Japan; while Tonga was given a
26 See Europa Yearbook 1990, p. 2901
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loan from Taiwan to build a sports stadium and Fiji received Taiwanese cars. This
was at the same time as the meetings about the problem of drift net fishing by these
countries in the South Pacific. Foreign interference in the domestic affairs of SIDS
may not always be from larger powers. In the South Pacific, the SIDS themselves
accuse one another of interference. In 1989, allegations were made by Western
Samoa that the government of Nauru had secretly contributed campaign funds to the
opposition in Western Samoa prior to the general election in 1988. This led to a
serious deterioration in relations between the two countries including the recall of the
Nauruan consul and the sale of all Nauruan assets in Western Samoa.
e) Violation of territorial zones: 
The illegal use of their territorial zones, especially their maritime zones, can
be a major threat to SIDS in numerous ways. Territorial violations can occur for a
number of reasons, among which are included attempts to land subversive elements,
smuggling, piracy, illegal fishing and exploitation of other natural resources, and
dumping of hazardous wastes. 27 Such events can threaten not just the military aspect
of their security but also political, economic and environmental security. In the
Caribbean, territorial violations are incurred for the purposes of drug trafficking,
money laundering and smuggling among others. Antigua has experienced several of
the above including the use of Antiguan territory for illegal export of arms to South
Africa in 1978-79 and to Colombian drug barons in 1989. In the South Pacific the
main territorial violations are those related unlawful fishing in the EEZ.
3. Economic Threats
Economic threats have been outlined as one of the most serious problems
faced by the SIDS. The Commonwealth includes economic shocks, bilateralism,
influence of foreign business firms and illegal fishing in the EEZ as among the major
economic threats faced by SIDS. 28
 Economic threats are invariably linked with the
27See Harden, Small is dangerous: micro-states in a macro-world, pp. 80 - 88.
28 Commonwealth Consultative Group, Vulnerability: Small states in the Global Society
66
economic vulnerability of the SIDS. Thus, unlike military threats or some political
threats, it is difficult identify when an economic threat begins and ends. It appears to
be more of a continuing process.
a) Resource Piracy: 
One of the major threats that affects economic and political security comes
from the security of their maritime zones. The importance of their surrounding waters
to island states, be they single island or archipelagic, cannot be overemphasised.
Among the possible threats to their maritime areas are the trespassing of the maritime
zones of the SIDS, poaching by foreign registered fishing vessels in these areas, and
illegal exploitation of other natural resources. As the traditional law of the three mile
territorial sea became obsolete, the maritime zones grew wider with states claiming
zones such as the Exclusive Economic Zone and fishing zones. These claims were
reinforced, internationally, by the Law of the Sea Conventions of 1982. However, it
was often the case that, not only did their claims to a 200 mile Exclusive Economic
Zones prove to be a benefit to these small territories economically, but it also
increased their duties to protect these maritime areas as well. It often proved beyond
their ability to exploit the living and non-living resources that exist in these areas,
and at the same time provide adequate facilities to patrol and safeguard their
patrimonial seas. Foreign fleets continuously exploit these areas, poaching among
other things, so depriving the local fishermen of their natural livelihood. Such
poaching could contribute to loss of revenue as well as depletion of fish stocks.29
These foreign fleets are equipped with some of the more sophisticated tracking and
fishing equipment that the SIDS could not themselves afford. This is a real threat
faced by the majority of the SIDS and one that still continues.
The above is a problem faced by many of the SIDS in the Caribbean and the
South Pacific. Although there have been instances of poaching in the Caribbean it is
not as much of a problem as the South Pacific due to the small size of the Caribbean
29 Op. cit. pp 80 - 88.
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Sea, as well as the pervasive presence of the United States. However, in the South
Pacific, poaching in maritime zones is a considerable problem and to some extent it
still is. None of the SIDS have the capability for effective surveillance of their EEZs.
Even PNG stated that the cost of minimal surveillance of their EEZ will cost more
than the return from fishing licence fees and royalties." The most obvious problem
related to that was of tuna fishing by the US fishermen in the EEZ of the South
Pacific SIDS. The United States regards fishing in the EEZ of other states as lawful
due to the migratory nature of the tuna. Therefore, when the SIDS intercept any US
fishing vessels, the United States threatened to apply a trade embargo under the
Magnuson Act. This happened when the Solomon Islands seized the Jeanette Diana
for unlicensed fishing in its EEZ and the US responded by applying a trade embargo,
banning all fisheries export from the Solomon Islands, affecting the economy of the
islands. However, in April 1987, the United States signed an accord with the South
Pacific. Yet the threat continues from the fishing fleets of Japan, Taiwan and South
Korea, who also use drift net fishing which can result in swift depletion of all kinds
of fish stocks. The South Pacific countries adopted the Tarawa Declaration in 1989,
banning drift net fishing in the region and calling upon the countries to stop using
drift nets and banned all port calls and refuelling and supplying of vessels. Japan has
now agreed to this after considerable pressure but Taiwan still continues to resist.31
The SIDS have received assistance from Australia regarding maritime surveillance
under the Pacific Boat project (participated in by seven countries) launched in 1983.
Apart from it, Australia provides funding to Western Samoa, Vanuatu and the
Solomon Islands to help in purchasing fuel and equipment for their vessels.
However, the SIDS have criticised the design of the vessels claiming that it is not
suitable to their own requirements. As such, maritime surveillance to stop unlawful
fishing and other territorial violation continues to be a problem to the SIDS.
30 See Hegarty, Small State security in the South Pacific,
31 Anthony Payne, "Small State Security in the South Pacific", The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics,
No.2, July 1993
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b) Influence of foreign business interests: 
The Commonwealth has identified the influence exercised by foreign
business interest as a possible threat to the SIDS in some cases. As SIDS are usually
economically weak, they try to attract as much foreign investment as possible. This
might prove beneficial to their economies but it could also lead to the foreign
economic conglomerates "exerting considerable pressure" on the internal affairs of
the small island states. 32 Due to the weakness of their administration system and
power, these business interests can encourage fraud, corruption and commercial
crime.33 These multinational companies have at their disposal resources that these
small states could never afford. Local governments are often too weak to resist the
"gifts and onslaught of international finance". 34 One extreme case of interference in
domestic politics by foreign companies is the case of Abaco in the Bahamas where
the Abaco Islands were seized by military force by a group of businessmen and the
islanders were encouraged to call for the status of self-governing territory "in order to
further the conspirators' plans".35 The Caribbean SIDS encourage the growth of off-
shore banking facilities, tax havens and casinos to enhance their weak economies.
Nevertheless, in many cases this can become a threat in itself. Many of these SIDS,
among which are included Antigua, the Bahamas, Barbados and St. Vincent, have
attracted dubious business interests who use them for money laundering and to evade
taxes. The SIDS of the South Pacific have not escaped the influence of foreign
business interests. In the late 1970s, in Tuvalu, a US real estate agent made off with
the country's consolidated revenue of one million dollars, with the Prime Minister's
approval, apparently to invest in the US. Tuvalu took more than ten years to recover
from this loss. 36 Even in Espiritu Santo the rebel leader was sponsored by The
Phoenix Foundation of America "which supposedly had a good deal of money"37
32 'Smallness and vulnerability of small states', Paper presented by H.E. Ibrahim Hussain Zaki, Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Maldives, May 1991
33 Commonwealth Consultative Group, Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society, p. 35
34 Robin Cohen (ed), African islands and enclaves, (Sage, London, 1983) pp. 11 - 13
35 Ibid.
36 Hegarty, Small State security in the South Pacific, p. 16; On economic security of the South Pacific, see also Robert C.
Kiste, Economic security issues in the South Pacific, prepared for Symposium on Pacific Basin Security: Economic
Dimension, (National Defense University, Washington DC, February 1986)
37 Cohen (ed), African islands and enclaves, pp. 11 - 13
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4. Societal Threats
a) Ethnic, religious and cultural problems: 
Many of the SIDS are multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural. Their
past colonial masters have often brought different races together and currently many
of the SIDS are trying to work out a formula that will suit all communities. However,
in reality, many are fragmented societies and the unity of these communities is
extremely delicate and fragile. Ethnic problems could disrupt the lives of all
members of the society. Due to their small size ethnic problems affect all parts of the
society. Ethnic insecurity contributes to political instability, secessionism and
invariably affects the economic sector. Religious fundamentalism can also become a
major threat to these societies. The Jamaat Al Muslimeen, the black Muslim group
that attempted to overthrow the government of Trinidad is just one example. The
Fijian coups also had their basis in the ethnic divisions of Fijian society. Cultural
penetration could also be regarded as a threat to the SIDS. Due to foreign cultural
influences, these societies could lose their own identities and values. The
development of the media and the associated technological advances have enabled
the international media to reach remote parts of the world. Radio and satellite
television go beyond the control of the state.
Most Caribbean states have a significant multi-racial population. The
societies are further fragmented by divisions along class lines. It can and does affect
political groupings as well as the security forces. Parties are often based on ethnic
lines and the civil servants and security forces can be dominated by one group of
people, as in the case of Trinidad, by the Afro-Caribbeans. However, ethnic
problems are kept under control as the societies have developed patterns of peaceful
co-existence for over a century. The main cultural threats to the SIDS come from the
US. With the expansion of the media in these states, with cable and satellite
communications, US programmes have increased considerably, penetrating domestic
households.38
 The dangerous aspect of such cultural penetration lies in the SIDS
38 See Rex Nettleford, "Threats to National and Cultural Identity", in Bryan et al (eds), Peace, Development and Security in
the Caribbean
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losing their own cultures and values. In the South Pacific, the Fijian coup of 1987
highlighted the ethnic problems that exist on the island between the ethnic Fijians
(Melanesians) and the Indian Fijians. The population is evenly divided between both
communities. Ethnic tension had always existed between the two communities as
there had been little integration. The military is mainly dominated by ethnic Fijians.
However, in the past, there had been no direct confrontation until the problems
erupted in 1987. Many Indians have since left the country. Vanuatu is another of the
states in the South Pacific that faces mounting problems based on different islands.
Regional tensions exist between the northern and southern islands and cultural
problems exist between the francophone and anglophone elements.
b) Narcotics: 
Drug traffickers and smuggling operations often favour island countries
where it is almost impossible for the national security services to maintain an
effective patrolling service for every tiny island. This is especially true of
archipelagic states where the islands are scattered over a large area and the economy
is too weak to bear the brunt of transport and communication costs. The illegal
trading of drugs and its attendant problems can effect security by destabilising small
island states. In some cases, it leads not only to the breakdown of law and order but
also to corruption and the loss of social values ultimately affecting the political
system itself. It undermines the credibility of the government and effects the
functioning of the government structure. This is a sizeable problem in the island
states of the Caribbean where a large scale drug trade was developed to meet the
demands of the tourist and then slowly took a grip on the islanders themselves.
Marijuana is a sizeable crop in some of the islands and the region is also used as a
transhipment point to North America and Europe. The problem facing SIDS
regarding such issues is that "in smaller countries the problems have a greater impact
because the populations are smaller and far fewer resources are available to meet the
awesome challenge posed by the narcotic trade".39
39 Ron Sanders, "Narcotics, corruption and development", Carribbean Affairs, Vol 3, No 1, Jan-March 1990, P. 83
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In the Caribbean this is a serious threat to the SIDS. The islands are used as
suppliers to others, intermediaries for trafficking and as consumers. This has led to an
increase in crime associated with drug abuse. Although, apart from Jamaica, none of
the other SIDS produce drugs on a large scale, they still act as excellent
transhipment points from the South American drug producing countries, especially
Brazil and Colombia, to the United States. The Bahamas, with its numerous cays and
islets facing the Florida coastline, has been categorised as the state that takes the
bulk of the cargo. In July 1992 more than 908 kilos of marijuana was seized in
Barbados, and 26.5 kilos was seized in Trinidad and Tobago bound from
Venezuela.40 Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados are also used for transhipment. It
has been alleged that the majority of the drugs pass undetected. 41 Cocaine abuse is
high in the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago. In the South Pacific, the problem of
drugs is still small. However, drug traffickers have made inroads into the region. In
1989, heroin was seized in Vanuatu for the first time. The country was being used as
a transhipment point between Hong Kong and Sydney. While the threat of drugs is
still small, it is nevertheless a potential problem given the number of small islands in
the region that could be used as transhipment points.42
c) Demographic threats: 
Many states in the Caribbean face the daunting task of accommodating a
growing population far beyond their economic capacity. The increase in the labour
force can lead to severe pressures on their economies. It can lead not just to
economic difficulties but also to political problems as the governments become
unable to provide the growing masses with job opportunities, in turn leading to
frustration of the people. This could threaten the political stability of these states.
40 lyelaw L Griffith, "Drug and Security in the Commonwealth Caribbean", The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative
Politics, No.2, July 1993; See also Griffith, The quest for security in the Carribbean: problems and promises in subordinate
states, pp. 243-271
41 Paul Sutton, "The politics of small state security in the Caribbean", The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative
Politics, No.2, July 1993
42 Anthony Payne, "Small State Security in the South Pacific", The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics,
No.2, July 1993
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Added to this, illegal immigrants can also threat the economies of these countries. In
the Bahamas in recent years Haitian refugees are causing considerable problems. It
has been estimated that the figure could be as high as 10,000. In the South Pacific
there is a serious refugee problem in PNG where more than 10,000 Irianese from
Iriyan Jaya in Indonesia have crossed the border.
5. Environmental Threats
Security in its traditional sense may not include environmental security.
Nevertheless, environmental threats can and do affect all aspects of security. Among
the most dangerous environmental threats to SIDS are those associated with climatic
change. Global warming and the subsequent sea level rise have threatened many low
lying areas. Among them the most vulnerable are low lying islands. The United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) claims that due to the greenhouse effect
the average surface temperature of the earth could increase by 1.5° C to 4.5° C during
the next 100 years. This could raise the sea level by melting the polar ice caps and
glaciers and through the thermal expansion of the water in the oceans. They claim
that unless attempts are made to slow down this process it could lead to a sea level
rise by 65 cm by the year 2100. While there is no consensus among the scientific
community about the rate of the rise in the sea level, even a slight change can effect
the low lying island states. Erosion of the islands will reduce their capacity to
support their population through loss of territory. Loss of elevation has also increased
their vulnerability to storms. Increase in the salinity of the freshwater lens in many
low lying SIDS has created economic difficulties adding to their burdens. The worst
case scenario is that the people of these low lying SIDS may end up as environmental
refugees. Both the size and the fact that they are low lying islands contribute to
enhancing the danger of such threats. The dumping of nuclear waste and other
hazardous material could also threaten their natural environments. As for those SIDS
that are unfortunate enough to be situated near the major oil routes, oil tankers are a
continuous hazard that pollute their waters by cleaning their tanks and damaging their
unspoilt beaches. An oil spillage of even a small size could be of national proportion
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to such states whose seas and beaches are a major asset as they are often dependent
on tourism as their mainstay. Further, as these SIDS progressed economically, there
is a growing threat from their own industrial waste. Garbage and sewage disposal is a
real problem for the SIDS and the threat of polluting their beaches and rivers are real
problems that the SIDS need to deal with.
The Caribbean is hurricane prone. All the SIDS have faced considerable
problems due to the devastating nature of the hurricanes that pass through the region.
Although effective monitoring of the weather had minimised the risk of the loss of
human lives, the economic costs are extremely high. Three hurricanes (Hurricane
Allen in 1980, Hurricane Gilbert in 1988, and Hurricane Hugo in 1989) that passed
through the region in the 1980s were quite severe and caused severe damage to
property;43
 for example, St. Lucia lost sixty per cent of its coconut and seventy-five
per cent of its banana harvest in 1980.44
 Other environmental threats include volcanic
eruptions in St. Vincent and erosion of soil in Barbados and Jamaica. The Caribbean
SIDS are mainly volcanic but there are low-lying islands and cays in the Bahamas
that may also be threatened by global warming and the subsequent rise in the sea
level. Further, the SIDS have also faced problems due to oil spillage, refinery
discharges and tanker collisions.
In 1989, a UN report on the 'greenhouse effect' listed four islands of the South
Pacific which would completely disappear beneath the sea in the next century unless
drastic actions were taken. They are Kiribati, Nauru, Tuvalu and Western Samoa.
Many SIDS of the South Pacific are also cyclone prone and many have felt the
devastating effects of cyclones. Among them include Cyclone Isaac in 1982 that
caused substantial damage to Tonga. Later in 1988, a tornado struck the capital
Nuku'alofa causing severe damage. In February 1990 Tuvalu was struck by a cyclone
that destroyed crops and wrecked buildings, especially on Vaitupu atoll where 370
44 Commonwealth Consultative Group, Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society, p. 19
43 Op. cit. p.2I
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people were made homeless. The same cyclone struck Western Samoa causing
several deaths as well as destroying crops and buildings.
Conclusions
The threats to the security of SIDS appear to be numerous. Firstly, SIDS
appear to be extremely vulnerable to military threats. Yet, how far are they real?
Military threats can be separated between real and potential threats by evaluating the
range of the threat and how distant the threat is in time. Although it is difficult to
predict the exact possibility of such a threat it can nevertheless be assessed based on
certain preconditions. For example, in the case of direct military intervention or
invasion by an external power, it has to be assessed who would be willing to
undertake such an event and for what reasons? Are there any adversaries or would-
be aggressors in the neighbouring region? How is the relationship of the state with
both its allies and adversaries? What benefit would a larger power gain from armed
aggression? What capabilities does a small island developing state posses to face
such a threat on its own? Or would it be able to get assistance from others?
Assessing the situation in the Caribbean and the South Pacific, it must be said
that in most cases direct invasion appears to be a worst case scenario. As far as
recent history goes, it is very rare that these "small and apparently non-viable states
have been taken over by direct conquest". 45 Apart from the Grenada crisis, this
situation has not risen in a small island developing state in the last ten years.
Although ten years may seem too limited a time period to discard the threat of
invasion by another power, the security environment of most SIDS, especially those
in the Caribbean and the South Pacific, lend favour to this hypothesis. This is likely,
not because foreign powers may not have a vested interest in the small island
developing state, but because they could invariably influence the small state and
achieve their objectives without actual territorial incursions. As Diggines claims,
most of the island states are "simply not worth the trouble, cost and international
45 Jonathon Alford, "Security dilemmas of small states" ,The Round Table, 292, 1984, pp. 377 - 382
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odium" that these states would get by 'hijacking' them. 46 Most of the SIDS have good
relations with the neighbouring larger powers. Apart from the Grenada crises,
territorial violations have not occurred among the SIDS of the Caribbean and the
South Pacific in recent times. Yet, for any state, territorial violations will always be
perceived as a serious potential threat, especially given the important role that
territory plays in defining the sovereign independence of a state. Even though
international law has outlawed the use of force except in self-defence, there are still
some states willing to employ force to enhance their interests. The Grenada episode
brought this factor to the limelight and emphasised the fact that political instability in
even a small island state could become a global issue. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq
in 1990 is another more recent example. Thus, this type of threat cannot be ignored
in its entirety. However, looking at recent history for most of the SIDS, it appears
that there is some discrepancy between the theoretical possibility and the execution in
practice.
As regards mercenaries, they appear to be a threat to the security of small,
vulnerable states. However, the possibility of a successful mercenary-led attack
against a small island developing state remains remote. In many instances, the
mercenary-led attacks have been foiled in their embryonic stages by the assistance of
friendly powers. In other cases, where the attacks have taken place, it has been
successfully defeated, again with outside assistance. Since 1970, eleven SIDS have
faced the threat of possible mercenary-led attacks and four states experienced an
actual attack; two in the Comoros in 1978 and 1989, one in the Seychelles in 1981,
one in Sao Tome in 1988 and one in the Maldives in 1988. Out of these, only in
Comoros were the mercenaries successful. In the Comoros the mercenaries did not
have to face any outside intervention against them. In fact, there is enough evidence
to support the involvement of two third party states on the side of the mercenaries;
South Africa and France. It has been alleged that the mercenary leader Bob Denard
did not attempt the first attack in 1978 until the French government gave the green
46 C.E.Diggines, The problems of small states', The Round Table, 295, 1984, pp. 195-205
76
light to go ahead.47 Besides, the second attempt was welcomed by the people of
Comoros and the mercenaries were "greeted as national heroes". However, where
mercenaries are concerned, the real issue is that as long as ex-soldiers are willing to
take up arms for material reasons, the threat of mercenarism will remain not just
against SIDS but in other areas as well. The number of mercenaries allegedly
involved in the current Bosnian conflict provides enough evidence that mercenarism
still exists despite the claims by sceptics that the heyday of mercenarism has long
gone. The stereotype white ex-servicemen from the Western armies who carried out
the major operations in the African continent in the 1960s and 1970s were the
pioneers of mercenarism in the modern day. However, they may have lost the chance
they once had to overthrow governments in the Third World as the demand for
ordinary foot soldiers may have diminished. In the current atmosphere, people want
specialised skills and experience and "not cannon fodder looking for excitement" as
Taulbee and Head claim. 48 While the typical mercenary of the 1960s may not be
playing such a vigilant role in the 1990s, there are other groups of people who may
be equally willing. In Antigua-Barbuda, a plot was uncovered in 1990 whereby
attempts had been made to establish a mercenary training establishment involving the
Israelis. According to the organisers, the aim was to establish a central civilian
security school to train 'corporate security experts' in executive and operational levels
to bring them to the 'highest professional capacity in order to confront and defuse any
possible threat'. 49 However, according to Louis Blom-Cooper, the jurist who led the
inquiry, "To any one with slightest knowledge of armed forces it was obvious that the
training school proffered by Spearhead Ltd., was intended, among other things, to
train mercenaries in assault techniques and assassination".50 As such, the heyday of
the white mercenary may be over but there are others from the Third World willing to
step into their shoes. In the case of the Maldives in 1988, it was Tamil separatists
fighting a guerrilla war in Sri Lanka who were hired. As such, mercenaries remain a
47 See Gerry Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, (Westview, Boulder, 1984)
48 James L Taulbee and David A Head, "Mercenary Commando Coup Operations:Theory versus practice", Journal of
Strategic Studies, Vol.16, No.!, March 1993, pp. 109- 121
49 Quoted in Griffith , The quest for security in the Carribbean: problems and promises in subordinate states p.262
50 Ibid.
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potential threat to the SIDS. Another equally important issue is not the success rate of
armed aggression, be they by other states or mercenaries. It is the deep marks they
leave on the people and even the structure of the state. In the majority of the SIDS,
apart from mercenary-prone Comoros, violence is comparatively low. In such a
society, an armed attack can disrupt the lives of the people and create instability and
disorder even if it is unsuccessful in the end. Thus the consequences and the
aftermath of the attack are as much of a problem as the actual armed aggression.
As regards the presence of foreign military bases, it is rather difficult to
comprehend how this could be an actual threat given the international political
climate today. With the end of the Cold War, the chance of a nuclear war appears to
be rather remote in the current climate. Besides, the presence of a foreign military
base can actually act as a deterrent to would-be aggressors. As regards the question of
foreign influence, it is true that it will be difficult for the smaller state to go against
the wishes of the foreign power whose base is on its soil. Especially in a situation of
domestic instability it may be difficult for it to prevent the foreign power from
interfering if it has its own citizens on the territory of the small island developing
state. As in the case of Grenada, the US claimed that it sent its forces to protect US
citizens. However, the reality is that that was the excuse rather than the raison d'être
of US intervention. No doubt if there were no US citizens in Grenada at the time, it
would have given another one. Besides, the larger powers do not need gun boat
diplomacy to influence SIDS. If a larger power wishes to interfere it can do so by
numerous means, the most frequently used method being economic. In general, these
are all possibilities. The real situation is that there are very few SIDS that have a
foreign military presence on their territories. France has a military presence in
Mayotte, a part of the Comoros archipelago that the Comoros government has
continually claimed as part of the state, but is still under French rule. The status of
the US military base in Diego Garcia is also questionable as it is still considered part
of the British Indian Ocean Territory even though Mauritius has continued its claim
for sovereignty over the Chagos archipelago.
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Many of the SIDS enjoy greater political stability than many of the large
continental states. The evidence for the above, as claimed by some, is based on the
limited number of successful coups in SIDS; only in four SIDS have they been
successful in the last twenty years. They are the Comoros (1975, 1978, and 1989),
Seychelles (1977), Grenada (1979, 1983) and Fiji (May and September 1987).51
However, as in the case of armed aggression from external elements, the threat from
political coups does not depend solely on the success rate. An unsuccessful coup
attempt can still affect all sectors of the state. Depending on the nature of the
attempt, it can cause both human and material losses, affecting the political system,
society and the economy. These damages may be hard to confront even if the coup is
defeated eventually. It can affect the political culture of the state where political
violence may have been rarely experienced. It can affect people's beliefs and values.
Further, if it involves any form of violence, it can damage property and government
buildings and the state might find it difficult to meet the losses. As in Trinidad where
even the prosecution of the perpetrators of the 1990 coup cost the state TT $4
million. 52 Thus the security problems from political coups do not end if they do not
succeed. The threat from attempted coups can equally affect the SIDS. The problems
of coups have also added another dimension to the politics of SIDS. The
governments of SIDS have often used the threat of coups and mercenary attacks to
dismantle opposition factions and parties. Or it has been used as an excuse to
proceed with unfavourable policies. As for political instability, for many of the SIDS
the changing domestic environment and the emergence of a new generation could
create domestic upheavals and problems unless adjustments are made in the political
systems to accommodate the changes. Nearly all SIDS are experiencing a demand for
more political openness and democratic practices and for more freedom for the
citizens. Old political traditions and values have been challenged by new ideas.
While many have sought to adjust to these demands, the task has not been an easy
51 Anthony Lemon, "Political and Security Issues of Small Island States", in D G Lockhart, D Dralcalcis-Smith, and J
Schembri (eds) The Development Process in Small Island States, (Routledge, London, 1993) p. 45
52 Griffith, The quest for security in the Carribbean: problems and promises in subordinate states, p. 32
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one. Economic difficulties add to political difficulties as the gap between aspirations
and desire for improved living standards widens, imposing additional constraints on
the government structure.
Secessionism appears to remain a potential threat to multi-island SIDS.
Physical separateness of islands contributes to their "strong sense of separate
identity" despite the improvement in transport and communication. 53 Nevertheless,
it is unlikely that this factor of 'islandness' can instigate separatist tendencies on its
own. It is the onset of other factors, such as economic deprivation or economic
growth, political discrimination, etc. that fuel the feeling of islandness and lead to
actual secessionist movements. At present there are only two SIDS that face
immediate secessionist threats. One is PNG and the Bougainville secessionist
movement and the other is the Comoros where Mayotte has continually voted to
remain under the French and the Moheli islanders indicate their wish to secede from
the Comoros. This marginalisation of outer islands by the capital can contribute to
future secessionist tendencies.
States use coercive diplomacy for a variety of reasons. It has been claimed
that it is the strategic attractiveness of islands that has acted as a catalyst for
unwanted influence and pressure by larger powers. While some SIDS may have lost
some of their traditional attractiveness in terms of providing military bases to larger
states, they still command a lot of attention from larger states.(see Chapter two). As
such, foreign influence and pressure will always remain a threat. It is, however,
difficult to identify exactly every form of pressure or unwanted influence during a
given period of time. Due to the nature of coercive diplomacy itself, larger states
often influence smaller ones through various means while denying, in most cases,
that it is so. It is also hard to identify when exactly coercive diplomacy began and
ended as it may continue in various forms from direct acts of influence to action
through proxies, etc.
53	 • -1-lintiens and Newitt (eds) The Political Economy of Small Tropical Islands. p. 11
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chess game" in the Asian Defence Journal,
pp. 27- 30
the South Pacific Nations", Asian Defence
Territorial violations, especially the violations of their maritime zones, can be
considered an actual threat to the SIDS, although in different states the violations
might take place for different reasons. In the South Pacific and other SIDS that have
rich fishing grounds, it may be mainly for the reasons of fishing. While SIDS can
overcome such threats by negotiating fishing agreements with those countries
poaching in their EEZ, they still would find it difficult to stop everyone. In the
Caribbean violations have more to do with the shipment of drugs or counter
movements to stop the drug traffic. The lack of capabilities for surveillance and
search has meant that this is a continuing problem. For effective patrolling of the
EEZ the SIDS need fast attack craft (FACs) and off-shore patrol craft (OPV). They
also require maritime reconnaissance aircraft. According to an article on the
surveillance of EEZs in the Asian Defence Journal, the answer for surveillance is the
OPV "where the large hull allows greater range, speed, endurance and ability to
accommodate advanced weapons and defences". 54
 However, these are clearly beyond
the resources of the SIDS. According to a survey of Caribbean maritime capabilities
carried out by Michael A. Morris only the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago have
multi-mission coast guards but even these have limited capabilities in the EEZ. 55 In
the South Pacific only Fiji and PNG have navies but these are also relatively small.
Most of the South Pacific SIDS have one or two patrol boats under the Pacific Patrol
Boat Programme. However, providing the SIDS with patrol craft only solved part of
the problem as many lacked the necessary financial resources to operate the boats
effectively. In the case of Tuvalu it needed full funding from Australia to keep its
Pacific patrol boat operational. 56 Threats of territorial violations of SIDS and their
consequences are difficult to quantify during a given period of time. The number of
vessels caught acting unlawfully in their maritime zones can be totalled during a
54 Stewart Walters, "Anti-ship missiles: The vital pieces in a three dimensional
April 1995, pp. 37 - 38
55 Michael A. Morris, Caribbean Maritime Security, (Macmillan, London, 1994)
56 Peter Lewis Young, "The EEZ Patrol Problem: Australia, New Zealand and
Journal, June 1995, pp.20 - 27
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certain time period but there is the difficulty in finding out how many have done so
without being detected.
The influence and pressure from foreign economic interests also remain a
threat to the SIDS as they are forced to encourage foreign investment to boost their
economic development. Foreign economic conglomerates often attempt to overcome
their own difficulties in operating on foreign territory by offering attractive
'incentives' to bureaucrats who then find it difficult to refuse them, often due to the
harsh economic conditions in which many of them have to live. Allegations of
corruption are, therefore, common in many of the SIDS. Such unethical behaviour by
the officials as well as the influence wielded by the foreign business interests in SIDS
can often lead to political instability and internal conflicts. Further, fraud and
commercial crime are other problems that are sometimes associated with foreign
firms.
Societal threats such as ethnic and religious problems are not unique to SIDS.
However, when there are a limited number of people living on a small territory,
these types of threats can be felt much more greatly than in larger countries and affect
the whole population. Ethnic problems are mainly due to the failure of integration of
diverse communities to form a national identity. This is especially difficult to achieve
in archipelagic SIDS where communication and transport links are often poor. In
most cases, ethnic problems are latent but even a single incident could have
disastrous results. As far as the threat from narcotic drugs is concerned, it is a real
threat for many SIDS. The smallness of the SIDS results in the rapid spread of drug
abuse, especially among the youth. Drug-money often finds its way into the pockets
of government officials with meagre salaries who are tempted by the prospect of
enhancing their financial situation. This type of corruption affects the credibility of
those in power and affects their status in the eyes of others. Besides, the spread of
drug abuse has a draining effect on the vulnerable economies of the SIDS.
Furthermore, in the case of archipelagic SIDS the existence of numerous islands and
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cays are often favourable to those attempting to cultivate drugs and to traffickers
seeking transhipment. However, the widespread dispersal of islands and the existence
of transport difficulties also means that the spread of drug abuse may be limited to
some islands unlike in a continental small state. The main problem in dealing with
the threat from narcotics is that for SIDS the burden of eradication is almost always
impossible to bear on their own. They lack the facilities for effective policing and
law enforcement or rehabilitation of abusers, and so need external assistance to deal
with the problems. As such, the threat from narcotics unfortunately remains real for
many SIDS.
Environmental threats are major threats to the SIDS that are beyond their
control. Although with improved technology they can receive warnings about
cyclones and hurricanes etc., they cannot stop them from causing extensive damage
to their resources, both human and material. One of the main problems with natural
disasters is that they not only cause extensive damage but they also raise the cost of
insurance that is often beyond the means of the SIDS. Further, the SIDS often lack
the expertise in dealing with natural disasters after they occur. The measures
undertaken are nearly always short-term and disaster-preparedness is frequently
lacking. As for climatic change, if the scientific predictions of global warming and
the subsequent sea level rise are true then this is a major threat facing the SIDS.
Especially the low lying SIDS are facing dire consequences. Even if the
disappearance of an island is a worst-case scenario there are other real problems
such as damage to reefs, increase in the frequency and the intensity of storms and the
intrusion of salt water into fresh water supplies which can be a serious health hazard.
Further, this problem is often exacerbated in multi-island SIDS by growing
population densities, especially with internal migration from the outer islands to the
capital island.
The threats to the security of SIDS cannot, however, be examined properly by
basing the study on SIDS alone. There is an added dimension that is extremely
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important and heavily influences the threat scenario. It is the security environment of
the SIDS. The security environment consists of the geographical location of the state
and its relationship with the other states in the region, especially the larger and more
powerful states, as well as between the main actors. As security is a relative term, the
security problems of any state cannot be analysed in isolation without reference to the
regional security pattern. In other words, the geopolitics of the region also shapes and
influences the security environment of the SIDS. This is especially true in the
Caribbean and the South Pacific. In the Caribbean regional influences from larger
powers such as the United States are extremely active in defining the security
environment of the SIDS. As Sutton claims, US actions ".. set the parameters within
which the Caribbean (SIDS) operate". 57
 This is also true of the South Pacific.
Australia and New Zealand are the two larger powers in the region and they are also
members of the South Pacific Forum. Although there are other states influencing the
security environment of the region such as the US and France, it is these two
countries who take the most active role and influence in determining the security
context of the region. Geopolitical influences are strong in these two regions. This is
not to say that it is all negative and they always lead to problems for the SIDS.
However, in many instances, geopolitics not only shapes the nature of problems in all
areas but also limits the options available to the SIDS in dealing with them. As it is
some times in the case of security in the South Pacific, "the interests of the (SIDS)
and their would-be protectors (Australia and New Zealand) are not necessarily
congruent on such matters". 58 In this context, it is important to examine the
geopolitics of the Indian Ocean in order to understand the security problems facing
the Indian Ocean SIDS.
57 See Sutton, "The politics of small state security in the Carribbean ", pp. 2 - 3
58 See Payne, "The politics of small state security in the South Pacific", p.105
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Chapter IV
THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF THE INDIAN OCEAN
This chapter will look at the geo-politics of the Indian Ocean in recent times
and analyse the effect it has had on the Indian Ocean SIDS (I0S). Firstly, an
overview of the Indian Ocean will be given. Secondly, it identifies the role of the
superpowers in the Indian Ocean. It also briefly analyses the movement to create an
Indian Ocean Zone of Peace and why this has been so difficult to achieve. Thirdly, it
identifies the main actors in the Indian Ocean and how their relationships with the
IOS contribute to the overall security environment of the IOS. Finally, the role of the
regional organisations in the sub-regions of the Indian Ocean where the IOS are
located will be analysed.
Background
The Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean in the world comprising more than
twenty-eight million square miles and over forty eight states, littoral and hinterland.*
Apart from regional neighbours it has been also traversed by the Arabs, Persians and
the Chinese, and by the western world since the day Vasco da Gama sailed into the
ocean in the 15th century. The attractiveness of the Indian Ocean grew in terms of
needs of the great powers to maintain open sea lanes and to prevent others from
gaining access to key areas and strategic terrain. Geographically, it has strong
boundaries that often divides the region into sub-groupings. It is marked by
Antarctica in the south, and it is flanked by three continents, Africa in the west,
Australia in the east and Asia in the centre. India projects itself into the centre of the
ocean cutting off both sides of the ocean into two huge areas, the Arabian Sea in the
west and the Bay of Bengal in the east. The Red Sea in the north-east connects the
* Hinterland states are those states with primary maritime access through littoral states of the Indian Ocean.
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Indian Ocean to Europe acting as a "vast river") The Indian Ocean is accessible
through the Suez and the Cape of Good Hope and in the east through the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore, or the Timor Sea. Other strategic narrow straits in the Indian
Ocean include the Lombok Strait (in the vicinity of the Indonesian archipelago),
Makassar Strait (between Borneo and Sulawesi), Sunda Strait (between Sumatra and
Java), and the Great Channel (between Nicobar Islands and Sumatra), which
connects the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. The others include the One and a Half
degree channel and the Eight degree channel (in the vicinity of the Maldives). In the
north west lies the Straits of Hormuz (the entrance of the Persian Gulf), the Bab el
Mandeb (between Saudi Arabia and Africa), the Straits of Tiran and Jubal and in the
west, the Mozambique Channel (between Madagascar and Africa). 2 More than
60,000 ships navigate through these waterways annually and the Strait of Hormuz is
one of the most strategic straits in the Indian Ocean as no other straits carry as much
tanker traffic. Almost sixty per cent of the global oil trade passes through the Straits
of Hormuz.3
The strategic attractiveness of the Indian Ocean was stated by Alfred Thayer
Mahan when he claimed that "Asia will belong to the power which will achieve
control over the Indian Ocean, and the future of the world will be decided in its
waters".4 Traditionally, the Indian Ocean was the main 'spice route' to the West that
was taken over and dominated by oil in the mid-twentieth century. Sixty per cent of
world's oil reserves are located in the Persian Gulf. The Indian Ocean coastal states
produce more that forty per cent of the world's off shore oil production. Over sixty
per cent of the oil consumed by Western Europe and ninety per cent by Japan is
supplied through the ocean by oil tankers. Over a quarter of the world's trade cargo
are handled in the ports in the Indian Ocean and more than 60,000 vessels traverse it
1 Philip M. Allen, Security and Nationalism in the Indian Ocean: Lessons from the Latin Quarter Islands, (Westview Press,
Boulder, 1987), p.7
2 Viv L. Forbes, "Of Sealanes, Straits and (Military) Services: Indian Ocean Region", The Indian Ocean Review, June, 1988,
pp. 12 - 13
i On the importance of the Strait of Hormuz, see Rouhullah K. Ramzani, "The Strait of Hormuz: The Global Choke Point " in
Larry Bowman and Ian Clark (eds), The Indian Ocean in global politics, (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1981), pp. 7 -
20
4 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, (Little, Brown, Boston, 1919)
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annually. While oil is the most important commodity located in the region there are
also other vital commodities produced in the region. More than sixty five per cent of
the earth's uranium are in the area and forty per cent of the gold reserves. 5
 South
Africa possesses much of the world's gold as well as platinum, manganese and
chromium. At the other end, Australia is the largest producer of bauxite; as well as
iron, lead, zinc and nickel. India has large reserves of iron ore, manganese and
titanium; with Malaysia being the world's largest producer of tin. The ocean is also
rich in fisheries resources. The Indian Ocean also contains large quantities of
manganese nodules, which also contain nickel, cobalt, copper and iron.
The Indian Ocean is also unique in the sense it is almost entirely made up of
developing countries apart from Australia and arguably South Africa. Some of these
states are developing fast and are under the category of newly industrialised
countries; for example Singapore and Malaysia. Some are rich on the basis of natural
resources, especially the oil-producing countries of the Middle East. Among the rest
are included some of the poorest countries of the world. Almost all share a history of
colonialism and almost all are independent today. The majority of the states claim
non-aligned status although some of them had established extremely cordial relations
with one or the other superpower.
The existence of a single Indian Ocean region in relation to security remains
a moot point. A region in security terms does not relate only to geographical
proximity but other elements such as the relationships among states, how their
friendship and rivalry affect their relationships, as well as their perceptions of each
other.6
 Although many have referred to the Indian Ocean region as a whole, the
singularity of the region exists only as far as geography goes. While almost all the
states share a colonial history, there are no common cultural links between the states;
rather different sub-regions exist which share cultural values and traditions,
5 N B K Reddy, "The emerging geopolitical patterns of the Indian Ocean region", in Alex Kerr (ed.) The Indian Ocean
region: resources and development, (University of Western Australia Press, 1981), p. 217;
See also Allen, Security and Nationalism in the Indian Ocean: Lessons from the Latin Quarter Islands
6 Buzan, People, States and Fear, p.188
88
institutions and levels of development. Besides, there are no economic ties among the
region as a whole. The lack of a regional grouping, especially among the SIDS in the
Indian Ocean, was recognised by the Commonwealth report on the vulnerability of
small states. The report notes that, "Given the vast distances separating Mauritius, the
Maldives and the Seychelles, they form a regional grouping only in a nominal
sense.. "2 Although it is generally agreed that the Indian Ocean is divided into
various sub-systems there is no consensus on the number of sub-systems located
within the Indian Ocean. A regional security subsystem has been defined as a system
whereby relationships of enmity and amity are confined to a specific geographical
area. 8 Although the Indian Ocean could be divided into numerous sub-systems based
on the above, most divide the Indian Ocean into five sub-systems. These regional
sub-systems forms security complexes on their own right. The five are the African
region, Middle East and the Persian Gulf, South Asia, South East Asia, and Australia
at the far eastern corner of the ocean. Each sub-region or security complex has
various separate elements affecting the security environment of that particular sub-
region. At the same time it is difficult to draw strict lines separating the sub-regions.
For example, the African region itself can be further sub-divided into north and
south sub-regions. Besides, influences in the ocean as a whole can and do effect all
parts of the ocean though not at the same level.
The African region comprises countries like South Africa and other coastal
states of East Africa, as well as island states of Madagascar, Comoros, Seychelles,
Mauritius and the French territories of Reunion and Mayotte. This sub-region is rich
in mineral resources such as gold, diamond, coal, nickel, chromium and uranium. It
controls the south east entrance to the region. At the northern end it also shares the
control of the entrance into the region from the Red Sea. The Middle East and the
Persian Gulf is an important sub-region. The importance of the Middle East and
Persian Gulf is immense to the rest of the Indian Ocean littorals as to the rest of the
7 Commonwealth Consultative Group, Vulnerability: Small States in a global society, p. 13
8 Barry Buzan, "A framework for regional security analysis", in Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizwi (eds) South Asian Insecurity
and the Great Powers, (The Macmillan Press Ltd., Hampshire, 1986), pp. 3 -36
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world. Their vast oil resources place them in an important position in the world that
cannot be over emphasised. At the same time this sub-region is extremely volatile
and has seen a number of wars in recent decades. The strategic importance of this
sub-region to the West was demonstrated by the reaction of the West to the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent war that followed. However, its relationship
with the rest of the Indian Ocean is somewhat different compared to some of the
other sub-systems. In this sense, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf sub-region can
be considered a separate region rather than a sub-region of the Indian Ocean and as
such will be considered so. The South Asian sub-region includes Bangladesh, India,
Maldives, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Some also include Myanmar in this sub-region.
Bangladesh, India and Pakistan together makes up for the two-thirds of the
population of the whole ocean. India occupies a pivotal position in the ocean and
with her resources and manpower, and by geographical location, occupies an
important position in the region. The South East Asian sub-region also has large
mineral resources such as tin, iron-ore and petroleum; and the existence of the
Malacca, Sunda and Lombok Straits at the entrance to the ocean from the Pacific
makes it a strategic location. The states of south-east Asia are now politically stable
compared to other sub-regions of the Indian Ocean and they form a regional
grouping, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) for mutual security
and defence. Australia is considered by some as the fifth sub-region of the Indian
Ocean although it has always been regarded as a Pacific country and is very much
so. However, in recent years Australia has projected a westward policy towards the
Indian Ocean and South East Asia. Australia has increased its involvement in the
affairs of the Indian Ocean and is a firm advocate of developing regional co-
operation among the Indian Ocean littorals.
The three case studies of this thesis, the Maldives, the Seychelles and
Mauritius, fall into two of those sub-regions; in the case of the Maldives it is South
Asia and in the case of the Seychelles and Mauritius it is the African region. Thus it
appears that where the IOS are concerned the security environment of the Indian
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Ocean has to be analysed giving importance to the sub-systems where the SIDS are
located rather than the whole Indian Ocean. Therefore, other areas will only be
touched upon briefly and where relevant to the security of the IOS.
Superpowers in the Indian Ocean
United States: The United States first sent a military task force into the Indian Ocean
in 1949 when it established the Middle East Force in the Persian Gulf
(MIDEASTFOR). However, the increase in the military presence of the United
States in the Indian Ocean in the 1960s has been predicated on the 'vacuum' theory. It
was based on the hypothesis that the British withdrawal of its forces from east of
Suez would create a power vacuum in the Indian Ocean and if it was not occupied by
a western power, the Soviet Union would do so.9 Besides, it had other vital stakes in
the region from economic motives to ensure freedom of the maritime routes, to
transport oil, etc. The US imports 77 per cent of its natural rubber, 28 per cent of its
manganese, and 80 per cent of its tin from the region. Besides, the Gulf region has
proved to be a valuable market for its products, especially military weapons.
The US military involvement in the Indian Ocean increased in three stages.
The first was in 1973 after the Yom Kippur War when a carrier task force was
dispatched to the Arabian Sea in November 1973. The second was at the end of the
1970s, after the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These
events led the United States to create a 60,000 strong Rapid Deployment Force. The
then US national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski declared in 1979,
"An arc of crisis stretches along the shores of the Indian Ocean, with fragile social
and political structures in a region of vital importance to us threatened with
fragmentation. The resulting political chaos could well be filled by elements hostile
to our values and sympathetic to our adversaries."10
9 For US strategy in the Indian Ocean see Rasul B Rais, "An appraisal of US strategy in the Indian Ocean", Asian Survey,
Vol. 23, No.9, September 1993, pp. 1043 - 1050
10 Time, January 15, 1979, p.4
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The Carter Doctrine emphasised the importance given by the US to the Indian Ocean,
especially the north-western littoral, the Persian Gulf. In 1980, President Carter
claimed that,
"An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be
regarded as an assault on the vital interest of the United States of America."11
The third was after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The US has concluded
military co-operation agreements with several of the Middle Eastern states such as
Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Qatar. The US also has a Joint
Task Force in the Middle East with forces in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 12 The United
States is also part of the Asia-Pacific group, including Australia, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand in the Indian Ocean littoral, that agreed in June
1993 to establish a new advisory regional body, the Council for Security Co-
operation. The Council would allow military experts to meet in private capacity to
draw up proposals on settling disputes and confidence building measures. 13 The
current American interest appears to be in the Middle East and South East Asia,
although its main military presence in the Indian Ocean is based on its military base
in Diego Garcia in the Chagos archipelago. Diego Garcia is a full-fledged military
base with a 12,000 foot runway, a deep water port facility and storage facilities for
fuel, oil and weapons. 14 Diego Garcia is at a strategic location in the centre of the
Indian Ocean; yet away from international straits. Besides, the fact that the
indigenous population of the archipelago has been totally removed makes it easy for
the United States to maintain it. It is also outside the 'cyclone belt'. Apart from Diego
Garcia, the US has naval access to ports in Kenya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Oman,
Bahrain, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Singapore and Australia. The presence of the
US forces in the Indian Ocean as well as the Soviet Union sparked off a desire by the
11 Carter's State of the Union Address, 1980, Time, 4 February, 1980, pp. 9 - 10
12 The Military Balance, 1993-1994, Brassey's (UK) Ltd. for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1993,
p.28
13 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, June 1993, pp. 39516
14 Admiral M P Awati, "The geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the Islands", in S Chandra, B Arunachalam, S V
Suryanarayan (eds) The Indian Ocean and its islands: Strategic, Scientific and Historical Perspectives, (Sage, New Delhi,
1993);See also Brojendra Nath Banerjee, Indian Ocean - A Whirlpool of Unrest, (Paribus Publishing Distributors, New Delhi,
1984), pp. 215- 227
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Indian Ocean littorals to remove them from the Indian Ocean as is discussed later in
the chapter.
Soviet Union/Russia: By virtue of its geography, the Soviet Union had a lot of
interest in the Indian Ocean. It was a link between the Western Soviet Union to the
Eastern Soviet Union by water and provided an alternate route of transportation of
commodities between the two regions. It had an interest in the ocean to protect its
maritime communication routes. It also had interest in assisting friendly regimes
among the Indian Ocean littorals. However, it was a late entrant into the region and
Soviet naval power was not substantially deployed in the region until the late 1960s.
The Soviets maintained a continuing presence in the Indian Ocean from 1968. In
1968, a Soviet flotilla visited ports in India, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Somalia and South
Yemen and the naval build-up in the Indian Ocean began. The main Soviet strategy
in the Indian Ocean appeared to be defensive against the American SSBN's and to
counter Chinese influence in the region; while assisting friendly regimes and to
increase Soviet political influence in the littoral states. 15 Even before its major naval
presence in the ocean it has made contacts with the Arab world. It had also developed
relations with several other states in the region such as Afghanistan, India, Sudan,
and Somalia. The Soviet Union had access to port facilities in Ethiopia, India, Sri
Lanka, South Yemen, North Yemen, Mozambique, Madagascar, the Andaman
Islands and Djibouti; and tracking and communications facilities in Asmara
(Ethiopia) and Socotra Island.
The Soviet Union's main ally in the South Asian region was India. Fear of a
common adversary, China, brought the two together and in 1971 the Soviet-Indian
Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed. In the western Indian Ocean, the Soviets
were close to Somalia initially, and was forced into the Ethiopian-Somali wars until,
under a major shift in policy, the Soviets withdrew from Somalia in 1977 and started
15 Geoffery Jukes, "Soviet naval policy in the Indian Ocean", in Bowman and Clark (eds), The Indian Ocean in global
politics, pp. 173-187; see also Walter K Anderson, "Soviets in the Indian Ocean: Much ado about Something - but what?",
Asian Survey, Vol. 24, No. 9, September 1984, pp. 910 - 930
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to extend military aid to Ethiopia in 1978. They also provided aid to liberation
movements in Africa such as the South West Africa Peoples' Organisation (SWAPO)
and the African National Congress in South Africa. The Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan in 1979 proved its interest in the region. In Afghanistan, the Soviet
forces were only about four hundred miles from the oil resources of the Gulf.
Although it has not involved itself directly in any crises, apart from Afghanistan, its
role in the major sub-regional crises such as the Indo-Pakistani war in 1971, had
demonstrated its desire to increase its influence in the region. The Soviet Union
approached the Maldives in 1977 to lease-out the former British base at Gan island.
Gan, which is just over 400 kilometres north of the US base in Diego Garcia, could
have become an equivalent of the American base. The Soviets also maintained good
relations with the Seychelles. Military assistance in the from of arms and training
was provided and Soviet advisers were sent to the Seychelles. The Seychelles took
a relatively tolerant approach to the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
Soviet relations with Mauritius were less extensive. Although an agreement was
signed between Mauritius and the Soviet Union providing facilities for the Soviet
fishing fleet, and several scholarships were offered in Soviet universities, its
relationship was never as cordial as that with the Seychelles.
The Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (IOZP) 
The presence of superpowers in the ocean was not officially welcomed by the
majority of the states in the Indian Ocean, including the IOS, and they pressed for the
implementation of the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace process. The IOZP concept was
proposed at the height of the Cold War and was mainly aimed at the removal of the
military power of the non-littoral states from the Indian Ocean. The concept was first
proposed at the 1970 Non-aligned meeting at Lusaka and was later introduced at the
UN. The original proposal by Sri Lanka was aimed at removing all forces from the
ocean, both littoral and outside. However, it was revised and the IOZP resolution of
1971 was based on the elimination "from the Indian Ocean of all bases, military
installation, logistical support facilities, disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons
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of mass destruction, and any military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the
context of great power rivalry". 16
 Its main aim was the withdrawal of the
superpowers from the Indian Ocean. Although it was first rejected by the US and the
Soviet Union, the Soviet Union later on supported the resolution. The basis for this
may have been that the resolution called for the withdrawal of the naval forces and
bases from the Ocean and that mostly affects the United States, especially after the
Soviet Union was expelled from Berbera in Somalia. From 1977 to 1979, it appeared
that the United States was willing to go along with it. President Carter announced in
March 1977 that the United States had proposed to the Soviets that the Indian Ocean
should be "completely demilitarised". 17 However, this approach was reversed when
he told the United Nations that, "We will seek.. to establish Soviet willingness to
each agreement with us on mutual military restraint in the Indian Ocean. 18 This was
most likely due to the fact that the Soviets had lost their facilities in Berbera and
therefore the US had an advantage in maintaining the status quo in the Indian Ocean.
However, even from the beginning the IOZP concept was flawed for several reasons.
Firstly, the withdrawal of a military presence by the US and the Soviet Union would
not have automatically made the Indian Ocean into a peace zone because, while the
presence of the superpowers did cause a certain amount of tension, it was problems
among the Indian Ocean littoral states that caused instability in the region. Secondly,
the IOZP concept was based mainly on the removal of naval deployments and it does
not take into consideration the military contacts the superpowers had with the
littorals. Thus, even if naval deployment was withdrawn, the superpowers still could
have had enormous influence in the region through their allies. Besides, it is a much
more effective way for the superpowers to support their allies in the region by
supplying them with arms and 'advisers' rather than involve their naval forces.
Thirdly, the Indian Ocean littorals themselves are divided over the application of the
17 Quoted in Philip Towle, "The United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean:Blind Alley or Zone of Peace", in
Bowman and Clark (eds), The Indian Ocean in global politics. ,p 208
18 Ibid.
16 UN General Assembly Resolution 2832 (XXVI), 12 December 1971. For the IOZP resolution see Appendix B
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concept. Many had alliances with one or the other superpowers although claiming
non-aligned status. Thus, they did not want to antagonise their allies.19
Although the IOS supported the IOZP, they also maintained a traditional
balance of power strategy between the superpowers. The Maldives did face some
pressure from the Soviet Union, especially in 1977 when the Soviets wanted the
Maldives to lease them the former British base at Gan. The Maldives supported the
IOZP resolution and often called for the withdrawal of the naval forces of outside
powers from the Indian Ocean. Besides, the Maldives has excellent relations with the
US and it is unlikely to view the US presence at Diego Garcia as a threat to the state
or a destabilising factor in the region. In fact, when the Maldives faced a mercenary
attack in 1988, it appealed to the United States for help from the US forces in Diego
Garcia. The US is also one of the main trading partners of the Maldives next to
Britain. The Seychelles when it was a socialist state, maintained close contact with
the Soviet Union, but it also had good relation with the US. The US has a satellite
tracking station in Seychelles that provides them with much-needed income.
Mauritius also supported the IOZP, although somewhat reluctantly, as it enjoyed
good relations with both superpowers. However, it also created a certain amount of
difficulty for Mauritius as the main US presence in the Indian Ocean was at Diego
Garcia, which was ceded to the British by the consent of the then Mauritian
government. The Chagos was part of Mauritius but was dismembered to form the
British Indian Ocean Territory with the islands of Aldabra, Farquhar and the
Desroches. The latter three were returned to the Seychelles at the time of its
independence but Chagos was made available to the United States on lease for a
period of fifty years in 1966. Although this was done with the collaboration of the
then government of Mauritius, in recent years Mauritius has pressed for the return of
the Chagos to Mauritian sovereignty. This issue has been supported by India, the
OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement suggesting that the recent claims to return the
19 On the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace proposals, see George W. Shepherd Jr., 'Demilitarisation Proposals in the Indian
Ocean", in Bowman and Clark (eds), The Indian Ocean in global politics, pp. 223-247; also B.Vivekanandan, "The Indian
Ocean as a Zone of Peace: Problems and Prospects", in Asian Survey, Vol.21, No.12, December 1981, pp. 1237-1249
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Chagos may be due to a certain extent to pressure from these countries. The Prime
Minister claimed in 1988, "We maintain our claim over Diego Garcia and will use all
diplomatic possibilities to have the island and surrounding archipelago handed over
to Mauritius". 2° Their anger appeared to be more rhetorical and confined to
international gatherings and their grievances are directed more towards Britain than
the United States. This seems likely to continue in the future. In 1992, Mauritius
joined the United States' military training programme, International Military and
Educational Training (IMET), after a hesitation of four years.21
Other powers in the Indian Ocean 
There are several middle powers operating in the Indian Ocean, some of
whom are Indian Ocean coastal states and some who are user states. Among the
important powers are India, Pakistan, South Africa and to a lesser extent Australia.
Among the external powers are France and to a lesser extent Britain.
India: With over a population of 846,302,688 and a land area of 3,165,596 square
kilometres, plus a geography in which the sub-continent juts out into the Indian
Ocean with a coastline 7,693 km long, India is clearly an Indian Ocean power. In
recent years it has become a high profile operator in the Indian Ocean, especially in
the South Asian sub-system. India's strategic interest in the region lies in the vital
security interest the ocean provides for India. India's maritime interest in the ocean
can be categorised as: the desire to maintain freedom of transportation for its
maritime trade; the protection of its island territories; assisting friendly regimes;
force projection; the denial of the sea to its enemies; and to a lesser extent the
exploitation of marine resources.22 Its geographical position allows it to control four
main waterways. However, Indian interest in the Indian Ocean did not materialise
substantially until the British withdrawal from the region, even though in the past
20 Cited in Larry Bowman, Mauritius: Democracy and Development in the Indian Ocean, (Westview press, Boulder, 1991)
p.160
21 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 15 February 1992, p. 3
22 Rear-Admiral Kailash K. Kohli, "India's Maritime and Geo Strategic Interests in the Indian Ocean", in S Chandra et al
(eds) The Indian Ocean and its islands: Strategic, Scientific and Historical Perspectives, p. 66
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leaders of India had commented on the vital security interest that the ocean provides
for India.
Although India may have desired to play a more prominent role in the Indian
Ocean its ability to do so was restricted by the presence of superpowers in the
region.23
 However, India sought to increase its strength in the Indian Ocean slowly by
two strategies. One was to increase its military capability in the region. The other
was to seek ways to reduce the superpower involvement in the region, especially that
of the United States, by supporting the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace resolution. The
end of the superpower rivalry in the region has given India the space it had so
intensely wanted to enhance itself as a regional superpower.
In recent times India's growing military strength, especially the attempts to
develop a 'blue water' fleet, has caused concern among the neighbouring states. With
naval bases in Bombay, Goa, Cochin, Visakapatnam, Tuticorin, Port Blair in the
Andamans, and Karwar, India has strong naval capabilities in the region. It has the
largest navy among the littorals of the Indian Ocean and the seventh largest in the
world. When India last went to war with Pakistan, in 1971, it had four submarines. It
now has more than nineteen. A nuclear powered submarine was acquired on lease
from the Soviet Union which has now been returned. The editor of Jane's Fighting
Ships stated that, "There is no question in any body's mind that India wishes to
dominate the region. That in itself explains the size of navy that India has built up."24
India's strengthening of its military base in Port Blair and the fortification of the
Nicobar islands near the entrance of the Malacca Straits has worried the states of the
South East Asia, especially Indonesia, which is just 80 km away from the islands at
the nearest point.
23 See G.V.C. Naidu, The Indian Navy and South East Asia", in Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.13, No.1, June 1991, pp.
72 - 85; Ashley J Tellis, "The naval balance in the Indian Subcontinent: Demanding missions for the Indian Navy", Asia
Survey, Vol.24, No.12, December 1985, pp. 1187 -1213; Robert Bruce (ed.) The Modern Indian Navy and the Indian Ocean:
Developments and Implications, (Centre for Indian Ocean Regional Studies, Curtin University of Technology, 1989)
24 Qouted in The Indian Ocean Review, 23 March 1989
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The current security situation assists regional powers such as India to take a
more dominant role in the region without being constrained by the superpowers.
India has intervened in three regional crises. The first was its involvement in
Bangladesh in 1971. The other two were during the 1980s when India sent a peace-
keeping force to Sri Lanka to assist in the quelling of the Tamil separatists. Because
of its own large Tamil population in the south (Tamil Nadu) India was a keen
observer of the militant Tamil separatist movement in Sri Lanka. Several allegations
had been made of the Indian (Tamils) assistance given to the Tamils in Sri Lanka. In
1987 India intervened formally when invited by the then Sri Lankan President J. R.
Jayawardene and the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was signed which allowed India to
station troops in Sri Lanka to assist the Sri Lankan government in its attempt to halt
the Tamils. It also provided India with the guarantee that the Sri Lankan base of
Trincomalee will not be given to any other states in a manner prejudicial to Indian
interests.25 However, the mission was not a success and the Indian Peace Keeping
Force (IPKF) faced a lot of hardship, including the loss of several of its members in
the sectarian violence. Although Indian forces eventually withdrew from Sri Lanka, it
has not resulted in the cessation of the Tamil insurgency. India's intervention in the
Maldives in 1988, when a group of Tamil mercenaries attempted to overthrow the
government, was much more successful. India's use of its military power in Sri Lanka
and the Maldives has demonstrated India's capability and, more so, its willingness to
use its military muscle.
India's relationship with Seychelles and Mauritius has remained close due to
a common colonial heritage as well as the presence of a large number of Indian
immigrants in these countries.26 Mauritius is one of the few countries apart from
India that has a majority of people of Indian origin. India provides considerable aid
which has continued to increase over the years. India has also provided a security
advisor to Mauritius following two assassination attempts against Prime Minister
25 Jerrold Elkin, "India" , in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti (eds), The Defense Policies of Nations: A comparative
study, 3rd edition, (The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1994), p. 466
26 Dieter Braun, "New Pattern of India's relationship with the Indian Ocean Littoral States" in Bowman and Clark (eds), The
Indian Ocean in global politics, pp. 21-39
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Jugnauth in 1988 and 1989. 27 After Indian intervention in Sri Lanka and the
Maldives, it seems highly likely that India will not hesitate to provide military
assistance of a similar nature to Mauritius which is closer to the sub-continent by
cultural affiliation than the other two states. India has also provided military
assistance to the Seychelles and helps in the training of the Seychellois armed forces.
President Rene has been quoted as saying that Seychelles would welcome Indian
intervention in the event of any future coup attempts against his regime. 28 For the
IOS, India remains a close ally as long as they are willing to accept India's role as a
regional superpower. India has given substantial assistance to these countries and is
likely to continue doing so. Although India's growing military strength has caused
concern among the neighbouring states, India has long term economic security
interests in the region and therefore they may be misreading India's real intentions.
Furthemore, the question is with its economic and financial problems can India
sustain its military development?
Pakistan: Next to India, Pakistan with a population of 112,050,000 and a land area of
803,940 square kilometres, is the power to reckon with in South Asia. Bordering
Iran, Afghanistan, China and India, Pakistan separates South Asia from the Persian
Gulf. Pakistan's proximity to the Middle East, especially the Gulf, made Pakistan into
a useful ally of the west, especially the United States, in its attempt to contain
communism and protect its oil supplies in the Middle East. Pakistan has thus always
relied upon the United States for its military security and assistance. Pakistan joined
the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954 and later the Central
Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in 1959. These alliances helped Pakistan to achieve a
reasonable degree of security, although it did not totally free her of her fear of
neighbouring India. The US interest in Pakistan was mainly to do with the defence of
US interest in the Middle East, as the then Assistant Secretary of State, George
28 Quoted in P.K.S. Namboodiri, "India and the Indian Ocean Islands: Case for a Security Framework", in Akhtar Majeed
(ed), Indian Ocean: Conflict and Regional Co-operation, (ABC Publishing House, New Delhi, 1986), p. 103
27 See Bowman, Mauritius: Democracy and Development in the Indian Ocean, pp. 107-108
100
McGhee, stated in 1951, "With Pakistan, the Middle East could be defended;
without Pakistan, I don't see any way to defend the Middle East".29
However, at the end of the Cold War, its relationship with the United States
has somewhat diminished, with Pakistan no longer being the useful ally it once was.
Pakistan plays second fiddle to India in the Indian Ocean. While it has close contacts
with the states of the Arab world in the west and China in the east, it does not have
the capabilities to dominate the region the way India does. The main cause for
instability in South Asia is the continuing rivalry between India and Pakistan; which
has resulted in continuing military build-up between the two states. Pakistan has
always been concerned about the military strength of India and, in 1978, at the UN
Special Session on Disarmament, proposed that the states of the Indian Ocean should
agree on measures, "such as a commitment to settle outstanding disputes by peaceful
means, the renunciation of nuclear weapons and the maintenance of a reasonable
military balance amongst themselves, in order to promote the conditions of security
within the Indian Ocean region". 30 The growing strength of the Indian military
forces, especially its naval forces, is a major cause for concern for Pakistan.
Pakistan's navy is small compared to that of India's and its choices of naval bases are
limited, (the main naval bases are at Karachi and Gwader), and without any aircraft
carriers it is certainly vulnerable to any threats from India. The recent signing of an
agreement between India and its other traditional adversary, China, in which both
sides agreed to renounce the use of force and to reduce troops at the borders to a
minimum, has also alarmed Pakistan. This will result in India having more forces
available to deploy in Kashmir. 31 For Pakistan, China is the only regional power that
could contain the dominance of India and cordial relations between India and China
will not be welcomed. The intractable problem of Kashmir still remains the major
thorn between the two countries and a future war will certainly endanger the security
29 Quoted in Anita Inder-Singh, "The Superpower Global Complex and South Asia", in Buzan and Rizwi (eds) South Aisan
Insecurity and the Great Powers, p. 210
313 Quoted in Philip Towle "The United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean:Blind Alley or Zone of Peace", in
Bowman and Clark (eds), The Indian Ocean in global politics, p.210
31 See Shekar Gupta, "Sino-Indian Relations: Vital Breakthrough", India Today, 30 September 1993, pp. 22 - 26
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environment of the ocean, especially that of South Asia. For a state like the
Maldives, which is close to Pakistan due to religious affiliation yet has closer ties
with India on military and technological grounds, it is important that the status quo is
maintained as any future war will make it rather difficult to maintain the delicate
balance it has at the moment. Although Pakistan has maintained ties to the IOS due
to Islamic minorities on these islands, its relationship is only second to that of India's.
Seychelles sells the bulk of its copra to Pakistan but India is a closer ally. The same
goes for Mauritius. Even the Maldives tilts slightly towards India despite the
religious affiliations with Pakistan. In all the three IOS Pakistan's relationship is
limited and India has a considerable stronghold.
South Africa: South Africa occupies a strategic position in the western Indian Ocean
and plays an important role in the regional politics of the western Indian Ocean.
With a population of 35,282,000 and a land area of 1,184,825 square kilometres and
abundant in such natural resources as diamonds, gold, platinum, silver, uranium,
copper, manganese and asbestos, and nearly 80% per cent of Africa's coal reserves, it
is a formidable power among the smaller states of the western Indian Ocean. Its
proximity to the Cape of Good Hope route which carries over 60% per cent and 20%
of Western Europe and the United States' oil supplies respectively, along with a naval
force of 4,500 and bases in Simonstown and Durban, gives South Africa a
commanding position in the south western Indian Ocean.
South Africa's relationships with the IOS, especially the Seychelles and
Mauritius, have always been, at best, precarious. On the one hand, these countries
joined the rest of the world in the universal rhetoric of condemning apartheid, and
for its part South Africa interfered in their domestic politics. During the height of
South Africa's isolation by the international community, South Africa sought to flex
its power on its small, helpless, neighbours. Its involvement in the numerous
destabilisation programmes in the region includes the sponsorship of mercenaries to
overthrow some of the governments in these countries. The 1981 mercenary-led coup
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against President Albert Rene of Seychelles was sponsored by South Africa and
several of the mercenaries were from South African special forces. South Africa was
also involved in the Comoros and the mercenaries in Comoros led by Col. Bob
Denard received financial and political support. South Africa also influenced these
states by its domination of their markets and tourism. The SIDS of the western Indian
Ocean came to accept the dominant role of South Africa, although somewhat
grudgingly. The Seychelles and South Africa came to an agreement on the problems
of the mercenaries in 1982 and six mercenaries captured by the Seychelles were
returned to South Africa in return for compensation. It has been claimed that the
agreement also had a secret clause in which South Africa agreed to prevent further
coup attempts being organised from South African soil and guaranteed the external
security of the government of Albert Rene. 32
 Mauritius also maintained a dual policy
against South Africa. On the one hand, it joined the rest of the African states in
condemning apartheid but on the other hand, it had close economic contact with
South Africa. South African investments in Mauritian tourism give South Africa a
stake in the Mauritian economy and despite the pressures faced by Mauritius from
the OAU, South African products found their way into the Mauritian markets.
Although South Africa's 'political adventures' in Mauritius were limited compared to
its involvement in the Comoros and the Seychelles, the South African connection led
to tension and unease among the political leaders, especially between those who
supported the severing of ties with South Africa due to its policy of apartheid and
those who wanted to maintain contacts for economic reasons in spite of apartheid.
Due to geographical distances, South African involvement in the Maldives has been
non-existent.
France: The western Indian Ocean - A French Lake?: France is the last of the
European powers to maintain a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean. France is an
Indian Ocean power, especially in the western Indian Ocean, by virtue of territorial
possessions. The island of Reunion is a Departement of France and Mayotte, part of
32 Africa Confidential, Vol.28, No.22, 4 November 1987, pp. 4 - 5
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the Comoros archipelago, is administered by the French. The French connection in
the Indian Ocean cannot be examined in isolation from the historical background of
the IOS in the western Indian Ocean and of French policies elsewhere. Both the
Seychelles and Mauritius were created by colonialism. There were no indigenous
people on these islands before the arrival of the Europeans and the Creole societies
typical of the islands were created as a result of colonialism. The French took over
Reunion, moving from there into Mauritius in 1715 and the Seychelles in 1770. The
British acquired the islands in 1809-10 although Reunion was returned to France in
1815. The British presence in the islands was never as penetrative as the French, with
the result that French culture persisted and Creole (a language derived from French)
is still spoken. While the British gave independence to the Seychelles and Mauritius,
the French territory of Reunion was made a Departement of France in 1946 and
decolonisation was achieved by integration with France; with the Reunionais voting
to remain French. The French also gave independence to Comoros which had come
under French rule, but retained the island of Mayotte.
Today, France maintains a military presence in both Reunion and Mayotte,
and there are also French bases in Crozet, Kerguelen and Amsterdam Islands to the
south of the Indian Ocean. 33
 The bulk of the French military forces are stationed in
Djibouti. Djibouti is situated on the Strait of Bab el Mandeb and, therefore, presents
a convenient watch post to the Suez Canal. France has assisted Mauritius both
politically and economically and was especially influential in helping Mauritius to
become the first of the Commonwealth states to benefit from the Yaounde
Convention of the European Common Market. France also assists Mauritius in their
textile and tourism industries. Seychelles, too, gets a lot of French attention in the
form of soft loans and grants for its development. A tuna canning factory was
established in the Seychelles in 1990 with French assistance. The French influence in
the Indian Ocean, especially the western Indian Ocean, has officially been explained
as necessary to protect its shipping trade, especially the oil traffic. France is heavily
33 N B K Reddy, "The emerging geopolitical patterns of the Indian Ocean region", in Alex Kerr (ed.) The Indian Ocean
region: resources and development, (University of Western Australia Press, 1981), p. 234
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dependent on foreign sources for its energy supplies and to a certain extent this
justifies its presence in this area. France also has had close commercial ties with
South Africa. Another reason for French policy in this part of the Indian Ocean may
be in the defence of the French language; Jean Houbert claims that the language
factor is "a particularly significant aspect of the French presence" in these states.34
Houbert 's claim is valid to a certain extent as France maintains close cultural ties
with these islands; and French television is telecasted via satellite and France assists
in arts and entertainment in these SIDS, including the financing of the Indian Ocean
Island Games. In October 1993, a French language summit was also held in
Mauritius. 35
 The entrance of Reunion to the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) in
1985, (set up in 1982 as a forum to discuss and co-ordinate policies in the region by
Mauritius, Seychelles and Madagascar) has enabled France to integrate herself into
the community of Indian Ocean states. (Comoros was also admitted to the IOC in
1985.)
In spite of the cosy relationship France appears to enjoy with the SIDS of the
western Indian Ocean, France has to maintain a delicate balance. While the SIDS of
the western Indian Ocean welcome French assistance, there are certain areas which
have led to problems in the past and appear to continue even today. One is the French
control of Mayotte, a part of the Comoran archipelago. Mayotte is strategically
placed in the Mozambique Channel. When independence was granted to the
Comoros, Mayotte opted to remain under French rule. This issue of decolonisation
has created a certain embarrassment for the French. The OAU has continuously
accused the French of imperialism and OAU recommendations have repeatedly
called for the return of Mayotte to Comoros. Although the Comoros is willing to let
this issue remain thus far as only rhetoric, probably due to its heavy dependence on
France, it has, nevertheless, caused difficulties with the neighbouring African states.
34 Jean Houbert, "The mascareignes, Seychelles and the Chagos, Islands with a French Connection: Security in the
decolonised Indian Ocean", in Hintjens and Newitt (eds), The Political Economy of Small Tropical Islands, p. 106; On French
policy in the Indian Ocean see also Jean-Pierre Gomane, "France and the Indian Ocean", in Bowman and Clark (eds), The
Indian Ocean in global politics
35 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 14, November 1992, p. 3
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This is exacerbated by the existence of Reunion as a Departement of France, thus
allowing France a permanent place in the Indian Ocean. France claims that Reunion
has been decolonised. However, the opposite view has been taken by the OAU,
although the French position has never been challenged in the UN. Madagascar has
also claimed the French islet of Tromelin which is also claimed by Mauritius. In
recent times, Madagascar has relinquished its claim in favour of Mauritius.
Mauritius is careful not to let the claim for Tromelin get out of hand and the matter is
being pursued cordially. Even in the Seychelles, the relationship has had its ups and
_
downs. In the early 1980s France was accused of assisting the coup-attempts to
overthrow President Albert Rene and French naval advisers were ordered to leave.36
However, relations have since improved. Reunion, itself has caused problems for the
French. About half the population is of Tamil origins and there are growing problems
that have led some Tamils to associate themselves more closely with their Asian
origins than France.
Under the new Law of the Sea Convention, France now has sovereignty over
300 million square miles of EEZ in the Indian Ocean. It is unlikely that the French
interest in these parts will diminish. Although the French presence is mainly in the
western Indian Ocean, France also maintains good relations with the Maldives and
the French navy makes occasional port visits to Male. Military assistance to the
Maldives is also provided, although not to the extent of that of the SIDS off the coast
of Reunion. Although the French presence in the western Indian ocean is sometimes
seen as an anachronism, the French presence in the region is welcomed by the SIDS
as much for the economic advantages as for their close cultural affiliations.
Australia: Until recently Australia was more a Pacific nation than an Indian Ocean
state. However, by virtue of its geography, Australia cannot ignore the Indian Ocean.
A third of its coastline faces the ocean and around 50% of its overseas trade is
through the Indian Ocean. 37
 However, its traditional association with the region was
36 Africa Confidential, Vol.21, No.13, 18 June 1980, p.3
37 Henry S Albinski," Australia and the Indian Ocean", in Bowman and Clark (eds), The Indian Ocean in global politics
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limited. Until 1988, Australia had maintained an air base at Butterworth in the
Malayan Peninsula, which is now controlled by the Malaysian air force. Australia
considered itself a two ocean country during the 1980s. Australia has several off-
shore territories in the Indian Ocean, Cocos and Christmas Islands being the most
significant. The other offshore territories include Heard and MacDonald Island and
Asmore and Cartier Islands in the Timor Sea. In recent years, Australia has increased
its relations with other Indian Ocean countries. In June 1995, an International Forum
on the Indian Ocean Region was held in Perth with delegates from 23 countries and
the Australian government is to assist the setting up of an Indian Ocean Centre in
Perth with an allocation of A$ 250,000 for 1995. 38 Australia has also increased its aid
programme to the Indian Ocean SIDS. Australian aid to Mauritius increased from
around A$600,000 in the 1970s to around 2.5 million in the 1980s. 39 Approximately
40,000 Mauritians have emigrated to Australia which helps to maintain contact
between the two countries. Australia also assists the Maldives, especially in
developmental programmes.
Britain: Until the late 1960s, the Indian Ocean was, to use the well-worn out phrase,
a British lake. Britain has monopolised the region for more than one hundred and
fifty years. The Maldives was a British protectorate until 1965, and the Seychelles
and Mauritius were colonies until independence in 1976 and 1968 respectively. The
British legacy in the Indian Ocean has had serious implications for the security of the
islands. The British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) was set up in 1965 comprising
the islands of Aldabra, Farquhar, Desroches (parts of the Seychelles) and the Chagos
archipelago, which was administered by Mauritius. Although the islands of Aldabra,
Farquhar and Desroches were later returned to the Seychelles, the Chagos was leased
to the United States to establish a military base. However, in 1968, following its
decision to withdraw from East of Suez, the British left the ocean, creating a power
vacuum almost overnight. The British role in the region is somewhat limited today. It
does not have any dependencies in the region and although the Chagos is part of the
39 Bowman, Mauritius: Democracy and Development in the Indian Ocean, p.147
38 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 15 July 1995, p. 2
107
BIOT it is the United States who mainly controls the islands. The renewal of the
Mauritian claim on the Chagos did result in Britain freezing aid to Mauritius.
However, relations have improved since. Although relations between the Maldives
and Britain were rather limited after the British withdrawal from Gan, in recent years
cordial relations have been established between the two countries. Britain is the main
trading partner for the Maldives and Britain has helped in the training of the
Maldivian security forces. Britain also assisted in training the coast guard of the
Seychelles. Britain still has substantial interests in the region broadly defined,
,
especially in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf as well as South East Asia.
Militarily, Britain appears to be prepared to let the United States carry out the role of
policing the region. In Diego Garcia, there is a naval group and one marine
detachment and in the Indian Ocean there is one armilla patrol and one support ship.
Britain also has troops (150) in Saudi Arabia.
Regional Organisations 
There is a lack of regional unity among the IOS, especially between the
Maldives and the three western Indian Ocean SIDS, the Comoros, Mauritius and the
Seychelles. There is no regional grouping comparable to the South Pacific Forum
established by the states of the South Pacific or the Organisation of Eastern
Caribbean States in the Caribbean. The closest they have come to a regional approach
is to support the IOZP resolution. This may be due as much to the vast distances that
exists between the Maldives and the three SIDS of the western Indian Ocean as to the
lack of common cultural, ethnic and economic ties. Besides, the Indian Ocean states
in South Asia and those in the Western Indian Ocean have created organisations in
their respective sub-regions to further regional co-operation although, as yet, none of
these have taken the form of a security relationship between the states. In South
Asia, the South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation (SAARC) was
established in 1985 by Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri
Lanka. The SAARC was set up to improve regional co-operation, especially on
economic issues, and the primary aim is to target regional problems of
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underdevelopment, poverty, illiteracy and so on. However, the clear mistrust and
reservations among the member states about each other's activities was reflected in
the inaugural meeting when the then President of Sri Lanka, J. R. Jayawardene called
upon India to "create among the South Asian states, by deed and words, the
confidence so necessary to make a beginning". 40 For India's part, the then Prime
Minister, the late Rajiv Gandhi stated that the states of South Asia, "had not sought to
melt their bilateral relationships into a common regional identity, rather to fit South
Asian co-operation into their respective foreign policies as an additional
dimensions". 41 The fact that SAARC has agreed to remove bilateral problems from
its agenda has also meant that the major conflicts in the region, such as the Kashmir
issue, is outside the SAARC framework thus making it difficult for SAARC to
expand its scope to include traditional security issues. The mutual distrust between
India and Pakistan, and the fear by other states of Indian dominance, has prevented
regional security issues from appearing on the SAARC agenda. Thus a collective
SAARC defence agreement remains unlikely in the immediate future. The problem
for a SIDS like the Maldives is that although the country is on equal footing as other
members in SAARC there are other ways that the larger powers could exert pressure
on the Maldives to follow their own agendas.
The SIDS of the western Indian Ocean, for their part, established the Indian
Ocean Commission in 1982 to bolster regional co-operation. The IOC includes
Mauritius, Seychelles and Madagascar, and membership was later extended to
Reunion and Comoros. With some assistance from the European Development Fund,
most of its activities are concentrated in the fields of tuna fisheries, transportation
and navigation, as well as tourism. 42 The influence in the region of India was
exposed when the then Mauritian Minister for Industry, Cassam Uteem, invited India
to join the Indian Ocean Commission. However, this move was not welcomed by the
French, especially when they were not consulted and they were supposed to have
40 Address by J. R. Jayawardene, President of Sri Lanka, at the first SAARC summit, Dakha, Bangladesh, December 1985
42 See Allen, Security and Nationalism in the Indian Ocean: Lessons from the Latin Quarter Islands, pp. 190-191
41 Address by Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, at the first SAARC summit at Dhaka, Bangladesh, December 1985
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considered it "out of order". 43
 While there has been no regional unity between the
SIDS of the western Indian Ocean and the Maldives, attempts are being made to
create some sort of a relationship. The Maldives was invited to the Indian Ocean
Island Games first organised by the French in Reunion.
Current Trends
The Indian Ocean in its widest sense was and still is a region of potential
turmoil. The majority of the states are still engaged in either domestic instabilities or
problems with neighbouring countries. Instability in the Indian Ocean is an
indigenous problem. It has been caused more by the Indian Ocean littoral than due to
conflict and rivalry between the superpowers. In South Asia, India and Pakistan have
gone to war three times. In Sri Lanka, a separatist guerrilla war is still continuing
without any sign of a peaceful settlement. Afghanistan is full of domestic instability.
Iran and Iraq had fought a bloody war for more than eight years. The recent Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait shows the danger of over militarisation of one country in respect
of the others in the region. In the African states, both Somalia and Ethiopia are
ravaged by war. In the western Indian Ocean, South Africa's return to democracy
with the election of an ANC government appears to have offered stability, at least for
the time being. For the IOS, their immediate security environment remains
precarious and they have to maintain a delicate balance among the regional powers.
This, however, is no novelty and the IOS are not new to this balancing act.
In the previous years, it was claimed that the security environment of the
Indian Ocean was dominated by superpower rivalry. The Indian Ocean was claimed
to be a theatre of superpower conflict and the IOS have maintained a balancing act
between the superpowers. However, the situation is somewhat changing. The end of
the Cold War, and the diminished interest in the region by Russia, has given the
regional powers such as India a vacuum to fill. Although the American presence in
the Indian Ocean still exists and they are by far the largest and most powerful state
43 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 15 February 1992, p. 3
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militarily in the Indian Ocean vis-à-vis Diego Garcia, the military build-up of the
littoral states could drastically change the security environment of the whole Indian
Ocean and not just their own sub-systems. Instead of the two superpowers, with their
more or less opposed but clear-cut ideologies and demands, the regional powers'
demands and desires are less open and less clear, making it difficult for the IOS to
carry out their old balance of power policies. It has also resulted in more regional
powers taking a closer interest in the ocean than they have done before. For example,
the build-up of Indian military strength in the Indian Ocean has caused concern not
just among the states in South Asia but also those of South East Asia. They, in turn,
have attempted to increase their military strength. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore
have all started to modernise their naval power, and Indonesia is also seeking to build
a naval base on the coast of Sumatra." This trend may continue as long as India's
future intentions remain unclear and India fails to reassure other regional powers that
its military build-up does not have any hegemonial intent. India's willingness to
intervene in regional states has underlined India's perceived role as the dominant
power in the region. For SIDS such as the Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius, as
long as they are willing to accept this role of India as a regional superpower, India
may not interfere in these states unless asked to do so. Yet any future crises
involving India could have serious effects on the IOS, especially the Maldives, as
unlike the Seychelles and Mauritius, the Maldives is clearly in India's immediate
sphere of interest. The Maldives has to maintain a delicate balance between Pakistan
and India and be careful not to take sides in any future conflicts that may arise. The
United States appear to concentrate its efforts more on the Persian Gulf and South
East Asia and recent US administrations appear to be willing to accept that regional
powers such as India should play a more dominating role in the Indian Ocean,
especially the South Asian part. In 1989, the then Assistant Secretary of Defence,
Richard Armitage stated:
"It does not make sense for the US not to have a congenial relationship
with the largest democracy and the dominant military power in the sub-continent
44 Pervaiz Igbal Cheema, 'Indian Naval buildup and South East Asian Security: A Pakistani View", Contemporary South
East Asia, Vol.13, No.1, June 1991, p.98
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and with a country that will clearly take its place on the world stage in the twenty-
first century" .45
The Indian intervention in the Maldives in 1988 was welcomed by the Reagan
administration and President Reagan congratulated India for its "valuable
contribution to regional stability" .46 The United States however; appears to be trying
to ease the tension in the South Asian region by increasing its pressure on both India
and Pakistan to negotiate over the Kashmir issue. It has also pressurised both states to
sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 47 Such policies will be welcome to the
IOS, especially the Maldives, as it will ease tension in their immediate system. In the
western Indian Ocean, any future instability in South Africa can also seriously affect
the situation of the SIDS. It is likely that South Africa's interventionist role in these
SIDS will be reduced with the end of apartheid and international isolationism.
Additionally, Mauritius and the Seychelles have close economic ties with South
Africa and rely on foreign investment from South Africa and therefoer, any political
turmoil in that state that affects its economy can have serious economic set-backs for
the two SIDS.
The security environment in the Indian Ocean is changing today. With the end
of the Cold War the so-called superpower conflict in the Indian Ocean has come to
an end. Regional states have taken this opportunity to enhance their role in the
ocean. Instead of the ocean being a zone of peace without superpower rivalry,
regional rivalries and tensions are contributing to the increase of military build-up in
the ocean and littoral as a whole far more then it did during the Cold War. The IOS
have to adjust themselves to this changing environment. They have to adapt their
traditional balance of power policy between the two superpowers to regional
rivalries. This may not be easy.
45 Time, 3 April 1989, pp. 6-13
46 Ibid
47 Dilip Bobb, "Indo-US relations: Turning the Screws", India Today, 30 November 1993, pp. 46 - 49
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Chapter V
Case Study: THE MALDIVES
Background
Physical Environment
The Maldives consists of 1,190 islands of which 200 are inhabited. The
islands are grouped into nineteen different administrative units or atolls. They spread
over an area of 90,000 square kilometres including the EEZ. However, land area is
estimated to be barely 300 square kilometres. The length of the archipelago is 823
kilometres while it is 130 kilometres at its greatest width. Geologically, the atolls lie
on top of two submarine ridges that arise from a flat submarine plateau. The atolls
vary in shape and size as do the islands themselves. The islands are extremely low-
lying, the average being barely two metres above sea level. All the islands are
coralline and there are no mountains, hills or rivers in the Maldives. The nearest land
masses are the Indian island territory of Minicoy in the north, Sri Lanka in the north
east and the British Indian Ocean Territory of Diego Garcia in the south. The
environment, although fragile, is rich with many varieties of flora and fauna. In the
Maldives, 113 different species of birds are found. It is assumed that there are as
many as 2,000 different species of fish in the reefs and the country exports live
tropical fish. I The Maldives enjoys a tropical climate with a mean annual temperature
of 28°C. The existence of naturally beautiful beaches, coral reefs and unpolluted seas
has led to the development of a successful tourist industry in recent years. Tourism
contributes to a large part of the total GDP. The Maldives has an added advantage in
that the country lies outside the cyclone belt and so damage due to tropical storms has
been rare in the past. Cultivable land is fairly limited and the porous and salty nature
of the soil has led to limited agriculture. Only five per cent of the land is arable.
Principal food crops cultivated include finger millet and coconut. Other food crops
such as sweet potato, taro, breadfruit and other vegetables are grown in small
1 See Paul Webb, Maldives: People and Environment, (Media Transasia, Thailand, 1988), p.83
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quantities. Poultry and other small livestock are reared mainly for domestic use.
Mineral resources, strategic or otherwise, are almost non-existent apart from any
mineral resources which may be found on the sea-bed. Surveys for oil were made by
Esso and Alf Aquitane in the 1970s and by Shell in 1991. However, no significant
resources of oil or natural gas were detected. In any case, the Maldives does not have
the capability to carry out any sea bed mining on its own. Due to vast areas of the
EEZ, fisheries resources form an important part of the natural resource of the
country. Fishing is not just important to the economic development of the country
through exports but it also forms an important part of the daily diet of the people.
Historical Background
The Maldives, or 'Dhivehi Raajje' as it is known to the inhabitants, has a long
history. Although no written documents are available as to when people first came to
these isolated islands, some early travellers have mentioned the Maldives in their
writings. The Greek geographer, Ptolemy, (AD. 150) cites in his writings of a
"multitude of islands" near Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Cosmos the Monk referred to
some "small islands around Ceylon". 2 Even though it was widely believed that the
islands were first inhabited during the fourth century BC, recent findings imply that
the islands could have been inhabited as early as 1,500 BC. 3 Historically, the
Maldives has been an independent yet isolated state except for a brief period of
fifteen years under Portuguese rule in the sixteenth century and then under the
Malabars of India for a few weeks in the eighteenth century. Thus the Maldives was
able to distance herself from the changes that swept across her neighbours for most of
the time. The British arrived in the islands in the middle of the nineteenth century
and the Maldives became a British protectorate in 1887. Under the terms of the
agreement concluded between the two countries, the British looked after external
security and foreign policy while the Maldivians were very much left to themselves
in running their domestic affairs. In 1948, a Mutual Defence Pact was signed which
2 Urmila Phadnis and Ela Dutt Luithui, Maldives - Winds of change in an atoll state, (South Asian Publishers, India, 1985)
pp. 1 - 2.
Ibid
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was later revised in 1960. Therefore, during this time, security was not a major
concern. After the end of the Second World War, when colonial territories started to
struggle for their independence, the Maldives was no longer content to remain under
the British. Unlike many of the colonies there was no long and bitter struggle towards
independence and the transfer from the status of a protectorate to a sovereign state
was fairly smooth and quiet. Full independence was gained on the 26th July 1965.
On attaining independence, the Maldives joined the United Nations as one of its
smallest members. In 1968, the Maldives was declared a Republic for the second
time. A previous experiment in 1953 resulted in the reversal to a sultanate just seven
months after the first republic was declared.
Socio-economic Background
The Maldives is categorised as one of the Least Developed Countries.
However, the country has made substantial economic progress in the last decade.
During the 1980s the GDP growth rate was some ten per cent per annum and GDP
per capita grew from Rf 1,930 to Rf 4,360 in real terms i.e. twice the growth rate of
the population. 4
 In 1993, per capita GDP stood at 4,993 (US$ 703.4). 5 The economy
is heavily dependent on fishing, tourism and to a lesser extent shipping. The
fisheries sector accounted for 12.4 per cent of the GDP and receipts from tourism
accounted for 17.1 per cent of the GDP in 1993. 6 The country has no agricultural
basis due to the lack of land area and poor soil conditions. In recent years attempts
have been made to diversify the economic base but limited financial and human
resources create a bottleneck to this development endeavour. One of the main
difficulties is the poor communication and transport network because of the scattered
nature of the islands. The opening of an international airport in 1981 greatly reduced
the remoteness of the country to the outside world and domestic airports are currently
being constructed. In the Maldives the industrial sector is two-fold; one a
traditional sector and the other a modern sector. The traditional sector consists of
4 Government of the Maldives, Sustainable Human Development; Constraints, Plans and Strategies, Vol.1, (Male', October
1994), P.3
5 Ministry of Planning, Human Resources and Environment, Maldives, Statistcial YearBook 1994, (Male, 1994), p.176
6 Government of the Maldives, Sustainable Human Development; Constraints, Plans and Strategies, p. 22
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boat building, mat-weaving, handicrafts and other such cottage industries. The
modern sector includes fish canning, garment manufacturing, construction of fibre
glass boats, production of PVC pipes, bottling of aerated water and furniture
making. The tuna canning factory has an annual production capacity of 13,000 metric
tonnes and is government owned. The total contribution of the manufacturing sector
to the GDP is small at only 5.73 % in 1990. 7
 A Bank of Maldives was established
and the Maldives Monetary Authority acts as a central bank. There are also branches
of other foreign commercial banks.
The country as a whole has seen improvement in the overall well-being of
its people in recent years. Medical services are being provided to outer islands. There
is a 94 bed hospital in Male and four other small regional hospitals in the country.
Infant mortality has been reduced from 121 per 1,000 in 1977 to 31 in 1992. 8 Certain
debilitating diseases such as malaria have now been eradicated from the country.
However, due to the scattered nature of the islands most of the benefits are mainly
restricted to the capital Male;' and the surrounding islands. The outer island societies
still rely on the sea for their daily survival. Traditional society still exists and
traditional values and customs still play a major role in outlook. In most islands,
education is still based on the teaching of reading and writing the Maldivian language
and the Islamic religion. Although they appear to be similar in most ways there are,
however, distinct differences among the islands. The differences are not so much in
the physical make-up of the islands, nor in the actual customs and values of their
island societies, but more in their own perception of themselves and the people from
other islands. Each island society appears to view itself as somewhat different from
its neighbours. The people of other islands are known as "Bee rattehin" of which a
rough translation is 'somebody who does not belong to this island'.
7	 • -Ministry of Planning, Human Resources and Environment, Maldives, National Development Plan 1991 - 1993, Vol I, (
Male, 1991) p.14
8 Op.cit., p. 3
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Perception of security problems
The Maldives have existed in a fairly isolated status until recently. As
noted earlier, the country was under foreign rule for only two brief periods of time
and from 1887 the British were responsible for its external security until
independence in 1965. Prior to this, the focus of security problems were more of an
internal nature. In the Maldives, power was concentrated in the hands of few
families and the mantle of leadership was passed within these families. There were
few political problems in the past in governing the country due to the strength of
traditional political culture. The Sultan was the source of all power and laws, and as
such, was acknowledged by the people. However, the people had the customary
power of rejecting and dethroning him and such occasions were not rare. This was
mainly done by the leading figures in Male, the capital, and by a traditional custom
whereby the people gather in front of the Sultan's Palace and demand that he resigns.
In most instances the problem is solved by negotiations and in some cases the
reigning Sultan had resigned and another one crowned. Thus, until recent times,
security problems were not a high priority issue.
Although the leadership of the Maldives has been concerned about security
issues and the vulnerability of the small states, until recently most attention was
given to economic vulnerability rather than any other issue. President Gayoom, in
his speech delivered at the opening ceremony of the 1985 Commonwealth Finance
Ministers Meeting in the Maldives, stated: "Help small states to feel ultimately secure
.. ensure the means of our economic development". 9 The subject of security took a
different turn, however, after the country experienced on 3 November 1988 a
mercenary attack that shook the whole country. Subsequently, the country has
attempted to draw the attention of the international community to the plight of the
SIDS with regard to security issues. Although the focus of security is on the kind of
threats from outside forces, especially from non-state actors such as mercenaries,
(The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs stated, "...small societies are far more
9 Address by H.E. Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, President of the Maldives at the opening ceremony of the Commonwealth
Finance Ministers Meeting, Maldives, 1985
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vulnerable and susceptible to being victims of such adventurers given the isolation of
our countries, dispersal of our islands and the paucity of our resources."9 the
government recognises that, "security of small states should be viewed as a
multifaceted concept encompassing such factors as military, economic, social and
environmental security"."
The fact that the leadership is nervous about possible aggression from non-
state actors such as mercenaries is not without good cause. The country has
experienced mercenary problems three times in the last fifteen years. The first
mercenary threat came in 1980 when the government discovered that dissident
elements had hired nine former British Special Air Services commandos to
overthrow the government. The attack was foiled before it actually took place and the
government imprisoned the would-be local trouble-makers. In 1983, another group of
Maldivians were known to have tried to hire some mercenaries to overthrow the
government. On 3 November 1988, an armed attack was actually launched against
the Maldives by a foreign mercenary group, which was later identified as belonging
to the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), a separatist group
in Sri Lanka, with a few Maldivians involved as well.
The attack, which was launched in the early morning, took the Maldivian
authorities by total surprise. The main objective of the mercenaries was to seize the
National Security Service (NSS) headquarters, in an attempt to capture the President
and the Ministers and establish a government that was sympathetic to the Tamil
cause. According to government reports, the purpose of the attack was to provide a
training base for the Tamil separatists from which they could launch subversive
operations in Sri Lanka. The fighting, which lasted eighteen hours, left eighteen dead
on the Maldives side with several others injured. The small defence force of the
Maldives could not quell the attack without outside assistance. President Gayoom
10 H.E. Ibrahim Hussain Zaki, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Maldives, Statement delivered at the Special
Political Committee on Agenda item 69, "Protection and Security of Small States", 15 October 1991
11 See Observation and suggestions of the government of the Republic of Maldives on General Assembly Resolution 46/43 of
9/12 1991, adopted under the agenda item entitled "Protection and security of small states"
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appealed to several friendly countries: Sri Lanka, India, the United States, Britain and
Malaysia, among others. Prompt help came from India, which sent an elite
commando force with sophisticated weaponry. Meanwhile, the mercenaries left the
country on a Maldivian vessel, the MV Progress Light, taking the Minister of
Transport, his wife, other government officials and ordinary citizens as hostages. The
saga ended when two Indian navy frigates gave chase, and finally after two days, the
mercenaries surrendered. The attack shook the whole country. It was the first time
such an incident had actually occurred in the normally peaceful country and showed
the extreme vulnerability of the country to attacks of such nature. It was Indian
assistance which helped the state to survive but the Maldives has no official defence
agreements with any country, and therefore there is no commitment on the part of
India or any other state to come to its rescue. The threat of mercenaries has
dominated Maldivian security since and has led to a substantial increase in military
resources.
As far as armed aggression by other sovereign states are concerned, the
current leadership does not regard the threat of armed invasion or aggression by
other states as a security threat at present or in the immediate future. The Maldives
has had cordial relations with the members of the international community,
especially with its neighbouring states, and therefore the possibility of an armed
invasion is regarded as highly unlikely. However, the military build-up in the Indian
Ocean is regarded with concern and the Maldives believes that this militarization of
the area could ultimately lead to the de-stabilisation of the region, and they feel
threatened. Therefore it continuously calls for the de-militarization of the Indian
Ocean area and the establishment of an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, as declared by a
UN resolution in 1971. President Gayoom of the Maldives asserted that "as small
states such as ours are vulnerable, we feel that for our own security and the security
of the world the need to make the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace has now become a
matter of greater urgency that ever before".12
12 Address by H.E. Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, President of the Maldives, on the occasion of the assumption of his second
term of office, Male, 11 November 1983
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Although the mercenary attack of 1988 was designed to overthrow the
government, domestic political problems, especially coups and political violence, are
not generally viewed as a cause for concern by the ruling elite. This may be due to
the fact that such events have been fairly rare. Isolated incidents of political violence
did occur in the late 1980s and especially in 1990 and 1991. There had been calls for
wider freedoms, such as that of freedom of speech and the press, including the repeal
of the notorious Article 38 of the Penal Code that prohibits citizens from any sort of
criticism of the government. For some time there was rumoured to be an underground
opposition movement known as the 'White Shark'. This movement has now
disappeared, although the cause for its disappearance is still unknown; allegations
were made that the government had arrested the leader, although no one appears to be
certain who was behind the movement. Planting crude bombs and setting fire to
property were also carried out which resulted in the arrest of some radicals. Most of
the radicals appeared to be those with western education who demanded more
freedom of expression. However, after the heavy clamp down by the government, the
country now appears to be fairly peaceful once again.
The Maldives is an archipelagic country but secession is not regarded as a
possible problem by the ruling elite; although the country did experience
secessionism in the 1960s. During the Second World War the British established a
military base at Gan. For the British, Gan proved to be a vital link in the strategic
supply line running to the Far East and Australia, especially after the independence of
Sri Lanka and the closure of the British bases in Trincomalee and Katunayake. 13 An
agreement was concluded between Britain and the Maldives in 1956 that allowed for
the use of Gan as an airfield. The nearby island of Hithadoo was established as a
radio communication centre for a period of 100 years as a 'free gi 
. 14 The Maldivian
parliament, however, refused to ratify the agreement. It was widely believed among
the Maldivian people that the Prime Minister of the Maldives should have
13 Christian Science Monitor, 18 April 1958
14 Ibid. 18 April 1958
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demanded more from the British as rent for the base. He was, therefore, forced to
resign and negotiations came to a standstill. The Maldivian government wanted to
re-negotiate the treaty so it would be more favourable to the country. The original
lease of Gan was for 100 years with rent at £2000 per year. The Maldivian
government wanted to revise it to fifteen years with an annual rent of £100,000.15
Relations worsened when the British High Commissioner arrived in a warship for
further talks, which was seen by the Maldivians as open gunboat diplomacy.
The Gan negotiations reached a crucial point with the attempted break-away
of the three southern atolls, Huvadu, Fua Mulaku and Addu (where Gan is located).
Although the Maldives consists of a homogenous group of inhabitants (the isolated
nature of the country in the past resulted in the blending of the early settlers: Aryans,
Dravidians, Indians, Arabs etc.), the same isolated nature has given a distinct feeling
of separateness to many of the islands. This is especially prominent in the three
southern atolls. Therefore, when the British established a military base in Gan it
fuelled separatists tendencies among the people of the southern atolls. This was
partly due to the fact that the government halted direct travel from these islands to
other countries and partly because it channelled the wages of those working in Gan
through Male which resulted in the exchange rate being favourable to the government
and not to the workers. There were 500 Maldivian labourers working in Gan at the
time. The people rebelled and sought to establish a separate sovereign state under the
name of United Suvadiv Republic, comprising a population of 30,000, with Abdulla
Afeef Didi as its President. He then appealed to the British Government to recognise
the Republic "in the name of justice and humanity".16
This proved to be a critical problem for both the Maldivians and Britain. The
government of the Maldives believed that the separatists had the tacit support of
Britian although recognition was not accorded. There was reason for this
15 R.H.C. Steed, 'Back to first base on Gan', Daily Telegraph, 12 May 1959
16 Quoted in the Daily Telegraph, 14 March 1959
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accusation. The government had imposed a ban on the employment of unskilled
labour in Gan but this request was ignored by the British. The British also brought in
a company of the 1st Battalion , the Cheshire regiment based in Singapore, which
further accentuated the situation. A group of journalists were also flown into Gan by
the British, who were then able to interview the rebel leader Afeef Didi. Had the
British government recognised the state it would have meant that not only would the
Maldives have been dismembered but that the much needed foreign earnings from
the base would be lost. It could also have led to other atolls demanding to join the
new republic rather than the one headed by the government in Male. On the British
side it was a matter of establishing a working relationship with the rebel leaders so as
not to disrupt the work on the base. The question of recognition was discussed, but
discarded, because had - Britain accorded recognition they might have had to face
criticism at the United Nations and by the international community for dismembering
a small defenceless country that was still a British protectorate. Finally, an agreement
was reached in 1960 under which the lease was reduced to thirty years with
considerably higher payments. However, the issue of the revolt was not resolved until
three years later when the Maldivian government pardoned all the dissidents and the
rebel leader was given political asylum in the Seychelles by Britain. Although the
'Addu Problem', as it is commonly known in the Maldives, had certain considerable
long-term effects on the country, today secessionism is not regarded as a potential
problem. Even though the Addu people were treated with contempt by the rest of the
country at the time, (and this may be one of the reasons why the government was so
reluctant to lease the base again once the British departed in 1976), today many
Adduans have migrated to Male and have inter-mingled with the inhabitants of Male.
Gan is now used as a holiday resort and a garment factory has been established on the
island.
Gan has also created other kinds of problems for the country. Although the
Maldives had tried to maintain a fairly isolated status, its strategic location was
always a potential trouble factor. Once the British departed in early 1976, the fact that
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the British had left a military base did not go unnoticed by the other powers of the
world. In 1977 an offer was made by the Soviet Union to lease Gan for one million
US dollars, to use as a base for the Soviet Union's Indian Ocean Fishing fleet. This
caused considerable dilemmas for the Maldivian authorities. Money was much
needed for the development of the country and one million was "enough to pay for
about a third of its annual imports." 17
 But there was reason to be suspicious about
Moscow's intentions, especially since the US military base of Diego Garcia is just
about 400 miles south of Gan. In fact, a Soviet base in Gan would accomplish for
them what Diego Garcia has provided for the Americans. The Maldives was keen to
avoid being drawn into the problems emanating from the superpower conflict
(Moscow might have viewed the former British base as an ideal point from which to
'oversee' Japanese and Chinese shipping lanes from West Asia.) 18
 At the same time
the Maldivian government did not want to antagonise the Soviets.
It was a difficult choice for the Maldivian leadership as the Soviets treated the
Maldivians with arrogance, their vessels turning up at the tiny harbour at Male
without any advance notice. This type of gunboat diplomacy enhances the vulnerable
state of the country. However, in this particular case, the government finally decided
to call the Soviets' bluff and not lease the territory. The government of the Maldives
moreover declared that Gan would not be leased to any foreign power, especially for
military purposes. Relations with the Soviets have since been enhanced and the
Maldives signed a Scientific and Cultural Agreement with the Soviet Union in April
1980.
In the past, problems of foreign interference and pressure in the Maldives
was mainly confined to the problems associated with the establishment of the
military base in Gan. With Britain, the problems had occurred when the parliament of
the Maldives refused to ratify the agreement concluded between the British High
Commissioner and the Prime Minister of the Maldives regarding the lease of Gan.
17 Asia Week 25 November 1977
18 Ibid. 18 November 1988
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20 Address by H.E. Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, President of the Maldives at the official meeting to mark Victory Day, 3rd
November1992
21 Ranjan Gupta, The Indian Ocean - a political geography, (Marwah Publications, New Delhi, 1979), pp. 15 - 16.
19 Charlie A. Gunawardene, Christian Science Monitor, 18 April 1958
Relations grew critical between the two countries from then on, and suggestions were
made that British economic assistance to the Maldives would be withdrawn if the
Maldives did not co-operate in the building of the base, thus creating the impression
that "Britain is dangling a carrot of aid with strings attached". 19 Then came the
attempted secession by the Southern atolls. As the British had started to build their
base at Gan, the Government felt that the rebels were backed by the British. But,
once the rebellion was quelled, relations improved. The Queen paid a visit to the
country in 1972 and the Maldives joined the Commonwealth in 1986.
Today, the Maldives maintains fairly cordial relations with most countries
and this strengthening of relations with other countries is seen to be "extremely
important"20 . Foreign influence, especially from neighbouring countries, is not
regarded by the leadership as a serious security problem. However, unstable relations
between its neighbours have, at times, created difficulties for the Maldives. It has a
long and traditional relationship with Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka provided the main link
between the Maldives and the rest of the world in the past. Although one author
claims that a former Sri Lankan Prime Minister had supposedly talked of Sri Lanka's
desire to lay claim to the Maldives, no such claim was ever made and relations
remained fairly smooth. 2i
 Its relationship with its largest neighbour India, too,
remained fairly close, although there was cause for concern when the current
President of the Maldives, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, soon after assuming power,
made a comment which was misinterpreted to the effect that the Indian island of
Minicoy (sixty-seven miles from the Maldives and where the Maldivian language,
Dhivehi, is spoken) was once part of the Maldives. However, this issue was soon
rectified and the Maldivian Government assured India that it had no intention of
laying claim to this territory. Relations with India have since improved a great deal,
especially after the Indian forces assisted in putting down the armed attack in 1988 by
foreign mercenaries. The relationship with India, especially the stationing for one
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year of Indian troops after the attack, did leave some of the local population uneasy
as there are misapprehensions about India's intentions and the fear that the Maldives
might become a client state of India. These fears are so far unsubstantiated. Indian
influence in the Maldives, especially with regard to the position of the Maldives in
foreign affairs, has also raised fears in some sceptics. However, the government of
the Maldives does not regard India's close relationship as one that might exert
pressure on the Maldives. When President Gayoom was asked whether India played a
major role in the foreign policy of Maldives he denied it by saying, "Our foreign
policy is determined by us". Nevertheless, he was quick to note that India and the
Maldives "see eye to eye in most cases". 22
 Difficulties arose for the Maldives when
the relationship between India and Sri Lanka deteriorated to some extent in the
1980's after Sri Lanka made allegations that India was supporting the Tamil
separatist movement in the country. The Maldives found itself in an extremely
sensitive position in maintaining the balance between the two countries without
taking sides as there always existed a 'subtle rivalry' between Sri Lanka and India to
"develop a special neighbourliness towards the Maldives".23 This is also the case
between India and Pakistan, as the Maldives has close Islamic ties with Pakistan.
Difficulties surfaced in 1994 when two Maldivian women (one of them a former
NSS official) were arrested in India for spying on the Indian space programme and
allegedly received hundreds of thousand Indian Rupees. The Deputy Director of
Indian Space Research Organisation's Liquid Propulsion Centre and an Indian
businessman was also arrested. This led to considerable difficulties for the
Maldivian leadership as one of the accused, Mariyam Rasheeda, was labelled at first
as a pro-Gayoom agent.24
 However, it was later alleged that the two were spying for
Pakistan and not on behalf of the Maldivian government. This was vehemently
denied by Pakistan. 25 While the Maldivian government tried to distance itself from
the events, sceptics claimed that it is highly unlikely that the two could have ever
22 Quoted in Ministry of Information and Culture, Maldives, Maldives News Bulletin, Yearbook 1990, (Male ,1990), p. 24
Ibid
24 See Shekar Gupta, "The ISRO Case: The great espionage mess", India Today, 31 January 1995, pp. 58 - 63
25 See 'Pakistan denies involvement in Indian espionage case", in Asian Defence Journal, No.1, 1995, p.95
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been spies; and moreover accused Indian intelligence of bungling the case. 26 They
claim that the Intelligence Bureau jumped to conclusions without checking the on the
dates and the venues of the alleged meetings and they hastily arrested the 'spies'
without carrying out proper surveillance. At present, the issue remains unresolved
and the women remain in an Indian jail.
External security problems are seen to be more common in areas such
as poaching in the EEZ by foreign fishing vessels. Due to the vast areas of the EEZ
and the country's heavy dependence on fishing, the government considers
monitoring and surveillance of the EEZ a high priority. Thus, the problems of
poaching in its waters by foreign fishing vessels are considered a serious menace.
The EEZ of the Maldives encompasses over 90,000 square kilometres but the
majority of the fishermen stay within a radius of 75 miles from land. 27 In the last
five years 48 vessels, mainly of Sri Lankan and Taiwanese origin, have been
apprehended in the EEZ by the Maldivian Coast Guard. 28 In 1992 eight Sri Lankan
registered trawlers were apprehended while poaching in the Maldivian territorial
waters and a similar number in 1993.29 According to the Maldivian Coast Guard
poaching increases during the north east monsoon when the seas between Sri Lanka
and the Maldives are calmer.
. Although military security has dominated since 1988, the leadership have
identified security as a multifaceted problem. It also recognises the fact that the most
of the problems have their basis in economic underdevelopment. The main economic
problems facing the country today are those associated with its small size and the
geographical nature of the islands. Although developmental problems are outside the
scope of this thesis, it is important to highlight certain economic issues facing the
Maldives in order to have a clear understanding of economic vulnerability and
threats facing the country. The smallness in size and the scattered nature of the
26 Ibid.
27 Government of the Maldives, Sustainable Human Development; Constraints, Plans and Strategies, p.18
28 Information by the Coast Guard, National Security Service, Male, Maldives
29 Ministry of Information and Culture, Maldives, Maldives News Bulletin, No.430, 13 March 1994
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islands means that there is only a limited natural resource base. The country is highly
dependent on two sectors of the economy, fishing and tourism. The wide dispersal of
the population has also given rise to severe diseconomies of scale. The limited
population has also resulted in a domestic market that is small, fragmented and
constrained by low incomes and purchasing power. At the same time, there is a
severe shortage of skilled manpower. The Maldives is thus, highly dependent on
foreign aid. The phenomenal performance of the economy in the 1980s owes much to
the assistance received from external donors.
Societal problems, especially ethnic problems, have been absent in the
Maldives for the basic reason that the Maldives is a homogenous country. The
existence of one religion, Islam, one culture and one language has helped to create
unity. Nevertheless, in recent years religious problems have been surfacing in the
country, especially in the form of Islamic fundamentalism. The government of the
Maldives recognises this as a problem and the Parliament has recently passed a law
banning all forms of religious preaching in the country apart from by those who have
been given special permission from the Department of Religious Affairs.
In recent years the government has also given special attention to the
increasing problem of drug abuse in the country. There is no written evidence that
drug abuse ever existed in the country in the past except the use of opium for
medicinal purposes. It is assumed that drugs were first introduced with the arrival of
tourism. In the early days of tourism many of the tourists who came were 'hippies',
who brought in marijuana and hashish into the country. Although the police at the
time were aware of the problem, nothing much was done for the simple reason that
the government did not want to discourage the arrival of tourists. In 1977, the first
measures to curb the problem were introduced after an American tourist was caught
with 350 grams of hashish. However, drug abuse grew fairly slowly until the last
five to six years when the problems have increased dramatically. It is assumed that
the recent increase of abuse, mainly by students returning from their studies abroad,
128
who use drugs for recreational purposes as a way of compensating for the lack of
other recreational facilities available in Male similar to those found abroad. A report
from the police states that more than 25% of students who had been studying in
India and Sri Lanka used or had used drugs. Today the drug scene in the country has
moved onto heroin, cocaine and other hard drugs. Although previously it was the
male youth population that was seen to have a drug problem, in 1993 girls too were
being arrested for drug abuse. The country has also been used to tranship drugs from
Thailand and India to Europe. 313 The government gives high priority to the control of
drugs and is concerned about the spread of drug abuse and trafficking. As the
Officer-commanding of the Drug Control Bureau stated, "It is not a nightmare that
will go away, but a cold, harsh reality that can only be defeated when we make
ourselves aware of the dire threat and danger to our society".31
Another area of concern to the government has been the high growth rate of
the population and the continued migration of the people from the outer atolls to
Male. The total population of the country grew from 180,088 in 1985 to 213,215 in
1990, representing a growth of 18.9% and an annual average growth rate of 3.4%•32
Among these 46.8% are under the age of 15 years. The growth of the population in
Male has created several problems, especially that of housing as Male has barely
two square kilometres. Overuse of the resources such as water has also led to severe
depletion of the fresh water lens in Male. The population share of Male in 1974 stood
at 13% but in 1990 it was 26%, with migrants accounting for 48% of the total
population of Male.33
 Although the population has been increasing, there is a severe
lack of skilled manpower in the country. Even basic labour for large projects has to
be brought in from other countries. In 1993, 17,177 expatriate workers were
employed in the country, mainly from South Asia.34
30 All Information by the Drug Control Bureau, Police Headquarters, National Security Service of the Maldives
31 First Lieutenant Ibrahim Latheef, Officer Commanding, Drug Control Bureau, Police Headquarters, National Security
Service, August 1994
32	 • •Ministry of Planning, Human Resources and Environment, Maldives, National Development Plan 1991 - 1993, p.533 Ibid. p.7
34	 • •Ministry of Planning, Human Resources and Environment, Maldives, Statistical YearBook 1994, (Male' 1994), p.42
129
One of the main security concerns of the government is that of environmental
security. Until recently, the lifestyle of the Maldives had little or no destructive
impact on the environment of the country. However, with the socio-economic
development of the country environmental degradation has increased. As President
Gayoom stated, "The destruction of coral reefs, coastal erosions, hydrological
problems of fresh water depletion and saline intrusion into acquifers, and the dangers
of marine pollution due to improper methods of sewage and solid waste disposal are
some of the issues."35 Coral has been used in the country for ages as a building
material but the recent increase in housing due to the growth in population and
infrastructure development has led to an increase in coral mining. This has caused
severe destruction of coral reefs. A study commissioned to assess the effect of coral
mining, particularly in the Male atoll, revealed that if it continues at the prevailing
rate the coral reefs of the atoll will all but disappear by the year 2015. 36 The depletion
of the fresh water acquifer has also become a cause for concern, especially in Male.
The fresh water lens of Male is being increasingly replaced by salt water. According
to a survey, the fresh water acquifer of Male will be exhausted in the next few
years. 37 Another major problem that has occurred of late has been the frequency of
storms and high tidal swells. In 1987, three days of high tidal swells with waves up to
2.5 metres washed away and submerged areas of Male and caused substantial damage
to the international airport. In 1988, tidal swells affected the southern atolls
inundating cultivated fields and caused extensive damage to the causeways linking
the islands. In 1991, storms again destroyed more than 190,000 trees and damaged
3,300 dwellings and 250 public buildings. These events increased the fear of the rise
in sea-level. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climatic Change in its first assessment
report of August 1990 estimated that the global sea level will rise probably by 20 cm
by the year 2030. This would be calamitous for a country like the Maldives.
President Gayoom stated, "a mean sea level rise of 2 metres would virtually
35 H.E. Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, President of the Maldives, Statement delivered on behalf of The Group of Eminent
Persons on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, Bridgetown, Barbados, 21 April 1994
36 Ministry of Planning, Human Resources and Environment, Maldives, National Development Plan 1991 - 1993, p. 161
37 Ministry of Planning, Human Resources and Environment, Maldives, State of the Environment: Maldives, ( Male, 1994),
p23.
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submerge the entire country ....That would be the death of a nation". 38
 The threat
from a rise in sea level has led to several scenarios being predicted for the Maldives
from the loss of land and displacement of people to destruction of reefs and loss of
fish stocks.39
Providing security in the Maldives 
Military Resources
Although the Maldives faces numerous problems, the country is not totally
-
without capabilities. However, the capabilities are extremely limited, especially with
regard to military problems. The National Security Service (NSS) of the Maldives
consists of approximately 2,000 personne1. 40 It has no navy or air force although a
Coast Guard Unit and a Quick Reaction Force Unit have been established.* The
Maldives has no defence agreements with other states. The defence expenditure of
the country is high in comparison to other sectors. In 1991, 13.9 per cent of total
government expenditure was spent on security'.41 The Maldives receives military
help in the form of equipment and training from Britain, the United States and India.
However, most of the forces are locally trained (although some have received
training abroad). The island of Girifushi in Male Atoll has been specially designated
for training the NSS and up to 1993 the Girifushi Training Centre had conducted
training for 20 intakes. The type of courses conducted include Task Force Training,
Drill Instructor Courses, VIP Protection Courses, NCO Cadre Courses, Weapons
Instructor Courses, Physical Instructor Courses and Military Diving Courses.
Training courses are conducted by local officers who have received training abroad
and by visiting instructors from Britain and the United States. The US recently
conducted a training course to combat urban terrorism known as the
Balance Metal '94. Nevertheless, the NSS still lacks the capability to match
irregulars who have seen	 action in	 their own countries and
4° See James Pringle, "Maldives: Hardliners hit back at political reforms", Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 May 1990
* For the strength of the Coast Guard see Appendix C
41 Ministry of Planning, Human Resources and Environment, Maldives, Statistical Yearbook, 1994, p. 158
38 Address by H.E. Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, President of the Maldives at the UN General Assembly on the issues of
environment and development, New York, December 1987
39 Op.cit. p.3
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with years of experience, as proven by the 1988 attack. Another major problem
facing the NSS is the difficulty in maintaining a military presence on other inhabited
islands of the archipelago. The NSS is mainly concentrated in Male. In 1993 a
regional headquarters was established in Laamu Atoll. Besides, the NSS has to adapt
its role in numerous circumstances and assist in many other areas. As such, its
services are used in fighting fires and flooding, in the control of epidemics, and
labour from the NSS is often used in public projects such as construction work etc.
Political Capabilities
The Maldives is a parliamentary democracy. The Citizen's Majlis
(Parliament) is the main legislative body consisting of forty eight members of which
eight are nominated by the President and the rest are elected on the basis of two
members from each atoll and two from Male, the capital. The government is headed
by the President who is nominated by the Citizen's Majlis and elected by a public
referendum for a renewable term of five years. The President is the Head of State
and the Chief Executive. He is also the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and
is responsible for the protection of the religion in the country. The Maldives is a one
hundred per cent Muslim country and is not secular.
Internally, political security has been maintained through out by the
widespread belief in the legitimacy of the political system as well as fear of the
authorities. The Maldivians by nature are peace loving people and traditionally
respect the policies of their elders. This deference has been extended to those
empowered with governing the country. Although isolated incidents of political
instability have occurred, widespread political factionalism has never been a
prominent feature in the past. Foreign political ideologies have never taken root and
this may be due to the scattered nature of the country as communication is in itself a
problem. The government owns the only radio station and the existence of a
language unique to the Maldives, together with the lack of understanding of foreign
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languages by the people, means that the chances of outside political philosophies
spreading are severely limited.
Externally, the Maldives follows a policy which can be defined as 'making
many friends and few enemies'. It has established diplomatic relations with over 114
countries.42
 However, the lack of resources means that the country has resident
diplomatic missions only in Sri Lanka, Britain and the United States. Because of its
geographical position its traditional allies have been the Indian Ocean states of South
Asia. It has a long relationship with Sri Lanka which remains extremely cordial. The
Maldives also maintains good relations with other South Asian countries, especially
India and Pakistan. India has provided training facilities for Maldivians in
educational and technical fields. 43
 Its relationship with India grew especially close
after Indian assistance to put down the mercenary attack in 1988. The then Indian
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi stated to the Indian Parliament, "We felt that we must
respond positively and go to the aid of a friendly neighbour facing a threat to its
sovereignty and democratic order." 44
 A Joint Commission has been established to
further relations and India contributes a great deal of development assistance. India
has become the second largest aid donor to the Maldives. 45
 One of the latest projects
is the building of a 200 bed hospital (which will be the largest in the country) and the
training of medical and para-medical staff. Another ongoing project is the building of
a Vocational Training Centre. India also provides defence assistance to the Maldives
and the Indian Coast Guard carry out training programmes for the Maldivian Coast
Guard.46
The Maldives maintains close links with the Muslim countries of the Arab
world, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as well as other Islamic states such as
Malaysia and Brunei. It receives assistance, mainly for the development of religious
42 Information by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Male, Maldives
43 See "Indo-Maldives Joint-Communique" Foreign Affairs Record, Vol 20, 1974 p.113
44 Statement given in the Lok Sabha/Rajya Sabha by the then Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi on 4th November 1988,
Foreign Affairs Record, Vol.34, No.11, November, 1988, p. 365
45 UNDP, Development Cooperation 1992 Report,( Male, 1994) p.19
46 Ministry of Information and Culture, Maldives, Maldives News Bulletin, Year Book 1991, ( Male), p. 89
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institutions, from these countries. Kuwait has also provided developmental
assistance, especially in the construction of Male International Airport through the
Kuwait Fund. The Maldives supported Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion and
subsequently the Emir of Kuwait paid a visit to the Maldives in 1992.
Its relationship with the Western world has also remained fairly cordial.
Britain is the main trading partner of the Maldives and the fourth largest bilateral
donor to the country. Britain provides educational and environmental assistance
among assistance to other developmental programmes. Military aid is also provided
in the form of training and military advice. In recent years, the Maldives has
strengthened its relationship with the United States. Although the country has always
claimed non-aligned status it appears to have a pro-American bias in its foreign
policy. The United States has become the second main trading partner of the country.
The US also provides military aid in the form of training and US military advisers
have visited the country from time to time. In 1992, the then Secretary of State,
James Baker, visited the Maldives, the first visit to the country from such a high
level American official. The Commander of the US Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral
Stanley Arthur, paid a visit to the Maldives in February 1993, the highest US military
official to visit the country.
Apart from bilateral relationships, the Maldives is a member of numerous
international organisations among which are the United Nations, the Commonwealth
and the Non-Aligned Movement.* To enhance the security of the country the
Maldives has been active in bringing the issue of the security of small states to the
attention of the world organisations. The Maldives initiated the move to raise the
issue of the security problems of small states in the UN General Assembly and the
subsequent resolution on the Protection and Security of Small States was co-
sponsored by the Seychelles and Mauritius among others. The issue was also taken
up by the Maldives at the meetings of the Commonwealth. The Maldives is a party
* List of organisation in Appendix C
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to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism under which the
member states are committed to extradite or prosecute alleged terrorists thus
preventing them from enjoying safe havens.
To improve its international standing, the Maldives has supported
international norms such as support for the fight against apartheid and for the
Palestinian people. At a regional level the country accords high priority to regional
co-operation and campaigns for regional issues such as the establishment of an
Indian Ocean Zone of Peace. In the past, the characteristic stance of the country in the
external sphere came from its role of maintaining a non-aligned policy and therefore
playing a minimal role in the East-West conflict during the Cold War years, together
with acquiring as many friends as it could, especially in the neighbouring areas. It
played a limited role in regional affairs until the early 1980s relying on isolationism
to maintain its sovereignty and political integrity. However, in the 1980s it began to
take a more active role in regional affairs and was one of the co-founders of the
South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation (SAARC).
In recent years, the Maldives has increased its involvement in the
international arena and enhanced its international standing by hosting international
and regional conferences and seminars. Islands states appear to be a popular choice
for such gatherings and the tropical climate and natural surroundings often gives a
relaxed and casual outlook to these gatherings. The Maldives hosted an international
conference of small states on the problem of global warming and sea level rise in
1989. In 1990 it successfully hosted the fifth SAARC summit in Male and in 1991 it
hosted a workshop on the security problems of small states attended by delegates
from the Seychelles and Mauritius among other small countries. In 1992 it hosted
the Commonwealth Youth Ministers Conference. This strategy appears to be a
popular and effective way of making its presence felt among the members of the
international community.
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Economic Resources
The Maldives lacks land-based natural resources and thus relies on its marine
resources. Fishing and tourism are the two cornerstones of the economy. Both
sectors have made progress in the last ten years. The fisheries sector contributed
13.5% of the GDP in 1992.47 Traditionally fishing was carried out in locally built
sailing boats known as 'Dhoanis'. Today, however, there are 1,609 mechanised
Dhoanis. With mechanisation the total fish catch increased dramatically. In 1993,
the total fish catch stood at 89,938 metric tons. 48 A canning plant was established in
1978 which was refurbished in 1986. It now has the capacity to produce 50 metric
tonnes of canned tuna per day and 7.4 thousand metric tonnes of tuna was exported
in 1992. Other exports include fresh and frozen fish, fish meal, salted fish and dried
fish. The country's highest foreign exchange earner, however, is the tourism sector.
With the opening of an international airport, tourist arrivals increased from 74,163 to
235,852 in 1992.49 The main tourist markets are the countries of Western Europe and
Japan. There are 69 tourist resorts with a bed capacity of 9061. 50 The government
expects the bed capacity to increase to over 10,000 by the end of 1994. Earnings from
tourism amounted to 17.7% of the GDP in 1992. 51 The government has been careful
to control the development of tourism in order to protect the natural environment of
the country. Strict regulations exist on the construction of hotels. Separate islands
have been selected for the development of tourism and this separation of tourists
from the local inhabitants has assisted in keeping cultural and social costs to a
minimum. For example, many associate the growth of prostitution with the
development of tourism. In the Maldives such problems have been prevented. 52 The
geographical nature of the country has facilitated in following such policies. As the
country is archipelagic, transport plays an important part in everyday life. The
existing inter-island sea transport networks are limited. Although the country had
47 Government of the Maldives, Sustainable Human Development; Constraints, Plans and Strategies, p.22
48 Ministry of Planning, Human Resources and Environment, Maldives, Statistical Year Book, 1994 p. 92
49 Ibid. pp. 257 -258
50 Ibid p. 108
51 Government of the Maldives, Sustainable Human Development; Constraints, Plans and Strategies, p.22
52 R Sathiendrakumar, "Tourism and the Economic Development of the Maldives", Annals of Tourism Research, 1989 Vol.
16, pp. 254-269,
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13,033 registered vessels, 73% are fishing vessels. 53 As far as internal air transport
is concerned there are four domestic airports. The leadership of the Maldives is aware
that the economic security of the country depends on careful planning and has
attempted to formulate development plans to identify and target areas for
development. Three such plans have been implemented so far. Further sustainable
development in harmony with the fragile ecosystem has been given priority.54
Human Resources
The total population of the Maldives was 213,215 at the last census in 1990
and the estimated population now stands at 245,910 (1994). 55 The population is
dispersed over 200 islands, but only three of them have a population of more than
4,000 people. There are 162 islands with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants or less and 90
islands have less than 500. The population growth rate is 3.4% as mortality has
been reducing due to the improvement of health services. 56 The country as a whole
consists of Dhivehi people (as the people of the Maldives are known) and apart from
foreign workers there are no minorities. Ethnically it is a homogenous country and as
such is distinctive among the SIDS of the Indian Ocean. Due to the homogenous
nature of the country the society as a whole remains close-knit although radical
differences exist even "in the economies and lifestyles" of various islands and
atolls. 57 Dhivehi, a mixture of old Singhalese and Arabic, is the mother tongue of
all Maldivians, but different dialects are spoken, especially in the southern atolls.
English is used as the medium of instruction in the schools in Male. Due to years of
isolation, the country has remained relatively untouched by political and social
changes in the neighbouring countries until recent years. Migration patterns in the
Maldives are mainly internal with the largest flow to Male by the people from other
atolls. The Maldives enjoys one of the highest literacy levels in South Asia with a
literacy rate of 98%. 58 Primary education is provided free. While the Maldives has a
54Govemment of the Maldives, Sustainable Human Development,. Constraints, Plans and Strategies,
55 Ministry of Planning, Human Resources and Environment, Maldives, Statistical Year Book, 1994, p.8
56 Ibid
57 Webb, Maldives: People and Environment. p. 31
58 Ministry of Planning, Human Resources and Environment, Maldives, Statistical Year Book, 1994, p.62
53 Ministry of Planning, Human Resources and Environment, Maldives, National Development Plan 1991- 1993, p.83
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total of 259 educational institutions, higher education institutes are limited with GCE
A' Levels the highest certificate being obtained. University education has to be
received in other countries. Although vocational training institutes have been
established the services are rudimentary.
The island societies are structured and disciplined. Islam is more than just a
religion in the country. It is a way of life and effects all aspects of the society.
Nevertheless, societal threats such as those that may arise from problems associated
with drugs do exist. In order to combat the spread of drug abuse and trafficking the
government has introduced a number of measures, both legal and organisational. The
Law on Narcotic Drugs (Law No. 17/77) was passed in 1977 by which any person
who knowingly imports, exports, uses, gives, stores, possesses or otherwise handles
narcotics may be subjected from 12 to 22 years of imprisonment or banishment
and/or may be fined an amount between Rf 5000 to Rf 200,000, depending on the
gravity and seriousness of the crime.59 Among the administrative measures include
the establishment of a committee for the control of drug abuse which was set up in
1986. The main purpose of the committee is to educate and create public awareness
among the people. A program was held in 1993 where all the chiefs of the atolls were
given information on drugs. A Drug Control Bureau (DCB) was also established in
the Ministry of Defence and National Security. The main objective of the DCB is to
stop the inflow of drugs by defining the routes and securing the arrest of the
traffickers and suppliers.
Environmental Resources
In 1989, the government of the Maldives, with the assistance from the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), forged an environmental management plan known as the
National Action Plan, the aim of which is,
59 Information by Drugs Control Bureau, Police Headquarters, National Security Service, Male
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"to help the government to maintain and improve the environment of the country,
including the marine and ocean areas within the Exclusive Economic Zone, and to
manage the resources therein for the collective benefit and enjoyment of future
generations". 60
The plan also underlines specific programmes such as the continuous assessment of
the country's environment, the development and implementation of management
methods, the enactment of national environmental legislation, and the strengthening
of national capabilities by institutional arrangements and financial support. With
regard to the above, surveys have been conducted on marine ecosystems and coral
reefs and a study has been done on solid waste management for urban centres and
tourist resorts. To halt the erosion of coral reefs, coral mining was at first banned and
later restricted to designated areas of the atolls. The government has also reduced the
import duties of building material to reduce the use of coral as a construction
material. In 1993, the Citizen's Majlis approved the Environmental Protection and
Preservation Act which gives the Ministry of Planning and Environment (now the
Ministry of Planning, Human Resources and Environment) statutory powers of
environmental regulation and enforcement of such regulations. To combat the
problem of the lack of trained personnel, the government sends employees to train
overseas.
The Maldives has also attempted to bring the environmental problems of
small states to the attention of the international community. It successfully hosted the
Small States Conference on Sea Level Rise in 1989 resulting in the Male Declaration
that called for greater international recognition of the environmental problems of
small states and more assistance to such states by the international community. The
Maldives also participated in numerous international conferences including the
Second World Climatic Conference in 1990, the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development in 1992 and the Global Conference on the
Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States in Barbados in 1994.
60ministry of Planning, Human Resources and Environment, Maldives, Environment Action Plan, (Male),
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The country was instrumental in modifying the language of Agenda 21 of the Earth
Summit to ensure that the concerns of the SIDS were taken into consideration. The
Maldives is also a member of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS).
Contemporary Problems
Even though the country recognises that SIDS are vulnerable and security
problems are multifaceted, what the country can do to ensure its security is still very
limited. Almost all the characteristics of the vulnerability of SIDS are inherent in the
country. In almost every area, the country is weak, open and dependent. Militarily,
the country is extremely weak and unable to defend itself from external aggressors
such as mercenaries let alone other states. Due to the small size of the population the
number of military personnel is limited. The country also lacks the financial
resources to obtain military hardware and training facilities. Further, defence policy-
making is more of a reactionary nature than one of forward planning. Before 1988 the
whole military structure of the country was geared to maintain law and order.
However, after the 1988 mercenary attack the main objective of the military
establishment today is geared to defend against another mercenary attack. One of the
major constraints facing the country in organising its defence structure is the
physical nature of the country. The scattered nature of the islands, with wide
dispersal of population, means that at present the government cannot provide any
defence for the majority of the islands apart from Male. In the event of an armed
aggression taking place in one of the outer islands it is going to take some
considerable time before the NSS can reach them. This kind of situation can be
further aggravated by rough seas and weather.
The political system in the Maldives has a dual personality. On one hand it is
strong and relies on traditional values and norms for its legitimacy and popularity.
On the other hand, it is weak, open and dependent on foreign resources. Lack of
resources and qualified manpower have created numerous problems, even in the day
to day running of the government. The country relies heavily on foreign expertise and
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assistance. Like most of the SIDS, the political system is based on a handful of
political influentials, if not just a single individual. Today, President Gayoom is
synonymous with the government and vice versa, as was the case with his
predecessors. Although the political system is based on 'parliamentary democracy',
the concept of 'democracy' is interpreted in a different manner to that of the normal
use of the word in the West. President Gayoom claimed in 1990 that the Western
concept of democracy differs from the Islamic concept of democracy. 61 The non-
existence of any political parties, and therefore an organised opposition, means that
the policies of the government are carried out virtually unopposed and unquestioned.
No pressure groups exist and the majority of the members of Parliament are also
government employees. Besides, no political rallies or demonstrations are allowed
and criticisms of government policies are not encouraged, although officially the
government states that it will appreciate 'constructive criticisms'. However, some
claim that the lack of political parties does not necessarily have a negative impact
for the people and the country in general. This is based on the argument that if there
are separate political groupings then it will divide the people and therefore a
government based on a 'single strong man' may be preferable; as Azar and Moon note
"National security performance may be enhanced more by 'benevolent' dictatorship
with high legitimacy than by fragile and incompetent pluralist regimes with low
legitimacy" 62 . However, the danger here is that the desire for political change among
the people may not let a regime which relies on traditional values and norms for its
legitimacy to remain so for a long time. As far as the role of the Maldives in the
international community is concerned, it has very little influence on what goes on
outside its territory. The Maldives does play some role in the SAARC, but it is still a
very limited role compared to the larger members such as India and Pakistan.
Vulnerability in the Maldives is most apparent in the economy of the country. It is
extremely open and susceptible to outside forces. An acute shortage of natural
resources means that the country's economy has to depend on fishing and tourism.
61 Ministry of Information and Culture, Maldives, Maldives News Bulletin, Yearbook 1990, ( Male), p. 80
62 Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon (eds), National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and
External Threat, p. 81
141
Almost everything that is needed has to be imported. Exports (f.o.b) stood at US$ 66
million in 1993 whereas the imports (c.i.f) amounted to US$218 million. 63 Due to the
small population the domestic market is extremely limited. However, the Maldives
cannot influence international markets and the main export product, tuna, is highly
sensitive to the prices of the international tuna markets. Further, the tourism industry
is also susceptible to foreign economic trends.
Threats: Potential, Latent and Manifest
Although every country is a possible target for aggression from another one,
as far as the Maldives is concerned it is highly unlikely that the country is about to
be invaded by another stronger power. The Maldives lacks any strategic raw
materials and though it is located in a strategic position in the Indian Ocean there is
very little reason for another state to actually invade and take over the country. There
are no foreign military bases in the country and it is unlikely that Gan or any other
island will be leased to another country in the near future. The threat from non-state
actors, however, is a potential one and one which is difficult to discard as a thing of
the past. The threat of mercenaries goes together with the tensions that exist in the
region. The attack of 1988 can be claimed as a spill-over effect from the conflicts in
neighbouring countries. Before 1988, the ethnic violence in Sri Lanka did not affect
the Maldives directly, but the easy availability of trained guerrillas was no doubt the
principal factor that finally led to the coup attempt. "They are doing nothing: they
have no jobs" commented a moderate PLOTE member "Anyone can recruit 100 to
200 any day". 64 The easy availability of arms in Sri Lanka was undoubtedly another
factor. The threat of mercenaries is based on the fear that the easy availability of such
mercenaries may encourage future trouble-makers to resort to similar methods to
satisfy their needs.
63 Commonwealth Secretariat, Small States: Economic review and basic statistics, (London, April 1995), p.40
64 Asiaweek 18 November 1988, p.37
142
The problem is not only of a military nature and does not necessarily depend
on the success rate. These kind of attacks affect the whole country and its social
structure even if unsuccessful in the end. In the Maldives, where the murder rate was
nil before the attack, the fact that eighteen people died left horrible marks on the
society. The effects of the attack left its scars on the political structure of the country
as well. It created panic and confusion among both officials and the general public.
Once the people recovered from the initial shock, they began to question why such an
incident happened in an otherwise peaceful country. The incident also led to a
massive effort to increase the military strength of the country. It led to young
students, who have just completed their schooling, being recruited directly into the
military service. Further, the government incurred substantial expenses to repair the
physical damage caused by the attack. There is also the fear of what could have
happened had these attacks succeeded. It is almost certain that in the Maldives a
puppet government would have been established and the country could have become
a terrorist base, not only affecting the country itself but also with the prospect of
being drawn into the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.
The Maldives reacted to the threat of mercenarism by strengthening its
military forces. However, a strong military force can create problems by itself.
Although the Maldives has yet to face an incident of this nature, the growing power
of the military has created uneasy feelings among the general population. The fact
that the 1988 attack led to the arrest of two army personnel, including an ex-Major of
the NSS, invites the possibility of threats emanating from the military. There have
been allegations that the top military officials are divided among themselves and
there are several factions within the NSS. In 1989 and 1990 rumours of a possible
military coup grew within the country and in 1990 the Deputy Minister of Defence
was removed from his post following his sudden departure from the country. In 1991,
some middle level officers were imprisoned for unknown reasons. It was alleged that
they had planned a military take-over. However, today the military appears to be
loyal to the President and the possibility of a military take-over appears to be remote.
143
Another problem that has surfaced in recent times is the distinct dislike of the
military by the general public. After the 1988 mercenary attack young males who has
just completed secondary school were forced to join the military. Although this
policy was relaxed later on, again in 1994 around 200 students were forced to join the
NSS. Under legislation passed by the Citizen's Majlis any student who has
completed the tenth Grade and who has sat for GCE 0' Levels is required the serve
the government for a period of three years if the government demands it. Many
students were forced to join the NSS and those who refused were put under house
arrest. The problem is that when unwilling students are forced to join the NSS it
could in itself become a security risk.
Although the country appears to be politically stable and the majority of the
people appears to accept the current political system, the country has also
experienced attempted political coups. Political coups or attempted ones can be
identified as two types. The first is that of the traditional kind where the people of the
country gathers in front of the seat of power; in the days of the Sultan it used to be his
Palace, and today it is the NSS headquarters. They demand the removal of the leaders
and it is more of a demonstration and usually without violence. The last one of this
type took place in 1974, when a dramatic rise in food prices led to the people to plot
to overthrow the government. They gathered in front of the Police Headquarters but
the coup was unsuccessful and more than 400 people were arrested. The second type
is new and more dangerous. That is of hiring mercenaries to overthrow the
government. Although mercenaries are not a totally new phenomenon, (in 1909 some
Indians were hired by a dissident to overthrow the government but the attack was
quelled by the local militia), in the last 15 years there have been three instances
where Maldivians have attempted to hire mercenaries to overthrow the government.
Although none of these attempts were successful such an event taking place again
cannot be totally ruled out. Besides, the 1988 attack had also raised certain questions
as to the real power behind the attack. Although it was claimed that the members of
the PLOTE wanted to acquire a training base and therefore sponsored the attack,
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there are allegations that certain high level government officials knew about the
attack and in some cases were responsible for financing the attack.
Although coup d'êtat aimed at overthrowing the government may not be
common, there are changes in the country that could create problems in the future.
One of the main potential problems is the growing dislike of the people of the
existing political system which is highly personalised. The whole government relies
solely on one person and that is the President. The Maldives has been a Republic
since 1968 and the President is elected for a period of five year terms but in the last
twenty nine years there have been only two Presidents. The President is extremely
powerful and the ruling elite has been mainly the relatives and few close friends of
the President. The problem, today, is that the younger generation of elites are
educated and thus do not appear to be quite so ready to accept such a system for
long. Such problems have already surfaced. In 1990 and 1991 several people,
categorised by Amnesty International as Prisoners of Conscience, were imprisoned
in relation to the launching of a magazine, "Sangu" (The Conch Shell), directed
mainly at criticising the nepotism and corruption that was allegedly going on in the
government. The problem is that although the government initially appeared to
welcome such freedom of expression evidenced when President Gayoom stated in
1989, "The Maldivian people need to begin a new era of democracy and thus fresh
ideas and new thoughts are in demand", the experimentation was short-lived.65
There has also been constant accusations of human right violations. Although
allegations of imprisonment without trials and abuse of prisoners are nothing new, in
the past it has always been discussed in hushed voices and never in the open.
Nevertheless, in recent years, this has attracted international interest, mainly through
the works of those who have received education abroad and have foreign contacts.
This has been highlighted in an Amnesty International Report which expressed its
concern to the government about prisoners who were detained for long periods
without trial and about certain prisoners who have been ill-treated in detention,
65 Qouted in James Pringle, "Maldives: Hardlines hit back at political reforms", Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 May 1990
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including solitary confinement for long periods.66 The problem is that although these
type of allegations are not unique to the current regime in power, since they were
also made about previous regimes, it is only now that the people appear to be
unwilling to accept them as part and parcel of the political system.
The desire in people for change was also highlighted in the 1993 Presidential
Election. For the first time in the history of the Maldives, where the incumbent
President has usually received 90% of the votes caste by the Majlis, the members
voted for an alternative candidate. Although President Gayoom won a majority of 28
votes, his brother-in-law Ilyas Ibrahim got 18 votes, proving that the people are not
so willing to agree with the wishes of the existing government as they had done in
the past. 67 The reaction of the government to this also created some apprehension
among the public. The government accused the opposition Mr. Ibrahim of engaging
the help of a local 'witch doctor' in order to attain power and of bribery and misuse
of power. He was tried in absentia and sentenced to 15 years and six months
banishment. 68 (He is currently living in Singapore in exile). Many of his supporters
were also imprisoned and some sentenced to fifteen years of banishment. Thus the
desire for political change by the people and the reluctance by those in office to
relinquish their power can ultimately create instability in the country. The problem is
compounded by the fact that the majority of those who support Mr. Ibrahim do not
appear to be genuine supporters of him as a person and as a leader but are simply
against the current regime. Mr. Ibrahim is seen as the man who is most likely to oust
the current leadership. However, the danger is that removing one President and
replacing him with another may not ultimately result in a change of the political
system. And, as such, the people may soon be disenchanted with the replacement as
well. However, a sudden and total upheaval of the existing system may also create
problems.
66 Amnesty International, Report on the Republic of Maldives, Prisoners of Conscience and unfair trial concerns, 1990 -
1993, June, 1993, pp.1
67 Haveeru News Paper, Male, 23 August 1993
68 Ibid. 19 September 1993
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Even though Male is the seat of political power and the rest of the country has
very little political say, it is unlikely that this will lead to secessionist tendencies in
the near future. Although the Addu secessionist movement could have resulted in the
dismemberment of the country, there have been no such attempts since then. The
problem of secessionism can always theoretically exist in archipelagic states and the
Maldives is no exception. There are individual differences among the atolls and there
is no love lost between neighbouring islands let alone neighbouring atolls. However,
the chance of one island declaring itself independent is highly unlikely as the
majority of the islands are sparsely populated. The only remote chance of it
happening is in the south again, in Addu Atoll where the people are more affluent.
However, the problem is less likely now as quite a bit of integration has taken place
between the Addu people and those from Male.
Domestically, real political threats facing the country today are limited.
However, the same cannot be said of threats from outside. One of the main problems
is that of violation of its territorial waters and the EEZ by outside sources.
Surveillance is a major problem as demonstrated by the fact that in 1988 mercenaries
were able to sail into the harbour at Male in two vessels without being detected.
However, unlawful use of the Maldivian territory is mainly restricted to fishing by
foreign vessels. The problem is one that is mainly associated with the geographical
nature of the country. The Maldivian Coast Guard is expected to patrol and maintain
surveillance over more than 90,000 square kilometres. However, it neither has the
financial and technical resources nor the manpower to do so. It is not known how
many Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFN) are operating in the EEZ of the
Maldives. To overcome this problem the country needs an effective maritime
capability; "a force which is capable of both surveillance and timely interception and
good intelligence". 69 However, the limited means available provides a hindrance to
this. Aircraft capable of surveillance of 200 nautical miles and beyond cost at least
US $330,000 - $430,000 with a running cost of more the US $ 100/= per hour. 70 This
69 Harden, Small is dangerous: Micro-states in a macro-world, p.85
70 Ibid
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was an estimate in 1985 and as such there is no doubt that the cost will be much
higher today. Apart from this, the country would require fast patrol boats capable of
intercepting the vessels violating the maritime zones, and these type of boats are
quite costly as well, even second-hand ones. The problem is much deeper than just
acquiring them. The Maldivian Coast Guard now possess some vessels for these
purposes. A further problem lies in the maintenance of these boats, the training of
personnel etc. The unavailability of spare parts in the country means that if there is a
technical breakdown of any of the parts or the vessel itself, the whole operation
comes to a standstill until spares can be brought from abroad and technicians flown
in. Besides, the Coast Guard also carries out rescue missions of those in distress at
sea and such missions are quite common in a country where the sea is the main route
for transportation. As such, in a leaflet outlining the functions of the Coast Guard,
the first on the list is that of search and rescue. The problem is that the Coast Guard
does not possess the resources to carry out the functions of search and rescue in a
proper manner let alone the surveillance of the EEZ for unlawful poaching as well.
The Maldives has tried to maintain a non-aligned policy and attempts to
distance itself from the regional turmoil that exist within the South Asian region of
the Indian Ocean. Actual cases of foreign pressure are difficult to identify but the
country has, from time to time, found itself in a difficult position. In 1990, the
Maldives hosted the Fifth SAARC Summit. Sri Lanka also wished to host the
Summit as they had been unable to do so the previous year when it was their turn due
to security reasons. The Maldives found itself in an extremely delicate situation. The
government wanted to have it in the Maldives yet did not want to go into a
confrontation with Sri Lanka. The issue was resolved when the rest of the SAARC
countries supported the Maldives claim to host the Summit. After Indian assistance
in 1988, the Maldives grew extremely close to India. Sceptics fear that it is now
going to be extremely difficult for the government to say 'No' to India. India can exert
pressure on the Maldives if it so wishes. The problem for a country like the Maldives
is that it is so heavily dependent on foreign aid and trade that it basically cannot
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afford to say 'no' to the wishes of these countries. It has been claimed that Japan
threatened to block Maldivian fish imports if the country refused to back the
Director-General of the WHO, Nakajima of Japan. 71 The growing influence of the
United States has also raised many questions within the country. Visits by high level
officials of the US government and military have created uncertainties as to the
intentions of the United States.
Although the country has made phenomenal progress in the last fifteen years
the Maldives still remains in the UNDP's Least Developed Category. Economic
threats in the form of economic shocks can seriously harm the economy. In the past
the country depended on the export of just a single product, dried fish known as
"Maldive fish", to Sri Lanka. In 1971 Sri Lanka changed its policy and announced
that it could no longer buy fish from the Maldives. This cessation of export brought
the country almost to a standstill. Although it led to moves to rapid diversification
and the development of tourism, initially the hardships faced by the people led to
severe problems. This economic hardship, coupled with the problems of the oil crisis
and world recession, led to the attempted coup in 1974. In the 1980s conflict in the
Persian Gulf, together with recession in the industrialised countries and the
imposition of 'third country' shipping trade, affected the Maldives shipping sector and
resulted in the decline of the country's ocean freight line. Similarly, the Gulf War
seriously affected the tourism industry. Although it has now recovered tourism is
highly susceptible to the impact of economic problems in Europe and the Far East.
According to a survey conducted with other factors being constant, "A one per cent
change in the income levels of the generating markets will lead to a two per cent
change in tourist arrivals in the Maldives." 72 The fisheries sector, too, is highly
dependent of world tuna prices. Since 1990, the industry has suffered from low
prices (30% decline) in export of frozen fish. Natural disasters can also threaten the
economy of the country. As such, economic shocks can create serious problems for
71 Time 18 January 1993, pp.16
72 Address by H.E. Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, President of the Maldives at the tenth Non-Aligned Summit in Indonesia,
1992
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the country not just in terms of economic development but also affecting other areas
such as political stability and harmony among the people. Another form of economic
threat can come from foreign business influences. In the Maldives one hundred per
cent foreign owned companies can invest in the country. However, major regional
and international companies are hesitant to do so due to difficulties in raising capital
overseas as a consequence of the lack of a legal investment framework in the country
and an international credit rating for the Maldives.73
 As such, at present, threats from
foreign business influence are minimal.
Although ethnically and religiously the Maldives is a homogenous country,
in recent years religious issues have started to divide the community. Although Islam
plays a major influence in the lives of the people of the Maldives, the country has
never been a traditional Muslim one. As such, Islam, although the state religion, has
never been a dominating force in the political decision-making of the country.
However, when the current regime took over, President Gayoom had sought to
introduce a policy of 'returning back' to the Islamic way of life. However, this was far
from the traditional or fundamentalist strain of Islam that is found in states such as
Iran. Yet, in recent years, fundamentalism appears to be spreading in the country.
More and more women are covering themselves in the fashion of those found in
traditional Islamic societies. The spread of fundamentalism appears to be sponsored
by Pakistan and Iran. The fundamentalists in the country argue against the sale of
alcohol in tourist resorts. Although the problem is still under control if the advocates
of such policies get to a position of power then the country might face many
problems, especially in its developmental efforts as tourism is the main foreign
exchange earner and according to leading economists the way for the Maldives to
develop.
Among the societal problems facing the country, the threat from narcotic
drugs is a real one. It appears to dominate Male at the moment, but it can spread to
73 Ministry of Planning, Human Resources and Environment, Maldives, National Development Plan 1991 - 1993, p. 66
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other islands as drug abusers are often banished to other islands, and signs of this are
already seen. Although illicit cultivation has been limited (it was first reported in
1978 that a group of Italians were harvesting marijuana on an uninhabited islands)
the number of uninhabited islands in the country can be an attraction for others to
follow suit. However, one disadvantage for those who may attempt such cultivation
is the poor nature of the soil in the Maldives which make it difficult to grow any sort
of plants apart from salt loving shrubs and coconut palms. Another problem
associated with drugs is the existing legal framework in the country with regard to
drug abuse. At the moment people are tried by the courts under Law No. 17/77.
However, no rehabilitation facilities exist in the country today, and banishment of
both traffickers and users to other islands may simply encourage the spread of drug
abuse to other parts of the country. The problem of rehabilitation is not only due to
the lack of resources needed to build such an establishment and the lack of qualified
staff, but is also attributable to the Islamic nature of the country which sees the
abusers as criminals rather than victims. Therefore punishment, by imprisonment in
jail or banishment to other islands is seen as the proper method of dealing with the
problem. As such, those who are drug dependent may continue to be so without
proper rehabilitation. The main difficulty here is that however much the government
tries to control the import of drugs, as long as there is a demand people will find
ways and means to smuggle in supplies, especially when they are easily available in
some of the neighbouring countries.
Another societal problem facing the country today is the increasing
population. The population is expected to double by the year 2010 A.D. One fourth
of the population dwells in Male in an area that is barely two square kilometres. This
has led to severe shortage of land and the depletion of the fresh water lens in the
capital island. Other sectors such as waste disposal, electricity and roads are over-
stretched. Associated with the population problem is the discovery that the Maldives
has one of the highest incidence of thalassaemia, a hereditary blood disorder, in the
world. One out of every six people is a carrier of thalassaemia. Children that have
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the disease rarely live beyond the age of ten years without treatment. Treatment is
expensive costing the government US$6,000 per child. 74 The problem with such a
disease is that although ante-natal diagnoses is possible abortion is an unacceptable
option for the people because of the Islamic background.
Among the actual threats currently facing the country, environmental threats
take top priority. Environmental fragility, together with environmental degradation,
have created real problems. The main threat is undoubtedly from climatic change and
the associated sea level rise. While the disappearance of the Maldives due to the rise
in sea-level may be a worst case scenario, any increase in sea-level is likely to result
in reduced island stability, enhanced beach erosion, land loss and reduction in the
quality and quantity of ground water resources. Further, the increasing frequency of
storms has had devastating effects. Even though the country is yet to suffer from a
major oil spill, this presents a serious problem as the Maldives relies so much on its
marine resources. It can effect the fishery resources as well as tourism. Although the
country recognises the threat from environmental degradation, among other problems
are the shortage of resources, human and financial, to overcome such threats. No
formal in-country training programmes in environment and development exist. The
absence of environmental expertise means that the Maldives has to rely on foreign
expertise and assistance to formulate and carry out its environmental policies.
Besides, the capacity to enforce environmental legislation is extremely weak. Further,
the lack of public awareness on environmental problems increases the difficulties in
carrying out policies
Conclusion
The Maldives faces numerous security problems. Militarily the country is
highly vulnerable with limited military resources to provide security for a large area,
most of which is the surrounding sea. Yet the actual threats facing the country are
low. The possibilities of military threats from foreign invasion exist as a potential
74 Government of the Maldives, Sustainable Human Development; Constraints, Plans and Strategies, p.4I
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problem but the probabilities of such an incident occurring is extremely low. Even
though the country appears to fear the threat from mercenaries it is unlikely that
another attack might take place in the near future given the past high rate of failure of
such attacks as well as external assistance from the outside world that may be
provided. However, as long as tensions and political instability remains in the
neighbouring countries it cannot be totally dismissed. Thus, militarily, the security
problems of the Maldives are more systemic than actual. The same is true where
political security problems are concerned. Threats in the form of political coups and
political instability are latent. Economically the country is once more highly
vulnerable and it faces threats which can be identified as manifest among which
include the unauthorised poaching in the EEZ of the country and the uncontrolled
growth of the population. Other economic threats exist as well, such as economic
shocks, but these are more difficult to identify until they actually take place. Thus,
problems are actual and total. Where the Maldivian society is concerned threats are
once again latent apart from the problems that may arise from drug abuse and
trafficking. Although threats exist the society appears to be capable of overcoming
some of them. The biggest threats facing the Maldives are environmental threats.
They appear to be real threats and ones that need an urgent solution. As far as
environmental security problems are concerned the problems appear to be total as the
country suffers from high vulnerability as well as actual threats. In general actual
threats and potential threats can be identified in all areas. However, the basis for the
majority of problems appears to stem from the country's vulnerability rather than the
number of actual threats facing the country today. Military weakness, coupled with
political and economic openness and dependence, and environmental fragility has
made the country extremely vulnerable to any threats that may arise in the future as
well as those that exist today. While on the whole, the Maldives faces some actual
threats in certain areas and is vulnerable in general, all problems appear to have their
underlying basis in the small size and the geographical nature of the country together
with its underlying characteristics of islandness.
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Chapter VI
Case Study: THE SEYCHELLES
Background 
Physical Environment
The group of islands that comprises the Seychelles cover an aggregate land
area of 444 square kilometres in the western Indian Ocean, 4° to 11 0 south of the
equator. It is fairly remote, being 575 miles from Madagascar and 980 miles from
Mauritius. There are 115 islands (excluding the tiny islets) which are located in four
main groups, the Seychelles, Amirante, Farquhar and Aldabra with four smaller
islands; Denis, Bird, Platte and Coetivy. The Seychelles boasts an EEZ of 1.3 million
square kilometres. Some of the islands are granitic, forty-two in all. The rest are
coralline. In some of the islands the land is therefore high above the sea level and the
beaches fringe massive granite mountains. The highest point is Morne Seychellois, a
2,990 feet peak on the main island of Mahe'. The coralline islands are barely a few
feet above the sea level and human settlements are few. The majority of the islands
lie outside the cyclone belt. In the Seychelles more than 500 varieties of flora and
many rare birds exist. The Black Parrot and the Paradise Fly-catcher are two birds
unique to the country. The coco-de-mer is among the largest fruits in the world and is
found only in the Seychelles, as are the giant tortoises from Aldabra atoll. The
country has set up a number of Marine National Parks for the protection of its marine
resources. The Seychelles enjoys a tropical climate lending favour to the
development of tourism. The average temperature is 27°C. Although tropical
vegetation is commonly found, the soil contains only 1% of organic matter, and
agriculture is limited. Mineral wealth, too, is fairly limited. Exploration for oil has
taken place on a small scale. The Seychelles organised a regional Indian Ocean
Seminar on oil exploration in September 1992, attended by eight Indian Ocean
countries, with a view to co-operate on a geological study to identify oil rich sites.'
The government is investigating the possibility of processing coral into lime. A
1 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 19 September 1992, p. 6
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Swiss Company is also involved in the quarrying of granite but in the past many such
projects were abandoned due to high transport costs.2
Historical Background
The island group of the Seychelles remained extremely isolated until fairly
recently. The Arabs may have sighted and landed on the islands in their voyages to
the east but the first Europeans that 'discovered' the islands may have been the
Portuguese. The first documented mention of the islands was by an Englishman,
John Jourdain, in 1609. He was part of an expedition which visited the islands and he
describes them as, "a very good refreshing place 	 without any fear or danger,
except the alligators, for you cannot discerne that ever any people had been there
before us". 3 The islands were also frequented by pirates among who the most
notorious was Olivier Le Vasseur, more commonly known as "La Buze", who was
well known for harassing shipping in the Indian Ocean, mainly British and French.
Although there appeared to be a Dutch settlement in the islands in the sixteenth
century, the first permanent settlements were by those who came over from
neighbouring Mauritius and Reunion and took place in the eighteenth century. It is
claimed that in 1771, fifteen "blancs" (whites) and some slaves settled in Mahe'. 4 It
appears that the French may have been among the early settlers with their slaves. The
British arrived in the islands in the nineteenth century mainly from India and the
colonies on the East African coast.
In the past, the Seychelles was the subject of rivalry between the French and
the British and the country was more or less jostled to and fro between French and
British control. In the middle of the eighteenth century two major expeditions were
sent to the Seychelles by the French and in 1756 the islands were claimed by the
French. The colony was named Sechelles after Vicomte Moreau de Sechelles, a
French Controller General of finance. The British acquired control of the islands in
3 Quoted in Marcus Franda, The Seychelles: unquiet islands, (Gower Publishing Co. Ltd, Hants, 1982), p. 7
4 Ibid.
2 Ibid, 23 May 1992, p. 5
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1815 under the Treaty of Paris and changed the spelling to 'Seychelles'. It has been
claimed that prior to this the leadership of the islands changed the flag in the port
from the Union Jack to the French Tricolour depending on which country's ships
were entering the port. The British control of the Seychelles was a second best as
they had tried to trade the Seychelles and Mauritius for the French possessions in
India but had failed to do so. The Seychelles were granted the status of a colony in
1903. In 1967 a partially elected governing council was established and in 1970 a
limited self-government was established with a chief minister. The Seychelles
received independence in 1976.
Socio-economic background
Economically, the Seychelles is like many of the SIDS, dependent on a few
primary industries. Tourism occupies the first place. It has expanded since the
construction of an international airport in 1971. Industries in the Seychelles include
a brewery, a tobacco manufacturing plant, a plastic factory, a milk production plant,
and soap and detergent factories. Others on a smaller scale include boat-building,
furniture making and tailoring. Although arable land is limited the climatic
conditions help the growth of coconut, the main cash crop. However, the staple food,
rice, and other main food products, are imported. Minor export crops include
patchouli, vanilla, tea and limes. Although agriculture is limited, home grown fruits
and vegetables such as bananas, mangoes, bread fruit and sweet potatoes are
common. The government owns some farms, including livestock farms and some
fruit and vegetable farms. The Seychelles has seen some progress in the country's
economy in recent years. The GDP increased from 147 million US dollars in 1980 to
393 million in 1992. 5 In the Seychelles, the Central Bank of the Seychelles is the
bank of issue and four foreign banks, including Barclays Bank and Banque Francais
Comerciale, have branches in the capital, Victoria.
5 Commonwealth Secretariat, Small States: Economic Review and basic statistics, (Commonwealth Secretariat, London, April
1995), P.31
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The Seychelles are fortunate to be free from most of the indigenous diseases
that are found on the African continent such as malaria, yellow fever and bilharzia.
In 1990 there were 49 doctors and 436 hospital beds. Due to the fact that the majority
of the population lives on the main island of Mahe', health services are accessible to
the majority of the population. A doctor is permanently stationed on the islands of
Praslin and La Digue and a midwife on the island of Silhouette.
Perception of Security Problems
Security problems occupied a minor place in the history of the
Seychelles until independence. Once independence was achieved and the protective
umbrella of the British was removed, the Seychelles, like most of the newly
independent states, found itself, as its first President, James Mancham described,
"alone in a world of conflict and pressure". 6
 At the time of independence he
stated that his government would,
"try and pursue the philosophy of a small Indian Ocean Switzerland which might
become an off-shore banking and financial centre, would have no armed forces,
would accept no foreign bases and would have no defence agreement with Britain".7
However, after independence, far from being the Switzerland of the Indian Ocean
the problems suddenly appeared to multiply. The Seychelles has been preoccupied
with threats of coups that might have led to the toppling of the government,
especially with the use of mercenaries. The government of James Mancham was
overthrown in 1977 in a bloodless coup and his Prime Minister, France-Albert Rene,
assumed control. The coup involved some members of the police force and 200
'militant workers'. Whilst this was done by Seychellois people and not foreign
mercenaries, the deposed President accused the Soviet Union of "active agreement
and connivance" and claimed that it was "part and parcel of the policy of the Soviet
control of the Indian Ocean". 8
 This was vehemently denied by the Soviet News
6 James Mancham, Paradise raped: life, love and power in the Seychelles, (Methuen, London, 1983) p. 158
7 Quoted in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 12 March 1976, p. 27852
8 Ibid. 4 August 1977, p. 28485
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Agency Tass and the new government in the Seychelles. There were also allegations
that the force which carried out the coup was trained by the Tanzanians.
The history of the country since independence is replete with incidents of this
nature. In 1978 the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Victoria announced the discovery
of a plot to overthrow the government of Rene with the assistance of mercenaries.
According to the government, several arms caches were found in vessel at the port of
Mombasa in Kenya ready to leave for the Seychelles. Although the Kenyan
authorities claimed that the only vessel fitting the description in Mombasa was an
unseaworthy yacht, the Ministry of Internal Affairs alleged that several Kenyan
ministers were involved in a personal capacity and that the former president James
Mancham and three of his former ministers were also involved. Subsequently, 21
people were arrested and two US civilians employed at the US Airforce Tracking
station were ordered to leave the country because of alleged involvement. 9 In 1979
the Seychelles government announced that another plot "sponsored from abroad with
the co-operation of mercenaries standing ready in Durban (South Africa)" had been
uncovered and 78 people were arrested. m
 However, the most infamous attack, which
actually took place, was in 1981. This was by a group of mercenaries led by Michael
Hoare, known as Colonel 'Mad Mike', and involved mainly South African merce-
naries disguised as a tourist group. The discovery of weapons in their hand luggage
by the Seychelles customs alerted the mercenaries and led them to start the attack
earlier than planned. The Seychellois government was able to quell the attack with
the help of the Tanzanian military whose men were training the Seychelles armed
forces. The mercenaries escaped to South Africa by hijacking an Air India plane
which happened to land while the fighting was still going on. In December 1982,
another 'plot' was discovered, first reported by The Sunday Times. It alleged that the
plot was to be carried out first by de-stabilising the islands through a series of
bombings of public buildings and then by the invasion of 300 South African
9 Ibid, 30 June 1978, p. 29059
10 President France Albert Rene, 16 November 1979, Quoted in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 30 May 1980, p.30273
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mercenaries." In September 1986, there was once again allegations of another plot
with the help of the army as well as mercenaries. This resulted in the dismissal of
three senior military officers and a reshuffle of the Council of Ministers. 12
 As such,
the early years of independence in the Seychelles was threatened by coups, real and
imaginary.
With respect to threats from external sources, the continuous military build-
up in the Indian Ocean did create anxiety among the leadership. President Ren6
claimed that the Seychelles had already taken measures to discourage the growth of
the military arsenal in the region and that it "will not grant facilities for the
establishment of any foreign military bases" within its territory. 13 However, an actual
invasion by a foreign military power is not regarded as a possible threat. Although
the government of President Renê took a pro-Soviet stance, especially in his early
days, the Seychelles was able to withstand the influence and pressure from the
superpowers by playing one against the other. The United States had established a
satellite tracking station in 1963, which "repairs and gives instructions to satellites
in order to keep them in orbit and on track", bringing in much needed foreign
currency. 14 The number of personnel in the Soviet Embassy in Victoria was
increased substantially after the Socialist government came into power and, after the
Seychelles suffered from the mercenary attack in 1981, the Soviet Union despatched
two naval ships, a cruiser and a frigate, to the port of Victoria within two days of the
attack, which according to some symbolised the "strategic upper hand that Moscow
seems to have gained in this part of the Indian Ocean". 15 However, in a radio
broadcast on 5 October 1984 the President denied allegations that the Seychelles was
permitting the establishment of Soviet military facilities and declared that the
Seychelles welcomed Soviet military aid because "it was free and would welcome
11 See The Sunday Times, 24 October 1982
12 Africa Confidential, Vol.27, No. 20, 1 October 1986, p. 1
13 Address by H.E. France Albert Ren6, the President of the Seychelles, at the opening seminar on regional co-operation by
ACP states of East Africa and the Indian Ocean, 17 April 1980
14 Franda, The Seychelles: unquiet islands, pp. 69 -72, 118
15 International Herald Tribune, 11 December 1981
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16 Quoted in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, January 1985
17 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 20 July 1991, p. 3
free military aid from other countries". 16 Thus the Seychelles manoeuvred between
both sides. The Americans maintained their tracking station and relations improved
considerably in the 1980s. In February 1983, a US $ 3,000,000 aid agreement
was ratified. The Seychelles government continued to express concern about the
military build-up of the Indian Ocean and declared that, although it would welcome
warships from any state into the tiny port of Mahe', they would have to declare that
they were not carrying any nuclear weapons on board. This offer was taken up by the
Soviet Union but not by the United States in accordance with their policy of not
declaring whether the vessel carried any nuclear weapons.
Although the Seychelles maintained close relations with its two former
colonial masters, the relationship was fairly rocky at times. Initially, its relations
with the British were cordial. Although the British had detached three islands,
Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches from the Seychelles in 1965 to form the British
Indian Ocean Territory, these were later returned to the Seychelles at the time of its
independence. With the establishment of a Socialist government in 1978 relations
grew cool between the Seychelles and Britain and France. Seychelles accused France
of collaborating with some persons attempting to overthrow the government in 1979
and two French diplomats were declared persona non grata. However, relations
improved afterwards and following the 1981 mercenary attack, the French sent a
warship to Victoria the very next day. In recent years Britain and France have put
considerable pressure on the Seychelles leadership to reform its political system and
President Rene, in his public addresses, constantly attacked this 'conspiracy' to force
him to make political changes."
When President Rene came to power relations with the OAU were
strengthened and close ties were established with Tanzania. Tanzania provided the
Seychelles with 'advisors' and assisted in training the newly established Seychellois
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armed forces. The difficulties with this kind of 'big brother' relationship for the
SIDS is to distance themselves from any conflict in which the 'big brother' might
get involved. Such was the case for the Seychelles when Tanzania went to war with
Uganda. The Seychelles described this incident as "something very serious" and,
admitting the dependency of Seychelles on Tanzanian military aid, President Rene
claimed that "there is a possibility that our enemies ... may decide that while our
brothers are busy with their problems they can come and attack us".18
In recent years, the Seychelles' biggest dilemma with regard to its neighbours
was with South Africa. Relations with South Africa were more or less double-edged.
Externally, relations had been quite hostile even though economic relations were
continued. No formal diplomatic relations were maintained in the past and the policy
of apartheid was widely condemned. Relations with South Africa deteriorated after it
was accused several times of helping with the numerous attempts to overthrow the
government of Rene, especially the 1981 mercenary attack. Allegations were made
that the attack was supported by the South African authorities who allegedly supplied
them with arms. Although this was vehemently denied by South Africa, later
evidence revealed it to be the case. A number of the mercenaries were reservists in
the South African defence forces and the manner in which they were treated once
they returned to South Africa shows that South Africa must have had some
connection with them. Although Mike Hoare and a few others were imprisoned, most
of the others were released. Louis Le Grange, the South African Minister of Police,
claimed that thirty-nine of the mercenaries were released because "they only shot out
some windows and ran around in the bush". 19 The United Nations Commission
which was set up to investigate the attack stated that "we find it difficult to believe
that the South African authorities did not at least have knowledge of the preparations
in this matter" 20 The mercenary leader himself later claimed that the South African
19 Quoted in Ministry of Education and Information, Seychelles, The White paper on aggression of 25 November 1981
against the Seychelles, (Seychelles, 1982)
2u Ibid.
18 Nation (Victoria Daily) 6 November 1978
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authorities supported the attack and provided them with weaponry. 21
 South Africa
later admitted responsibility and in July 1992, the government of the Seychelles
announced the receipt of R8,000,000 from the South African government as
compensation for the attempted coup. 22 While South Africa was accused of
interfering in the domestic politics of the Seychelles, economic contacts were
maintained discreetly, which gradually led to the decrease of South African
involvement on the political front. In 1982 an agreement was reached between the
Seychelles and South Africa under which the Seychelles released the mercenaries
captured by the security forces in the 1981 attack. According to some sources it also
included a secret clause under which the South African government agreed to prevent
further coup attempts developing in South Africa. 23 Whatever the truth of this the
Seychelles has subsequently been accused of assisting South Africa in breaking the
arms embargo and in aiding the sale of South African oi1.23a
Relations with Kenya too came to a head after the 1981 armed attack.
Allegations were made that Kenya helped the organisers of the attack. One of the
captured mercenaries claimed that the Kenyan government had "agreed to provide
two planes which would fly Kenyan soldiers and policemen to replace Tanzanian
troops" and that a new government would be 'flown in from Kenya 1 . 24 President
Rene, in a press conference held soon after the attack, claimed that "some members
of the Kenyan government do not like Seychelles and its present government" •25 But
Kenya categorically denied any involvement. Relationships with its smaller
neighbours are more or less friendly as it has cultural affinities with both
Mauritius and Reunion. However, the relationship with Mauritius is
complicated by a territorial dispute over the oceanic banks of Saya de
Malha, which are considered by the Seychelles to be an extension of its continental
21 Michael Hoare, The Seychelles Affair, (Bantam Press, London, 1986), pp. 19,48 - 56
22 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, July 1992
23 See Africa Confidential, Vol.28, No.22, 4 November 1987, pp.4 - 5
23a See The Independent 9 June 1992
24 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, May 1982
25 Ministry of Education and Information, Seychelles, White paper on aggression of 25 November 1981 against the
Seychelles
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shelf but are also claimed by Mauritius. In addition to this, Seychelles' ties with the
socialist Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM) have not been welcomed by
Mauritius which accused Seychelles of interfering in its domestic affairs by
financing the MMM.
Domestically, security problems have been seen by the leadership in the terms
of threats to itself from those advocating democratic policies in the country.
Domestic problems had existed even prior to independence. The relations between
the two political parties that existed at the time, the Seychelles Democratic Party
(SDP) led by James Mancham and the Seychelles People's United Party (SPUP) led
by Albert Rene, were quite hostile, and they constantly accused each other of
activities aimed at disrupting the peace and stability of the country. Sporadic terrorist
incidents occurred before and after independence, although at the time of
independence the two parties had called a truce. But the unstable nature of the
internal situation was revealed in full when the government of Mancham was
overthrown by the supporters of the SPUP. Soon after assuming power the new
leadership announced the establishment of a National Youth Service, which led to
considerable opposition by students and parents alike. Violent demonstrations by the
people led to schools being closed for one week. The President claimed that they
were trying to instigate "a counter-revolutionary situation" •26 The establishment of a
one-party state was also opposed by some factions of the society, and led to the
creation of resistance groups abroad, some of which were accused of being behind
the various attempted coups in the Seychelles. Among those who led the call for the
return of democracy to the Seychelles through multi-party politics was the former
President James Mancham who launched an organisation known as 'Crusade for
Democracy in the Seychelles'. They inundated the Seychelles with political messages
through the fax machine. Religious organisations were also viewed as a problem by
the leadership, especially the main Christian organisations which were critical of the
regime. Ever since Albert Rene assumed power the government and the Church has
26 Quoted in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 30 May 1980, p. 30237
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been at loggerheads. The Church was openly critical of the political system and often
called for the establishment of a democratic system, accusing the government of
corruption and embezzlement of state funds and criticising its human rights record,
especially the treatment of political prisoners. 27
 The government lashed back
vigorously at the Church and President Rene once stated that he wonders whether
one Reverend's accusations were "in the name of God, or of the former President
James Mancham, or a political party."28
The Seychelles has also faced problems from its military. At the time of
independence the country had no armed forces. However, the Seychelles People's
Militia was created shortly afterwards and a military establishment was completed in
1980. On 17 August 1982, a group of soldiers from the Seychelles Peoples Defence
Force (SPDF) took over key installations in Victoria, including the radio and police
stations, the telegraph office and the Union-Vale army camp, and demanded changes
from the government. These demands were somewhat uncertain with some
demanding the resignation of the government while others only wanted the removal
of the senior military leaders. Nine people were reported to have been killed in the
attack. The rebellion was suppressed with the aid of some 100 Tanzanians troops
who had remained on Seychelles after the 1981 armed attack, demonstrating the need
for external assistance. Another case of military involvement came in 1986. The
attempted coup against President Rene at this time was apparently led by the Minister
of Defence. However, at present the military appears to be loyal to the leadership
and therefore it is unlikely to be seen as a potential trouble-maker.
The Seychelles is fortunate that so far it has not experienced any separatist
incidents so that secession is not regarded as a potential problem by the government.
The absence of secessionist tendencies may be due to the fact that there were no
indigenous people and all Seychellois are ethnically of 'foreign' origin. Besides, the
smallness of the population may have helped in the assimilation of the community as
27 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 27 October 1990, p. 5; also 15 December 1990, p. 4
28 Ibid. 27 October 1990, p.5
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the need for co-operation and reliance on each other becomes greater. Besides, the
majority of the people live on the capital island of Mahe'.
The problems relating to the protection and surveillance of its territorial zones
are acknowledged to be a potential problem by the leadership. The Seychelles
possess the largest maritime zone in the Indian Ocean apart from India and France. It
has jurisdiction over 1.3 million square kilometres. This problem is prominent in the
Seychelles as the islands are far apart from each other and the majority of the people
live only on three islands. Although it does license foreign fleets from certain
countries to fish in its EEZ, such as the countries of the EC and the former Soviet
Union, several South Korean ships have been shipwrecked on islands carrying tons
of fish. The difficulty is that, like most SIDS, the Seychelles has no way of proving
that these vessels had been fishing in its EEZ. In the early 1980s a Japanese fishing
vessel was caught poaching and the government seized the ship with its catch.
Efficient surveillance of the EEZ is vital not just for the protection of the fish stocks
from unlawful fishing but also in watching out for contraband. Moreover, with the
numerous threats the Seychelles has experienced from mercenaries this is also a
main concern. Although a sea-borne invasion did not actually happen in the
Seychelles, the mercenary leader, Mike Hoare, claimed that the original plan for the
1981 attack included the use of boats and inflatable landing craft, but the plan had to
be abandoned due to the unavailability of funds. 29 President Rene claimed soon
afterwards that the maritime surveillance unit in the Seychelles "is a very effective
one" and that, "if once in a while we can bring in a culprit, someone who has in fact
been exploiting resources in our area of control, that is sufficient to deter others
from doing it because the cost to them is very high". 30 The violation of their maritime
zones and the airspace is not only carried out by would-be terrorists or fishing
vessels. Even other states sometimes use their waters as if it were part of the high
seas and their airspace as part of the global commons. In December 1981, soon after
the mercenary attack, an aircraft was sighted in the Seychelles' airspace which was
29 Hoare, The Seychelles Affair, p. 41
30 In an interview with Third World Media Services, March, 1982
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not identified. The Seychelles warned foreign missions in diplomatic notes that "any
such further violations will entail the shooting down of all aircraft involved without
prior warning".31
 However, it has no capability to carry out such actions.
Societal threats do exist to some extent in the form of those associated with
the trafficking and abuse of narcotic drugs, but, overall, the leadership does not see
the society as facing major security problems although the threat from narcotic drugs
is acknowledged as a potential one. It first arose in the country in the early 1980s
when there was a large infiltration of drugs into the country. President Rene declared
in 1982 that, "They have even come into the country inside settees, from which foam
has been removed and replaced by dnigs." 32
 Cannabis is the most common drug
found on the islands and is grown there. In September 1994, after attending a
regional conference on combating drug trafficking, the Police Commissioner
acknowledged that it is vital that the ships in transit at Port Victoria are thoroughly
checked for drugs. 33
 The police have also seized several consignments of dangerous
drugs, some allegedly brought in from Madagascar, and the anti-drug squad has
raided several plantations of cannabis.
Although the current leadership has been pre-occupied with security problems
that may arise from mercenary attacks or threats to itself from political opponents
favouring a democratic form of governing, the leadership recognises that the main
problems faced by the country are in the economic sector. 34
 The small size of the
country has created many bottle-necks in its economic development. The country is
highly dependent on tourism and although economic diversification has taken place
to a certain extent, it still has a lot to achieve. Although the small population has led
to a high GDP per capita in comparison with some other SIDS, the limited
population has also resulted in a limited domestic market. Among the main economic
31 International Herald Tribune, 1 December 1991.
32 H.E. Albert Rene, President of the Seychelles, speech delivered at the SPPF branch meeting at Mont Fleuri, Seychelles, on
19 September 1982.
33 Seychelles Nation, No.157, 1 September 1994 p.1
34 Interview with H.E. John P. Mascarenhas, the High Commissioner of the Seychelles to the United Kingdom, 12 December
1994
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problems facing the country today, the government argues, are the problems of
financial aid in the form of grants and loans. The government claims that the main
problem here is that the financing agencies, bilateral and multilateral, rely on a single
development indicator -per capita GNP- as the basis for providing grants. They state
that, "failure to mobilise grants and loans on sufficiently concessionary terms remains
the single largest threat to Seychelles' ability to deal with its high degree of
vulnerability" .35
The leadership also recognises the problems of environmental degradation
and argues that for the Seychelles "'environmental threat' has an immediate meaning
as well as long term significance" 36 . The Seychelles is fortunate that the main islands
are granitic and, as such, the problems of global warming and sea level rise is not a
major threat. However, due to its small area Seychelles' ecology is highly susceptible
to the destruction of trees and vegetation on steep slopes and along beaches, and to
improper disposal of domestic and industrial waste. Among those problems that have
been highlighted as needing urgent attention include the problem of marine
pollution. High levels of pollution have been building up, especially near the Victoria
harbour. Beach erosion is also a considerable concern to the government. It has
reached an advanced stage in many areas on the main island. The other area of major
concern is the disposal of domestic and industrial waste. 37 Oil spills, forest fires and
land slides have also been identified as "significant threats".38
Providing Security in the Seychelles
Military Resources
At the time of independence the Seychelles was without a defence force. A
small force was created soon afterwards which grew in strength in the following
years. However, today the total armed forces of the Seychelles consist of 300
35 Ministry of Planing and External Relations, Seychelles, National Development Plan 1990-94„ Vol 1, (Victoria, Mahe,
1990), p.22
36 Ibid, p. 24
37 Ibid. pp. 44 - 64
38 Ibid. p. 48
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personnel in the army, 1,000 personnel in the national guard and the coast guard has
300 personnel. The army has one infantry battalion, one artillery company and a
support unit and is based in Mahe'. The main strategy of the armed forces appears to
be to prevent small interventions by mercenaries or domestic dissidents. The
Seychelles spent 6% of its GDP ( US$ 12 million) on defence expenditure in 1990.
However, the defence budget has been cut down to US$ 9.6 million in 1995.39
Although the Seychelles has no defence agreement with another power it has
received military assistance from several countries among which are France,
Tanzania, India, North Korea and the Soviet Union. Indian military assistance has
been in the form of equipment and training. Tanzania also helped to establish and
train the Seychelles People's Liberation Army and it was with the assistance of
Tanzanian troops that the 1981 mercenary attack was put down. The Tanzanian
troops have now left and so have the North Korean military advisors. In 1988 a coast
guard delegation from the Seychelles visited India as guests of the Indian Navy and a
statement from the Indian side declared that they looked forward to 'substantial'
discussions on enhancing co-operation between the navies of the two countries.
President Rene also praised the Indian intervention in the Maldives in 1988 saying
that it was "the responsibility of the best equipped neighbouring countries to come to
the assistance of threatened nations which do not have the means to defend
themselves". 40
 The Seychelles have also sought assistance from the United States in
recent years. The first joint military exercise by the two armed forces, known as
Balance Scale 95 - 1, was held in July 1995 and involved 60 members of the
Seychelles' Peoples Defence Force (SPDF) and 90 members of the US Armed
Forces.4'
Political capabilities
Seychelles was a one-party state from 1979 to until recently. In 1992, multi
party elections were held for the first time for a 23 member commission to draft a
39 The Military Balance 1995/96, (Oxford University Press for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995), p.254
40 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 12 November 1988
41 Ibid. 1 July 1995, p. 3
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new constitution. Although the constitution failed to gain the necessary 60% votes at
the referendum in November 1992, an amended constitution was adopted in 1993.
Under the new constitution multi-party politics was institutionalised and currently
there are nine political parties. A National Assembly of thirty three members was
also established. Among the members 22 are elected directly and 11 seats are
allocated on a proportional basis. The government is headed by the President who is
elected every five years. The President is the Head of State and the Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces. In the first multi-party Presidential elections held in June
1993 after the abolition of the one-party system, President Rene was re-elected with
59.5 % of the vote; his party, the Seychelles People's Progressive Front (SPPF)
gained 27 seats to the opposition's five seats. The former President James Mancham
received 36.7% of the votes and his party the Democratic Party has four seats in the
parliament.42
Although the Seychelles has faced numerous political problems, mainly in the
form of attempts to overthrow the government, the country is relatively stable. One of
the reasons for this may be that those who dared to voice their criticisms against the
government or those who attempted to deviate from the official line have been
severely reprimanded in the past. According to some a person could lose his job and
his house for dissenting against the official view and phones have been regularly
tapped.43
 It appears that this has resulted in high levels of fear by the public of those
in power, and consequently, low levels of political participation. Further, the majority
of those who opposed the government of President Rene were based abroad, either of
their own will or having been forced to flee the country. For those Seychellois living
at home, despite the curtailment of political freedom, the economic and social well-
being and the standard of living have been improving considerably in recent years.
Under the Rene government the standard of social welfare provisions have been high
42 Africa South of the Sahara, 24th ed., (Europa Publications Limited, London, 1994), p.795
43 The Independent, 9 June 1992
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and many have benefited from the system. Therefore, many local people appeared to
be content with the then existing system of one party politics.
Externally, the Seychelles has followed a strong non-aligned policy that is
described by the Rene government as positive non-alignment. This means that the
country although following the path pursued by the more radical members of the
Non-Aligned Movement, who had the tendency to lean slightly towards the Socialist
bloc, also attempted to maintain good relations with the West. Despite having a
socialist government in the past, it has maintained good relations with both the US
and the Soviet Union and this policy appears to continue. The lease for the US
satellite tracking station was extended until September of the year 2000. President
Renê paid a visit to the United States in 1989 and in 1991 the commander of the US
AirForce Space Command made a three day visit to the Seychelles. 44 The Seychelles
has strong cultural links with France. France is the main trading partner and almost
half of domestic products are exported to France. It is also the largest aid donor to the
Seychelles. It maintains close contact directly and through the French Departement of
Reunion. In 1990 France assisted the Seychelles in setting up a tuna canning factory
and it also gives assistance to numerous other sectors such as education. French
interest in the Seychelles can also be seen as part of the wider role of France in
promoting and maintaining its language abroad.45 Free television programmes in
French are shown and French assistance is given to cultural centres that promotes the
language and French culture.
The Seychelles also plays an active role within its immediate environment,
maintaining contacts with neighbouring states. In 1983 the Seychelles, Madagascar
and Mauritius formed the Indian Ocean Commission to increase co-operation in the
region. The Seychelles and Mauritius have also established a Joint Commission for
fostering relations under which agreements have been signed for co-operation in
44 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, March 23, 1991, p.4
45 Jean Houbert, The Mascareignes, the Seychelles and the Chagos Islands with a French Connection: Security in a
decolonised Indian Ocean", in Hintj ens and Newitt (eds), The Political Economy of Small Tropical Islands, pp. 93 - 111
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various sectors, including the exchange of expertise in different sectors. In 1988 the
Seychelles established diplomatic relations with Comoros and Mauritius. In 1989
diplomatic relations were established with Morocco, Madagascar and Cote d'Ivoire
and in 1990 with Kenya. Formal relations were established with South Africa in
1992. Although diplomatic relations have been established with many countries very
few Embassies and High Commissions have been established overseas due to the
lack of necessary finances. In the Seychelles there are diplomatic representations
from Belgium, China, Cuba, Finland, France, Germany, India, Mauritius,
Madagascar, Netherlands, Russia, South Africa, Britain and the United States. 46 The
Seychelles has also joined several international organisations in order to promote its
interests including the United Nations and the Commonwealth.* It has also been
active in bringing to the attention of the international community the plight of small
states and was one of the co-sponsors of the UN General Assembly resolution on
protection and security of small states. It also actively campaigned for the
establishment of the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace and the removal of the military
arsenal from the Indian Ocean.
Economic Resources
The Seychelles has a narrow economic base and relies heavily on few
industries, especially tourism. Tourism has made reasonable progress in the last
decade but the threats from mercenary attacks did lead to occasional drops in tourist
arrivals. The number of tourist arrivals increased from 3,175 in 1971 to 98,547 in
1992.47 Most tourists come from Europe. Tourism employs around 20% of the total
employment providing directly 16.7% of the country's GNP. 48 Tourism is heavily
regulated by the government and standards of hygiene and health for hotels are
enforced. Construction industries boomed during the early days of tourism. The
current regime has stressed the importance of fisheries resources. Although fish was
46 Information: The High Commission of the Seychelles in the United Kingdom. For diplomatic missions accredited to the
Seychelles and Honorary Consulates of the Seychelles see Appendix D
See Appendix D
47 Information: Department of Tourism and Transport, Tourism Division, Republic of Seychelles.
48 Tourism Division, Dept. of Tourism and Transport The Evolution of Tourism in Seychelles, (Mahe' November 1992).
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a major source of the daily intake of protein for the people in the past, fishing was
never carried out on a large scale and for the majority it was mainly a supplementary
source of income. However, today exports of fish and fish products accounts for
around 90% of all domestic exports. The government established the Seychelles
National Fishing Company and has constructed a cannery. The Seychelles Fishing
Authority is responsible for managing the marine resources. The Seychelles also
receives revenue from licensing foreign fishing. Among them is a protocol
concluded with the EC in January 1990 for a three-year period that allows forty tuna
trawlers' access to the EEZ of the Seychelles. The Seychelles government stands to
benefit by 6.9 million ECUs per annum on top of 20 ECUs per tonne of fish
caught.49 The main port at Victoria can accommodate up to eight ocean-going vessels
at any one time. In 1990 the gross tonnage of goods loaded and unloaded in the port
of Victoria amounted to 11,200 and 347,700 tonnes respectively. 50 Inter-island sea
transport is mainly carried out by private owners and operators although the
government operate scheduled passenger services by air to outer islands. A number
of institutions have also been set up to assist the country in its economic
development. The Seychelles Monetary Authority was converted to a central bank in
1983 and the Development Bank of Seychelles was set up in 1978. To enhance trade
within the region there has been discussions within the neighbouring states about
setting up a new trade bloc. This idea of an 'Indian Ocean Rim' has been warmly
supported by the Seychelles and according to the government the Seychelles intend to
fully exploit its location in becoming a transhipment centre.51
Human resources
The population of the Seychelles is around 72,000 and is divided among the
three main islands; Mahe' (64,000), Praslin (6,000) and La Digue (2,000). Although
the islands have been inhabited by various groups of people, among them Africans,
Chinese, Indians and French, interbreeding has led to the development of a group
49 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 27 January 1990, p.6
50 The Europa World Yearbook 1993, Vol. II, (Europa Publications Ltd, London, 1993), P. 2492
51 Information: Seychelles High Commission, London, 12 December 1994
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that today identifies itself as ethnically Seychellois. The majority of the population
are Roman Catholics, (around 90% with 8% Anglican and other 2%). 52 Creole is the
main language in use by the public, although French and English are widely used.
English is the official language of the National Assembly. Despite the growth in
population, emigration has always affected the country. The main reason for
emigration appears to be economic as well as political, although with the
improvement of the economy the trend has diminished slightly in recent years. The
literacy level for the Seychelles stands at 85 per cent. 53
 However, there is a lack of
higher training institutes. In the Polytechnic, where students study for A' levels,
1,604 students were being educated in 1991. 54
 Higher education is obtained abroad,
mainly in Britain.55
Domestically, social strength derives from the natural existence of close-knit
ties. Although the Seychelles is a multi-ethnic society, apart from the average day-to-
day tensions, very few racial or religious problems exist. The leadership also
recognises the dangers of social unrest to the country, especially with the successful
development of tourism, and has attempted to minimise the problems, stating that
"the failure to address matters of social development, equity, social stability and
national unity could pose an immediate threat for a small tourist-oriented country".56
Although societal security problems may be low, threats from the infiltration and
trafficking of narcotic drugs are recognised, and certain measures have been put in
place to meet such problems. In August 1994, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1990 was
amended under which stiffer sentences for trafficking were introduced. A national
task force has been set up to study the problem, to make recommendations and to
review legislation. The Seychelles' police have also set up a telephone hotline for
those who want to give information on drugs and other related crimes. 57 Regional
52 Africa South of the Sahara 1994, 23rd edition, (Europa Publications Limited, London, 1993), p.754
53 Ministry of Planning and External Relations, Seychelles, National Development Plan 1990- 1994, Vol. 1
54 Africa, South of the Sahara 1995, p.802
55 Ibid.
56 Ministry of Planning and External Relations, Seychelles, National Development Plan 1990- 1994, Vol. II, p.24
57 Nation, Vol.15, No.138, 4 August 1994
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assistance is also being sought from countries such as South Africa in an attempt to
combat drug trafficking.
Environmental Resources
The Seychelles has always attempted to protect its natural environment and
many policies and plans have been implemented in order to do so. Nature parks and
reserves occupy more than 40% of the land area of the country. Five oceanic areas
have been designated as marine parks. In 1989 the Environmental Protection Act was
initiated and a Department of Environment was established, the Executive head of
which reports directly to the President. A series of workshops and seminars have
been conducted and following the inter-ministerial workshops a list of priorities has
been outlined. The Seychelles has also formulated an Environmental Management
Plan 1990-2000. The measures proposed are:
1) Protection of health and environment: among which include the setting and
monitoring of water quality standards; both domestic and coastal; the preparation of
local and regional oil spill contingency plans; etc.
2) Management of natural resources on a sustainable basis: among which include the
improvement of water supply and allocation system, the prevention of vegetation
loss, and combating soil erosion on mountain slopes and coastal erosion;
3) Preservation of the Seychelles Natural Heritage and Biological Diversity: among
which the main targets are the improvement of facilities at the Curieuse National
Park, the Aldabra World Heritage site and the monitoring and protection of
endangered tortoises and turtles;
4) Strengthening of Decision-making, Laws and Institutions: among which include
the preparation of guidelines for agriculture, construction, chemicals, forestry and
outer island development, the completion of the review of environmental legislation
and the presentation of environmental audits with the annual budget requests.
5) Environmental Information, Education and Training: the publishing of periodical
reports of the state of the environment, and creating awareness among the public, in
schools etc.
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6) International co-operation and law: under which the Seychelles will help the
preparation of an international contingency plan for responding to major marine oil
spills in the East African region.
Apart from the above, the Seychelles has also taken an active role in other
regional and international programmes. The plan also proposes joint action with
Kenya, Mauritius and Tanzania in the recently grouped East African Task Force on
the implication of climatic change. The Seychelles also initiated a proposal for a
whale sanctuary in the Indian Ocean and played a key part in the International
Whaling Commission in guiding the policy. It also plays an active role in the UNEP.
The Seychelles is also party to several international agreements. In 1985 it signed the
Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and
Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region and in 1988 the Seychelles
signed the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in
Case of Oil Pollution Casualties.
Contemporary Problems
The Seychelles has faced numerous problems, both in the form of
vulnerabilities as well as threats. While some of the former problems may have now
disappeared the country is still small and weak, open to external pressure and
dependent of foreign resources in almost every aspect. Militarily the country has few
resources and little strength to defend itself in the case of armed aggression.
Although the leadership claims that the armed forces successfully defeated the
mercenary attack of 1981, it was undoubtedly the presence of the Tanzanian troops
and the assistance the local armed forces received from them that proved decisive.
Given the size of the population there is obviously a limit to the number or persons
that could be drafted into the armed services and though the percentage of the armed
forces amounts to around 2% of the population it is still extremely small. It is
unlikely that it can defend itself from an attack from another country even if the
country arms all of its citizens. Besides, as more people are drafted into the armed
forces the fewer are people available for other activities such as those that are needed
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for the economic and social development of the country. Moreover, the Seychelles is
a country scattered over a large area and although the majority of the people live on
Mahe' island, it is going to be extremely difficult for the armed forces to provide a
reasonable amount of security to the other areas of the country.
In the past, the political system in the Seychelles appeared to be extremely
strong, at least domestically. For almost fourteen years the leadership has resisted any
change to the system and therefore appeared to have a total grip on the country. Yet
when analysed the above view is false. Political vulnerability has always existed.
Lack of human and financial resources has led to the 'importation' of foreign
expertise and help. The whole political system was extremely personalised even
before the establishment of a one party state. Previously, the former President James
Mancham was the sole leader and 'father figure', the position later occupied by
President Rene. This has led to the reliance on one person for almost everything. The
existence of a one-party state in the past meant that the government was able to carry
out their policies without any resistance. Although the Seychelles appeared to resist
all forms of pressure to change to a democratic political system the lack of political
legitimacy of the system eventually created all sorts of problems. The domination of
the leadership by one individual or one party was the main influence for the
numerous coup attempts and mercenary threats. Besides, however much the
Seychelles resisted outside pressure, and although President Rene claimed that the
changes that were happening elsewhere in the world, especially the changes in the
Eastern Bloc and in South Africa did not have an impact on the Seychelles, it appears
that foreign pressure was the key influence in the recent change to democratic politics
and that the restoration of democracy in other areas did indeed have some effect.
Besides, the need for external assistance and aid finally overtook the need to promote
their own political interest by the leadership. In short, it is the dependence on
countries such as France and Britain for aid and assistance that made the leadership
bow down to the wishes of these countries to change from a one party state to multi-
party politics.	 Under these circumstances, and however much the Seychellois
177
leadership had resisted the change, it appears that the political system was indeed
weak and penetrated. It also lacks the ability to influence events abroad and
international participation is limited.
The country is most vulnerable economically. The economy is small, open
and influenced by prices abroad. In 1993 exports (f.o.b) stood at US$ 75 million
while imports (c.i.f) were US$ 234. 58
 Limited population has also led to limited
markets and limited domestic spending power. Most of the products are imported
and there are no substitutes for these products domestically. Besides, the isolated
nature of the country has led to high transport costs and has discouraged several
would-be investors. Due to heavy reliance on foreign aid and trade the foreign debt
of the country is high. Although in recent years the economy has grown it has also led
to the decrease of foreign aid and assistance. The Seychelles needs more assistance if
it is to sustain growth and development. However, as the economy improves and the
per capita income rises it in turn limits the willingness of the donor countries to
provide aid, claiming that the Seychelles no longer needs such assistance as before,
therefore putting the country in a catch-22 situation. The government's record of its
own achievements in developing the Seychelles from a poor country to the status of a
middle-income country has become a considerable concern for future growth and
economic security.59
 The country also has a severe shortage of skilled and qualified
personnel.
Threats: Potential, Latent and Manifest
The Seychelles faces threats but it is unlikely, even with the vulnerable nature
of the country, that an armed invasion by another power is about to take place. It has
very little strategic material and although located near the oil routes of the Indian
Ocean it has few or no enemies today. However, threats from foreign elements such
as mercenaries cannot be totally disregarded given the number of incidents
58Commwealth Secretariat, Small States: Economic Review and basic statistics, p.41
59 See Roger De Backer, "Seychelles: Recognising the writing on the wall," The Courier, No.134, July-August 1992, pp. 31-
34
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involving mercenaries. The problem with mercenaries is that as long as they remain
for hire there will be people willing to pay them to undermine the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of SIDS, so these states cannot relax totally. The mercenary
attack on the Seychelles in 1981 was carried out for a surprisingly small sum.
Michael Hoare claims that the assault on Seychelles was carried out for only
US$ 300,000. 60 The problem posed by such activities are not only of a military
nature. These kinds of attacks affect the whole country and its social structure. In the
case of the Seychelles, the armed attack in 1981 proved to be disastrous, especially
economically. The government estimated that the total cost of the attack to the state
was US $ 17.6 million. 61 The Seychelles' only international airport was badly
damaged, and repairing the airport was estimated at a cost of Seychelles Rupees
(SR)8.3 million. 62 The attack also led to a substantial decrease in tourism. The net
result was an estimated SR 13 million loss to tourism in December that year.63
Rumours of further coups had also resulted in the drop of tourist arrivals in the past.
However, today the majority of the underlying causes that led to the threats from
mercenaries have now been reversed, among which include the abolition of the one-
party state, the return or the freedom to return for the large population in exile who
were opposed to the current regime, and more significantly the improvement of
relations with South Africa who had given some sort of approval to the involvement
of mercenaries in the numerous attempt to overthrow the government of President
Rene. The Seychelles now has a close relationship with South Africa, and with a
democratic government in power and with acceptance into the international
community, it is less likely that South Africa will be so keen to follow an adventurist
policy with regard to its smaller neighbours. Besides, the Seychelles is keen to
further its newly established relationship with South Africa. President Rene recently
stated that, "South Africa's new position in the region and international community
will give it a key role," .... and that "the Seychelles have recognised this and we have
60 Hoare, The Seychelles Affair, p. 37
61 Ministry of Education and Information, Seychelles The White paper on aggression of 25 November 1981 against the
Seychelles
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
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already taken bold steps as a small nation to join hands with South Africa for there is
a lot we can do if we join hands together".64
Threats from foreign pressure are real ones and the Seychelles has
experienced foreign interference in its domestic affairs from time to time. The
majority of the problems that it has faced came from France and South Africa.
Although France is the main aid donor to the Seychelles its relationship with France
can best be described as 'precarious'. The relationship has brought many advantages
to the country but the role of France as the 'gendarme' of this part of the world is less
welcomed. The Seychelles has also at times regarded French policy in the Western
Indian Ocean as 'imperialist'. It has accused France of trying to disrupt the economic
independence of the SIDS in the area. The Seychelles has also been critical of the
French military presence in this region, especially in Reunion and Mayotte, and
President Rene has at times claimed that the French military presence was an "illegal
occupation" •65 Although the French President, Francois Mitterrand, visited the
Seychelles in 1990 the visit was carried out as a very low-key affair. 66 In the recent
past, both France and Britain have put considerable pressure on the current regime to
bring political reform, and this pressure was a major influence in the return of the
Seychelles to multi-party democracy in 1993. Britain and France both cut back aid
and at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Summit in Harare, Zimbabwe,
Britain insisted that future aid will be tied to progress on the democratic front.67
Although this form of coercive diplomacy may be welcomed by those advocating
democratic practices, it is still a problem for SIDS such as the Seychelles. The
difficulty here is that while theoretically foreign pressures should cease now that the
country has established a multi-party democracy, it is often the case that in reality the
foreign influence could continue in other areas as long as the Seychelles has to
depend on these countries for financial and other assistance. Besides, the traditional
role of France in this area is being challenged by South Africa and it has been
64 Seychelles Nation, Vol.XIX, No.83, 16 April 1994, p.2
65 See "Indian Ocean: Outcast of the islands", Africa Confidential, Vol. 30, No.23, 17 November 1989, pp. 2 -4
66 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 16 June 1990, p. 2
67 The Guardian, 24 December 1991, p. 8
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claimed that certain officials in the French government would like to see the
strengthening of France's relationship with the Indian Ocean SIDS as a counter
measure against the developing role of South Africa. 68 This may increase French
involvement in the Seychelles.
The pre-occupation of the leadership with the threat that may arise from
mercenaries has led to the entire armed forces being geared to meet that threat. The
reinforcement of the armed forces created problems in the past. However, the
government of the Seychelles now appears to be keen to cut down their power and
reduce costs now that the country no longer sees an armed threat as likely in the
near future. In September 1994, the Minister for Defence, James Michel, announced
that the Seychelles Peoples' Defence Force (SPDF) was to be re-organised involving
the combination of certain services. He stated that in the current environment the
threat from armed aggressors has been reduced and that, "consequently, we have to
review our priorities and adopt a new strategy". 69 Therefore, with the scaling down
of the armed forces it appears unlikely that the country would face a serious military
threat from its own forces in the near future. Although the current leadership claims
that the Seychellois coast guard is effective, the problem of protection and
surveillance of their waters is a real one. This is especially so in the case of unlawful
fishing and detecting contraband. Foreign vessels poaching in the EEZ are
continuously sighted and in July 1994 a Taiwanese vessel was apprehended while
fishing in a restricted zone. 70 As such, in these circumstances, it is vital for the
Seychelles that they maintain an effective surveillance of their maritime areas. With
the restructuring of the military services more emphasis is to be given to enhance the
capabilities of the coast guard. As the Minister for Defence stated, "One of the
priorities is to protect the marine resources".71
69 Seychelles Nation, Vol.XIX, No.! 67, 15 September 1994, p.1
71 Ibid. Vol.XIX, No.167, 15 September 1994, p.1
68 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 30 May 1992, pp. 1 , 5
70 Ibid. Vol. XIX, No. 139, 5 August 1994.
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As noted earlier, the country has experienced some political problems and
unrest from time to time. This was mainly due to the desire for change by certain
groups of people coupled with the determination of the leadership to resist change for
as long as possible. The desire for change came more from those residing overseas
than those living at home. This may be due to the autocratic nature of the regime in
power which at times has resorted to extraordinary methods to silence those against
the government. In November 1986, Gerard Hoareau, the Seychellois leader of the
opposition, who was in exile in London, was assassinated by an unknown assailant.
Although the Seychelles' government unequivocally denied any involvement it,
nevertheless, raised suspicions as also in 1987 when three British nationals were
convicted in London for illegally tapping Mr. Hoareau's phone they claimed that they
were hired by the Seychelles' government for the job. It was also reported that in
September 1985, the congress of the ruling party had sanctioned an appeal by the
President which would enable him to carry out whatever actions were deemed
necessary against the "enemies of the revolution". 72 Therefore, there appears to be
reason to doubt the government's denial of involvement in the assassination. There
have been other allegations that others have had strange accidents or have
'disappeared'. Even the recent elections were labelled by the opposition as being
'rigged', although Commonwealth observers claimed that it was fair and free.
Allegations of corruption and misuse of state funds are also common. The opposition
accused the government of directly bribing the voters and although there is no real
evidence of bribery the government announced gratuity payments for all long serving
public employees just before the elections. Furthermore, while the government
claimed that it is prepared to "listen to criticism from sincere people", in the past this
was severely curtailed. The establishment of a multiparty democracy may reduce
such problems. The government appears to be willing to normalise its relationship
with the religious organisations which had voiced their concerns about the
undemocratic practices by the leadership. However, it may take some time before
the current leadership rids itself of some of its autocratic ways after fourteen years
72 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, April 1986, reported by Le Monde, December 3, 1985
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of one party rule, and therefore problems of domestic unrest may still surface in the
future. As such, although the system may have changed from a one party system to a
multi-party one, the underlying situation appears not to have changed. President Rene
is still very much in control of politics. However, it must be noted that in many SIDS
this 'one strong man politics' is a common phenomenon, whether in the form of a
one party system, no party system or even in a multi-party system. The public tend to
associate the party with its leader and not the other way round.
The Seychelles in its attempt to enhance its economic development has
encouraged investment as an off-shore tax haven. However, this has led to actual
problems and may continue to do so in the future. Fraud, corruption and commercial
crime have been identified as practices brought in by foreign companies. A tax haven
is very attractive to foreign firms as they are not obliged to publish any accounts, so
making it virtually impossible to trace their activities, sales and profits, as well as
their share holders. As such, it is extremely difficult to find the real business of these
firms and many scandals have surfaced regarding off-shore firms based in the islands.
In 1986, during the trial of a Lebanese businessmen, it was discovered that through
his firm based in the Seychelles and known as Bis Electronics, he was running a
lucrative business trafficking arms. 73 Besides, the Seychelles tax haven is the only
'private' tax haven run by the Seychelles Trust Company (SETCO), now owned by a
firm whose owner is an Italian businessmen and who, according to some, "is the real
manager of the Seychelles tax haven". 74 An investigative documentary by French
television in 1991 alleged that the Seychelles International Bank based in
Switzerland was used as a money laundering venture by an Italian businessmen.
However, in 1992, the Seychelles government increased the cost of registration of
foreign firms from SR 1,500 to 2.5 million. According to the government the aim is
to discourage foreign business firms from entering into "dishonest business" and it
acknowledged that some firms have been involved in "illegal activities".75 The
73 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 6 July 1991, p.3
74 Ibid. pp. 1, 3.
75 Quoted in Ibid., 7 March 1992, p. 7
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problem is that the government has no control over the tax haven and therefore it will
be very difficult for them to monitor the foreign firms. Further, the problem for SIDS
such as the Seychelles is that they lack the capability to effectively monitor tax
havens. Potential economic threats may also arise in the form of economic shocks.
The Gulf War hit the country's tourism badly and tourist arrivals from Europe
dropped by around 40%.76
 Further problems may occur in the industry if recession
hits the European markets. Besides, it faces increasing competition from other SIDS
in the Indian Ocean such as the Maldives and Mauritius. Its external debt also has
continued to rise. Further, as economic progress is made in some areas the threat of
donors cutting back economic assistance has become a real one. The United States
has already cut down economic assistance from US$ 3 million to a mere US$
220,000 in 1994.77
Although drugs have found their way into the Seychelles, at present the
problem remains minimal in the sense that, so far, it has not managed to penetrate the
socio-political structure of the country; unlike some states the drug lords have not
influenced the politics of the state. Currently, the government appears to be
successful to a certain extent in trying to control the drug problem. Only 16 people
were arrested in 1988-89 for drug offences. However, it must be noted that the
control of this problem is a very difficult task. The country's population is fairly
young and over 45% of the population is under the age of nineteen. It has been
reported that the drug problem is growing in schools and more and more young
people are getting involved. However, the main threat is not just from the young
generation. In June 1994, the Roman Catholic Bishop of the Seychelles resigned after
admitting that he tried to grow marijuana. 78
 Thus the problem, although limited, may
still be a potential threat in the future. It is likely that the government could control
the smuggling of drugs through the airport but it is very difficult for them to stop a
76 Roger De Backer, "Seychelles: thriving on tourism", The Courier, No.134, July-August, 1992, p.41
78 The Cuardian,_1 June 1994, p.10
77 The Seychelles Independent, Vol.2, No.37, 29 September 1994, p.5
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ship from dumping its cargo of narcotics on one of the outlying islands or prevent
people from attempting to grow hallucinogenic plants in the islands.
Environmental problems are both actual and potential; those that exist today
and those that may become serious threats if no action is taken now. Yet the main
concern is not just the existence of such threats as beach erosion, but also the lack of
the means to meet these problems. The Seychelles, like most SIDS, has limited
resources to meet their environmental concerns and among them are included the
lack of qualified manpower and technical expertise. There are only a handful of local
scientists. The lack of financial resources has increased not only the need for foreign
assistance but also a constant dependence on overseas resources. However, there are
other areas that may threaten the real issue at stake, that of the protection of its
environment. It has been claimed that SIDS often uses the environmental issue as a
means of attracting foreign aid. In fact, the Seychelles Minister for Environment
admitted that the government does use the environment as a tool to attract foreign
aid.79 As such, this may result in the funds not being diverted to the real cause.80
Conclusion
The Seychelles is a vulnerable country and it has faced numerous threats in
the past. It had experienced military threats in the form of armed aggression
involving mercenaries. However, security is never static and the security scenario in
the Seychelles has changed in recent times. As such military threats appear to be low
today. Therefore, military security problems appear to be more systemic than actual
The main security problems in the past appear to be related to the political problems
of the Seychelles. Its experience with socialism and the one party state appears to
have brought a whole range of problems to the country. It is still difficult to discount
political disturbances and unrest as a thing of the past, although the establishment of
a multi-party democracy may give a sense of peace and stability. With more freedom
79 Charges cited in The Seychelles Independent, Vol.2, No. 37, 29 September 1994, p.5
80 Ibid.
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of expression and a range of political parties to lead their concerns, political upheaval
may continue for some time yet. This is compounded by the smallness of the society
which will give the range of separate political groupings platforms where it will be
very difficult for the public to remain as apolitical as in the past. Therefore,
(SEE PAGE 186)
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political security problems, especially on the domestic front, may yet threaten the
country. As for potential security problems from external sources, much depends on
the relationship between the Seychelles and South Africa and the role that the latter
develops in the western Indian Ocean together with the role of the French. Although
the traditional role of the French in the area may not be in harmony with the desire of
SIDS like the Seychelles to entice more involvement and co-operation from South
Africa, the Seychelles has been playing the balancing act quite well, and so it may be
able to continue to do so. As long as this can be maintained the Seychelles may be
able to escape the attendant problems from these states, especially in the form of
foreign pressure and interference. However, any delicate upset can lead to potential
problems for the Seychelles as both countries try to enhance their individual roles in
the area. Economic vulnerability is one of the main features of the country. Threats
are there in the form of economic shocks, unlawful economic ventures by foreign
business firms, and poaching in the EEZ, among others. Although it may appear that
with the establishment of multi-party democracy its former donors may once again
be willing to assist in the development of the country, the growth of the economy has
led to disadvantages in the form of decreased foreign assistance. Even though the
Seychelles have introduced several policy plans, such as the Public Sector Investment
Program, an investment program aimed at decentralisation and the shift from
government control of the key economic sectors to more private ownership; and the
Human Resources Development Programme, which covers the years from 1994-
2000, and is aimed at addressing such issues as training of staff and job creation, it
still requires considerable assistance from its overseas donors in order to carry out
and implement these programmes. Societal threats such as ethnic problems and
religious issues found in other states are minimal, although the infiltration of narcotic
drugs is a potential problem that could become manifest if uncontrolled.
Environmental threats do exist and they are a problem, but with assistance from
abroad the Seychelles appears to be sufficiently geared to meet such threats in the
future. Although the Seychelles appears to have minimised most of the threats that it
had faced in the past, especially on the political front, security problems exist in the
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form of vulnerabilities in almost all areas and potential threats in many of them.
Nevertheless, the main problem facing the Seychelles today appears to be the
vulnerable nature of its economy. Although the country is attempting to build
democratic politics and a capitalist form of system, the economy is weak, open and
dependent on foreign resources. It requires overseas assistance to continue on the
path of development and without substantial assistance from abroad it may not be
able to do so. The establishment of democracy might bring positive changes to the
Seychelles. A large number of people had believed that, although the country had
developed under the socialist government, democracy will arrive in the country at
some point of time and the numerous threats of coups and mercenary attacks will
disappear. A former Minister has claimed that development without democracy is
impossible in the long term. 80 However, it may also be the case that democracy
without further development may be difficult to sustain in the long term. In the
Seychelles economic insecurity is a potential problem and together with weakness
and dependence on the political front, could manifest itself in returning the country
to instability.
80 Quoted in De Backer, "Seychelles: recognising the writing on the wall", p.34
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Chapter VI
Case Study: MAURITIUS
Background
Physical Environment
The Republic of Mauritius consists of the island of Mauritius, covering a
land area of 1,864 square kilometres, Rodrigues, a volcanic island about 104 square
kilometres and its two dependencies, the Agalega (two islands) and the Cargados
Carajos Shoals (also known as St. Brandon Islands) that comprise of 22 islets which
are uninhabited. 1 Including the other islands, Mauritius covers a land area of 2,040
square kilometres in total and has an EEZ of around 1.7 million square kilometres.
Mauritius also seeks the return of the Chagos Archipelago (once administered by
Mauritius but made part of the British Indian Ocean Territory in 1965) which is a
coral atoll situated about 1,930 kilometres to the north east. Mauritius also claims
sovereignty over Tromelin situated 556 kilometres to the north west, a claim disputed
by France. Situated in the south west Indian Ocean, Mauritius is about 190
kilometres north east of Reunion, 800 kilometres east of Madagascar and 2,000
kilometres from the east coast of Africa. The island of Mauritius is 61 kilometres
long and 47 kilometres wide. The island is volcanic consisting of an undulating plain
rising to form a plateau. There are three main groups of mountains with the highest
one being the Piton de la Riviere Noire at 815 metres. There are several short non-
navigable rivers some of which are used to generate hydro-electricity. The island is
encircled by coral reefs and the existence of lagoons and white beaches have led to a
flourishing tourist industry. The climate of Mauritius is sub-tropical with two
seasons. The islands are vulnerable to cyclones, especially from December to March,
and in the past cyclones have caused considerable devastation to the country.
However, the land is arable and sugar cane is grown on 87% of arable land. Tea is
also grown in the highlands and tobacco is also grown as a cash crop. The island is
I Africa:South of the Sahara 1995, 24th edition, (Europa Publications Limited, London, 1994), p.615
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almost self sufficient in vegetables. Maize, vanilla, rice and ground nuts are also
grown. Mineral wealth, however, is limited.
Historical Background
Mauritius appears to have been first 'discovered' by the Arab sailors. The
Portuguese seemed to have visited the island in the past but Mauritius was given its
present name after Prince Maurice of Nassau by the Dutch who visited in 1598 and
from 1638 to 1710 held the island as a small Dutch colony. However, it appears that
the island was first permanently inhabited by French settlers and slaves were later
brought in from Madagascar and East Africa. The French arrived in 1715 but no
settlement took place until 1721. The islands were administered by the French East
India Company until 1767 when it was administered by French officials appointed by
the French government. The islands were captured by the British in 1810 and were
formally ceded to Britain in 1814 by the Treaty of Paris. Under the British
administration, slavery was abolished and indentured labour was brought in from
India, especially to cultivate sugar cane. This was later to change the islands' social
history. From 1810 to 1903, Mauritius was administered by the British as a single
colony with the Seychelles. When the Seychelles became a separate colony Mauritius
received its independence in 1968 within the Commonwealth. In 1992, it became a
republic remaining within the Commonwealth.
Socio-economic Background
Economically, Mauritius is now categorised as one of the fast developing
countries. It has experienced a steady growth rate and the per capita GDP stood at
US$ 2,566 in 1992.2 The economy of the country is based on the sugar industry,
manufacturing and tourism. Previously most of the sugar was sold to Britain. Today
most of it is sold to Britain under the preferential terms of the Sugar Protocol. Other
agricultural products include tea, potatoes, coconuts, tomatoes, tobacco, groundnuts
2 Commonwealth Secretariat, Small States: Economic Review and Basic Statistics, (Commonwealth Secretariat, London,
April 1995), p. 30
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and maize. Livestock farming is also carried out and Mauritius is almost self-
sufficient in poultry, meat and eggs. Fishing is not a main industry, although in recent
years attempts have been made to improve it. One of the main income generating
economic activities is the industrial production of the Export Processing Zone (EPZ).
Textiles and clothing account for 80% of the EPZ export. Other products include
electronic components, toys, razor blades, industrial chemicals and so on. Tourism is
the third largest foreign exchange earner. After initial growth the economy
floundered a little bit in the late 1970s. However from 1983 it has improved and from
1984-1987 the country experienced a growth rate of 7%• 3 On the whole, the socio-
economic well-being of the island has greatly improved since independence. The
country is free from most of the tropical diseases found in Africa such as malaria. A
national health service provides free medical services to all. There are 11 hospitals
and primary health care services are provided by 14 health centres, 38 primary health
care units and 47 community health centres. Life expectancy is 64 for men and 71 for
women.
Perception of Security Problems
At the 44th UN General Assembly in October 1989 the Mauritian delegate
stated that,
"small nations and in particular small island states encounter considerable
difficulties, through lack of resources, in building up a wider operating environment
likely to overcome geographical, economic, financial or political objectives.
Stability and security is therefore essential to the development of small states whose
territory must be preserved from the threats of military or nuclear conflicts".4
Yet security problems, as regarded by the Mauritian leadership, have been
minimal as far as actual external military threats are concerned. Unlike the Maldives
and the Seychelles, Mauritius is so far free from the threat of mercenaries. It has
3 The Ministry of Information, Mauritius, The Mauritius Handbook, (Port Louis, Mauritius, 1989), p.15
4 Statement by the delegation of Mauritius to the Special Political Committee on Agenda Item 150 - Protection and Security
of Small States, United Nations, October 1989
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cordial relations with its neighbours and most of the states in the international
community so that an external armed threat is not envisaged. The only concern of
Mauritius in this area has been the growing militarisation of the Indian Ocean,
especially in the 1970s. Mauritius has been an ardent supporter of the movement to
establish a Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean. As far as foreign interference and
pressure are concerned, in the past Mauritius has encountered difficulties regarding
its policy towards South Africa. Mauritius had followed the policy of the majority of
the countries in condemning apartheid in South Africa. Yet at the same time it had
economic ties with South Africa. The then Prime Minister of Mauritius, Sir
Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, claimed that "We hate apartheid just like any other
African country. But business is, of course, a different matter". 5 This policy caused
considerable problems for the country, especially with its African neighbours. In
1988 the Liberation Committee of the OAU accused Mauritius of being one of the
countries which had close contacts with South Africa. Nonetheless, with the
establishment of democracy in South Africa this problem is now in the past and today
Mauritius is comfortable with its South African contacts. South Africa is its third
largest trading partner after Britain and France.
Mauritius also claims Tromelin, a sand bank 500 kilometres to the east of
Madagascar. The island is also claimed by the French who maintains a meteorology
station there. Although Mauritius has raised its claim from time to time this issue is
not seen as one of serious importance. Mauritius views its traditional friendship and
close ties with France as more significant than seriously raising the issue of Tromelin
and jeopardising its relationship. Mauritius has also had certain problems involving
Libya. In the early 1980s, the Libyan government through the Libyan 'People's
Bureau' in Mauritius privately funded religious institutions and organisations, often
without prior approval from the Mauritian government. Despite warnings from the
Mauritian government, their activities continued and in 1983 the mayor of Port
Louis and some councillors visited Tripoli where funds were donated to the council.
5 Cited in Larry Bowman, Mauritius: Democracy and Development in the Indian Ocean, (Westview press, Boulder, 1991) p.
155
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This was quite worrying for the government as there were quite a number of Gaddaffi
supporters among the Muslim community. The government feared that if Libya was
allowed to continue it could lead to divisions within the society. In 1984, Mauritius
expelled the Libyans, although formal diplomatic ties were not severed.
For Mauritius the main thorn in its political history is the problem of Diego
Garcia. The problems associated with Diego Garcia are two-fold. Firstly, the actual
detachment of Diego Garcia from Mauritius by Britain, the circumstances
surrounding the creation of the BIOT, and the question of sovereignty of the islands.
Secondly, the question of what happened to its former inhabitants.
Diego Garcia: In 1965, the British Indian Ocean Territory was established from the
islands of Desroches, Aldabra, Farquhar and the Chagos Archipelago. The former
three islands were previously under the administration of the Seychelles and were
later returned to it. The Chagos Archipelago consists of a total land area of 60 square
kilometres and the surrounding area spreads over 54,400 square kilometres. 6 It was
administered by Mauritius and is 1,930 kilometres north-east of the country. 7 The
BIOT (currently the Chagos archipelago including the atoll of Diego Garcia) was
created to meet the defence requirements of Britain and the United States in the
Indian Ocean. At the time it was formed Britain undertook to return the Chagos to
Mauritius when it was no longer needed for this purpose. Diego Garcia is
strategically located in the Indian Ocean occupying a central location, 2,000 miles
from East Africa and 1,200 miles from the coast of India. In 1966 Britain and the
USA concluded an agreement which provided for the territory to be used by both
states for an initial period of 50 years, with the option of further extension for 20
years. The lease does not expire till the year 2025. It was later discovered that the US
had given Britain around £5 million by way of excluding research and development
surcharges from the cost of the Polaris missile system in exchange for the use of the
6 Africa: South of the Sahara 1995, p.632
7 Ibid. p. 632
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territory. 8
 The United States at first established a communication base which was
later expanded to a naval support facility. Today, it is a fully fledged naval and air
base. It has a 12,000 foot runway and a lagoon that can accommodate carrier task
group ships and submarines.9
The problems associated with Diego Garcia is linked to the conditions
surrounding the independence of Mauritius and cannot be analysed in isolation.
Historically, the Chagos has been inhabited since 1776. Initially it was a leper colony
from Mauritius. There were inhabitants not just on Diego Garcia but also on some of
the other islands of the archipelago- Peros, Banhos and Salomon. At the time of
establishment of the BIOT there were around 1,200 people on the island known as
the Ibis. The main economic activity was fishing and the production of copra. The
coconut plantations were owned by a private company, Chagos Agalega. In 1967 the
BIOT bought the company and copra production was gradually wound down. The
people were told to leave and the British Foreign Office claimed that they went
willingly and that no coercion was used.' 0
 However, this was not the case according
to its former inhabitants. They claim they were given just two weeks to leave." The
inhabitants were resettled in Mauritius and a few in the Seychelles. They had no jobs
and it has been claimed that there was little sympathy from the government of
Mauritius at the time. There was no compensation for the people and the British
government continued to claim that there had been no indigenous population on the
island. The case of the Ibis people was raised with subsequent British governments
and in 1973 a sum of £650,000 was allocated by the British but no money was
handed out until 1978. When Mauritius began more vociferously to claim its
sovereignty over Diego Garcia in the early 1980s a sum of £ 4 million was given by
the British government in 1982 as a final compensation.
9 See Admiral M.P. Awati, "The geo-political and geo-strategic importance of the Islands of the Indian Ocean" in Satish
Chandra et at (eds) The Indian Ocean and its islands: Strategic, Scientific and Historical Perspectives, p.75; also "Diego
Garcia: Its role in the US Gulf Security policy" in The Asian Defence Journal, July 1992, pp. 20 - 25; also_John Madely,.
Diego Garcia: A contrast to the Falklands, Minority Rights Group, (London, 1985)
See Madely, Diego Garcia: A contrast to the Falklands, p.5
11 See Ram Mannick, Diego Garcia: Victims of imperialism or Mauritian muddle, (Mauritian Educational Association,
London), p.14
8 See John Madely, "Diego Garcia: An Indian Ocean storm-centre", in The Round Table, 1981, Vol. 283, pp. 253 -257
194
The role of the Mauritian government at the time is less clear. It was claimed
that Diego Garcia was 'sold' by Mauritius for US$ 8 million, paid to the government
of Mauritius then headed by Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam. 12
 According to the British
the Mauritian delegation did little to resist the transfer of Diego Garcia. However, it
was later claimed by the Mauritian government that, "It was blackmail. Britain told
us that we had to give up Diego Garcia or we would not get independence. We were
in no position to refuse". 13
 The reality of the situation lay to some extent in the ethnic
composition of Mauritius. According to some, the majority of the ruling elite in
Mauritius at the time was of Indian origin and for them what happened to the Ibis
people was a low price to pay for independence. 14
 Although the elite of Indian origin
themselves were initially not too keen about breaking away from Britain it also meant
that they would be the ones to acquire power once an independent state was set up.
The issue of the Ibis people and what happened to the US$ 8 million was a cause of
embarrassment for the government of Mauritius at the time. Mauritius has since
called for the return of the islands to Mauritius. This call has been supported by the
OAU as well as other countries such as India. Mauritius also took the issue of Diego
Garcia to the United Nations, first raising it in 1980 at the 35th General Assembly.
The then Prime Minister Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam stated, "It is necessary for me
to emphasise that Mauritius
	 has already at the last meeting of the Organisation of
African Unity reaffirmed its claim on Diego Garcia.." 15
 However, it is unlikely that
Britain is willing to return the Chagos to Mauritius. The very next day after
Ramgoolam's speech the then British Ambassador to the United Nations claimed that
Britain had sovereignty over the islands. 16 This was reiterated in November 1991 by
the British Ambassador to Mauritius, Michael Howell, who declared that British
sovereignty over the Chagos was not negotiable." The issue of Diego Garcia is seen
12 Jooneed Khan:, "Diego Garcia: The militarization of an Indian Ocean Island" in Robin Cohen (ed.) African Islands and
Enclaves, Sage Series on African Modernisation and Development, Vol. 7, (Sage Publications, 1983) pp. 168- 169.
13 Ibid.
14 See Jean Houbert, "The Mascareignes, the Seychelles and the Chagos; Islands with a French Connection: Security in a
decolonised Indian Ocean" in Hintjens and Newin (eds), The Political Economy of Small Tropical Islands, p.98
15 Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, Prime Minister of Mauritius (former) Address to the 35th General Assembly at the United
Nations, October 1980
16 Khan:, "Diego Garcia: The militarization of an Indian Ocean Island" p.180
17 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 23 November 1991, p.5
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by the leadership of Mauritius as a "delicate" one. 18
 Even though Mauritius would
like to see the return of Diego Garcia it is not seen as an issue which should
jeopardise its relationship with Britain too much. In January 1994, a fisheries
agreement was signed between Mauritius and Britain and the British-Mauritian
Fisheries Commission was established under the terms of the agreement, "to
promote, facilitate and co-ordinate administration, conservation and scientific
research in the maritime zone of the Chagos archipelago".19
External security problems appear to emanate more from non-governmental
sources such as poaching in the EEZ by foreign fishing vessels. Mauritius has a huge
EEZ and finds it difficult to effectively monitor the vast area. Poaching is mainly
carried out by Korean and Japanese registered fishing vessels and according to
Babooram Mahadoo, the High Commissioner of Mauritius to Britain, "this is a
problem". 20
 Mauritius has a coast guard unit 600 strong and is keen to introduce the
idea of joint patrolling of the EEZs by the members of the Indian Ocean
Commission.
Although Mauritius is a country that contains more than one island the
government of Mauritius do not see secession as a major problem. The majority of
the people live on the main island of Mauritius. However, at the time of
independence there were secessionist tendencies in Rodrigues. 2i
 The island voted
unanimously against independence as part of Mauritius. The majority of the people in
Rodrigues are Creoles and the economy of the island is not based on the sugar
plantation, as was the main island of Mauritius at the time of independence. Even
today, the people of Rodrigues resent rule from Mauritius to a certain extent, but the
18 H.E. Babooram Mahadoo, High Commissioner of Mauritius to the United Kingdom, Interview at the High Commission of
Mauritius in London, 26 May 1995
19 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 30 April 1994, p.3
20 H.E. Babooram Mahadoo, High Commissioner of Mauritius to the United Kingdom, Interview at the High Commission of
Mauritius in London, 26 May 1995
21 Houbert, "The Mascareignes, the Seychelles and the Chagos; Islands with a French Connection: Security in a decolonised
Indian Ocean", p.108; also "France in the islands of the South West Indian Ocean", in the International Peace Academy
Report, The Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, Workshop on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, (International Peace
Academy, New York and Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordecht/Boston/Lancaster, 1986), pp. 114-115
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island is dependent on Mauritius for almost everything. To create unity among the
islands, telecommunications are being improved and there are regular weekly flights.
Domestically, security problems in the form of coups are not perceived to be
a problem by the leadership. Political security problems are more in the nature of
crises within the government and ruling coalition parties. Political instability is also
more a product of shifting coalition politics than political violence or instability
involving the people on the whole. Domestic security problems, as perceived by the
leadership, cannot be understood on their own without first analysing the political
environment of Mauritius. Internal politics in Mauritius has been a volatile process,
yet one carried out by democratic means. The numerous political parties have an
element of racial and ethnic fragmentation. However, the uniqueness of Mauritian
politics is that problems have existed not just between the parties but within parties
that has resulted in much factionalism and alliances within and between the political
parties. Therefore, alliance politics remains the main feature of politics in Mauritius
and has been the main strength as well as the main problem for the leadership. No
single party has won an overall majority since 1959.
To review alliance politics in a historical context, in 1936 the Mauritian
Labour Party (MLP) was formed and is today mainly dominated by the Hindus. The
Franco-Mauritian population meanwhile grouped themselves under the banner of
Ralliement Mauricien which later became the Parti-Mauricien Social-Democrate
(PMSD). The Muslims of Mauritius rallied under the Comite d'Action Musulman
(CAM) and a fourth party was organised by the Hindus in the rural areas known as
Independent Forward Block (IFB). At the time of independence a newly formed
coalition led by Seewoosagur Ramgoolam won the majority of the seats. The
government then invited the PMSD into the government forming a coalition of all
groups.
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In the early days of independence the main political problems for the
leadership arose from the Movement Militant Mauricien (MMM) led by a Franco-
Mauritian, Paul Berenger. The MMM had close contacts with three of the major
unions and in 1971 the dockers union went on strike. The government then declared a
state of emergency and arrested Berenger and his supporters. The state of emergency
continued until 1972 and public meetings were banned. In the 1976 election the
MMM won 32 seats. However, the uniqueness of Mauritian politics was highlighted
by the fact that the Independent Party (IP) immediately formed a new alliance with
the PMSD to form a majority political group. This led to severe unrest in the country
and strikes and clashes between the members of the MMM and the police became
common. Some of the MMM members were arrested. However, in the 1982
elections a coalition led by the MMM and the Parti Socialiste Mauricien (PSM) won
the elections, winning all 60 of the elective seats of Mauritius island. Aneerood
Jugnauth became the Prime Minister and Paul Berenger was the Minister of Finance.
Yet the alliance was short lived and in 1983 Berenger and 11 other ministers
resigned and Jugnauth formed a new party, the Mouvement Socialiste Mauricien
(MSM). The PSM was later dissolved and incorporated into the MSM. In August
1983, general elections were held and a coalition by the MSM, the MLP, and the
PMSD won 41 seats and Jugnauth remained as Prime Minister. They now faced
several problems within the alliance and the MLP withdrew from the coalition in
1984, but the government managed to hold on despite reducing their majority. At
the next elections in 1987 a coalition was once again formed between the MSM,
MLP and PMSD and won 39 of the seats. The MMM fought the election forming an
alliance with two smaller parties. The elections in August 1991, however, were
fought with the MSM forming a coalition with its former opponents the MMM as
well as the MTD (Mouvement des Traaillistes Democrates). They won 57 seats and
the alliance of the MLP and the PMSD won only three seats. The current
government has claimed that it will serve out the remainder of the political term until
the next general election which is due in 1996. The shifting alliances of political
parties in government has therefore led to a lot of in-fighting and has created
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difficulties in the smooth governing of the country. However, the holding of elections
at regular intervals and the underlying acceptance of democratic practices by the
political parties have also led to the opposition parties acknowledging democratic
means of acquiring power. This is accepted as the norm by all political parties and
the electorate and therefore has reduced the threat of unconstitutional seizures of
power. However, this has not rid Mauritius of all threats. There were two
assassination attempts on the Prime Minister, Sir Aneerood Jugnauth, one in 1988
and one in 1989. In November 1988, the Prime Minister was threatened by a Hindu
priest.22
 The Prime Minister was attending a religious ceremony at a Hindu temple
when the priest suddenly stepped forward and thrust a .38 revolver at him, claiming
that he had six bullets and if anyone made a move he would kill the Prime Minister.
The priest claimed that he wanted 'justice' and would like to speak to the Prime
Minister alone. The drama ended when a former prison warden flung himself at the
priest and brought him down. No one was harmed. However, this incident
highlighted that there are still underlying problems in Mauritius despite the attempts
to bring the various religious communities together and in conducting democratic
politics. The man, who was later identified as the former president of the temple,
blamed the Prime Minister for his failure to get re-elected at the temple elections.
Another attempt was made on Jugnauth on 3 March 1989, again while attending a
religious ceremony. A man attempted to attack the Prime Minister with a knife. He
was seized by the Prime Minister's bodyguards and arrested. The Prime Minister later
claimed that the attempts were made by those associated with drug traffickers and
that he had received several death threats from them.23
Additionally, there are problems of other kinds. Internally the politics of
Mauritius is full of allegations of corruption and nepotism which is a considerable
problem to those in power. In 1982 it led to the downfall of the Labour government
and allegations of corruption also created severe problems between the coalition
partners during the years 1983 to 1987. In 1989, there was an allegation regarding the
22 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 12 November 1988, p.1,
23 Ibid., 11 March 1989, p.5
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sale of Mauritian passports. The leader of the PSM, Harish Boodhoo, accused the
wife of a Mauritian minister of being involved in the sale of Mauritian passports.
This led to the arrest of Mr. Boodhoo by the government although he was soon
released. In 1990 the Minister of Health, Jugdish Goburdhun, was accused of having
used public funds to finance a co-operative in which he is the company secretary. It
was alleged that Rs. 20 million (US$ 1.4 million) was granted to the co-operative by
a fund dependent on the Ministry of Health and was used in the construction of a
building on government land which was leased to the co-operative. 24 Furthermore,
the Prime Minister, Sir Aneerood Jugnauth, has also been accused of nepotism,
especially when a new bank note was issued in April 1992 that depicted his wife.
Economically, Mauritius confronts few of the problems that are commonly
found in other SIDS. There has been extensive diversification and therefore, today,
the Mauritian economy appears to be rather strong. Nevertheless, the Mauritian
economy is sensitive to international price fluctuations. This is especially so in the
case of sugar. The sugar industry is also vulnerable to the weather and because
Mauritius lies within the cyclone belt this is a considerable concern to the
government. Due to unfavourable weather conditions sugar output fell in 1987 and
1988 to 691,134 and 568,000 respectively from 707,000 tons in 1986. 25 Further,
cyclones in January and April 1989 affected the sugar harvest badly. Although the
Mauritian economy is relatively healthy, economic shocks can hit the economy as
was seen during the Gulf War when hotel bookings slumped heavily and the tourism
industry was affected. The Export Processing Zone of Mauritius also faces
difficulties with shortages of labour.
Societal threats, such as those that arise from narcotics, have also emerged
and this is seen as a considerable problem. Marijuana is grown in the country and
other drugs smuggled into the country include heroin in the form of Brown Sugar.
Mauritius is also used as a transhipment point. The majority of drugs appears to
24 Ibid. 15 September 1990, p.3
25 Donald L. Sparks, "Economy"(Mauritius) in Africa: South of the Sahara, 1995, p.618
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enter the country through the international airport mainly from India and Pakistan.
The level of drug trafficking in Port Louis reached an alarming state in 1984-85 and
in recent years the situation has worsened, especially the trafficking of heroin from
India.26 In the first few months of 1994 alone drug traffickers were arrested carrying
more than three kilograms of heroin. However, according to reports this is less than
2% of the drugs imported annually. 27 It is also associated with those at the highest
level. In December 1985 four Mauritians were arrested at Amsterdam airport,
allegedly with £700,000 worth of heroin in their luggage. They were later found to be
Members of Parliament and one of them, Ismael Nawoor, was a member of the
Parliamentary Select Committee set up to examine the problem of drugs in the
country. Although three of them, including Nawoor, were later released this led to a
serious crisis within the government. A Drugs Commission was set up to investigate
the problem. The Commission claimed that several high ranking officers in the police
force were involved in the drug trade including the former head of the Anti-Drug
Special Unit (ADSU). It recommended several measures to curb the growth of the
narcotics trade. The crisis led to the resignation of four cabinet ministers and the
Vice-Prime Minister who was also implicated by the Commission. Another incident
occurred in 1988 when the son of the Mauritian High Commissioner to London was
arrested in New York for drug trafficking offences. Although the High Commissioner
himself was not involved, he was suspended from his duties. In 1989 he was arrested
in London for allegedly laundering the 'narco-dollars' on behalf of his son.28
Although Mauritius has tried to institute measures to rid itself of the threat from
drugs, the problem still continues.
Like most SIDS, Mauritius has a fragile environment and several native
species have become extinct in the past. Mauritius is also within the cyclone belt and
this has caused problems. Cyclones are frequent and one in 1989 led to severe
damage to food crop production, especially sugar. Some 125 homes were destroyed
26 Africa Research Bulletin, February 1995, p.1 1418
27 Ibid.
28 Kevin Shillington, Aneerood Jugnauth: Prime Minister of Mauritius, (Macmillan Educational Limited, London and
Basingstoke, 1991), pp. 181-182; The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 4 March 1989, p.3
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and the overall cost was estimated around Rs 900 million. * In 1994, Cyclone
Hollanda led to the death of two people and to 1,400 people being homeless. Sixty
per cent of the electricity transmission grid was damaged. Buildings were destroyed
and the damage was estimated at 25 million Mauritian Rupees.29 Further, 80% of
food crop was lost. The total cost from the cyclone including rehabilitation amounts
to 1.5 billion Rupees. 3 '3
 Further, global warming and the sea level rise could also
threaten the country, especially the low lying areas. The former Minister for the
Environment and Quality of Life, Dr. Swaley Kasenally, has claimed, "Mauritius is
genuinely concerned by such issues as global warming - as an island we could, so as
to speak, be on the receiving end" •31 Beach erosion is becoming more common and in
recent years there has been an increase in the frequency of storms. The normal rainy
season in Mauritius is from December to March but in the last four to five years this
has started from November and continued well into April. These heavy storms have
also caused damage to homes and industries and led to heavy flooding. One of the
other major environmental concerns of Mauritius is the problem of waste
management. Due to its industrial development the disposal of industrial waste, as
well as domestic waste, has created difficulties. Another environmental concern is
the unplanned growth of the tourist industry that has led to the pollution of several
beaches due to inadequate sewage treatment. The threat of pollution from oil spills
also exists as Mauritius is close to the major oil routes along the east coast of Africa.
Providing security in Mauritius
Military Resources
The Mauritian defence force is not divided into an army, navy or airforce. Its
internal security is maintained by the paramilitary Special Mobile Force, Special
Support Units and a regular police force. These forces are under the command of the
Commissioner of Police. The total number of personnel in the Special Mobile Force
* Exchange Rate: US$ 1 = 17.86 Rupees (31 March 1994)
29 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 19 February 1994, p.7
313 Ibid.19 February 1994, p. 7
31 Quoted in Roger De Backer, "Mauritius: Going for Gold again" in The Courier, No. 135, September-October, 1992, p. 28
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is 1,300.32 There is a Coast Guard Unit with 600 personnel, equipped with patrol
crafts. 33 The Coast Guard Unit is based in Port Louis but they also have twelve
other manned coast guard stations. A Dornier aircraft is also used for maritime patrol
equipped with a search radar. The forces are generally well-disciplined although
allegations of abuse of power by the police are on the increase. Defence expenditure
was Rs. 167.3 million in 1991/92. This amounts to 1.4% of total expenditure. 34 The
1995 budget was estimated at Rs. 224.5 million.35
There are no defence agreements with other countries at present. A previous
defence agreement with Britain expired in 1975 and was not renewed. No foreign
bases are allowed. Mauritius is fortunate in that it has not faced any terrorist or
mercenary threats. However, in the event of a well organised attack it will not be
able to defend itself and will have to resort to outside help. The most likely sources
of help would be France and India. France has close contact with Mauritius as part of
the French presence in the Indian Ocean. As the majority of the population in
Mauritius are of Indian origin, India too has close contact with the country and has
helped train its forces. Indian help is also envisaged due to the regional security role
it undertakes in the Indian Ocean. India also provided Mauritius with a security
adviser following the two assassination attempts on the Prime Minister in 1989 and
1990. Mauritius also receives military assistance from other countries, including the
United States. Mauritius joined the United States' military training programme,
International Military and Educational Training (IMET) in 1992.
Political Capabilities
Until 1992 Mauritius was a state within the Commonwealth with the Queen
as its Head of State. On 12 March 1992 Mauritius became a Republic. It is a
parliamentary democracy with a legislature consisting of 70 members of whom 62
33 Capt. Richard Sharpe OBE RN (ed.), Jane's Fighting Ships 1995-96, 98th edition, (Jane's Information Group Limited,
Surrey, 1995),; See also Appendix E
34 Estimate given by The Military Balance, 1993-94, (Bassey's UK Ltd, London) p.231
35 The Military Balance, 1995-96, p.294
32 The Military Balance, 1995-96, (Oxford University Press, 1995), p.249
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are elected members and eight seats are allocated to the 'best losers'. The members of
parliament are elected for a period of five years by universal suffrage. The country is
divided into 21 multimember constituencies with three members each and two from
the island of Rodrigues. The Constitution protects the fundamental rights and
freedoms of the people. All Mauritians over the age of 18 have the right to vote.
Since its independence in 1968, Mauritius has maintained a fairly stable political
system. Recently a republican system has been adopted with a President as the Head
of State. However, the role of the President is largely ceremonial and executive
power is vested in the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is the leader of the
majority party in the Parliament and appoints the Council of Ministers. Unlike many
of the developing countries, elections and transfers of power from one political
regime to another are fairly smooth and peaceful. Elections are regularly held in an
orderly and fair manner. The political stability of Mauritius relies on many factors:
constitutional safeguards that protect the citizen and accommodate ethnic groupings;
eight seats allocated to the best losers thereby ensuring no section of the population is
alienated; a wide acceptance of the legality of the political system by the people; and
the democratic election of leaders. 36
 Furthermore, the judicial system in Mauritius
is truly separate from the political system and not just in name like some other states.
It consists of a Supreme Court that has appellate powers, and lower courts.37
Moreover, Mauritians believe that their justice system is fair to all.
Externally, Mauritius claims that its "foreign policy is dictated by the
concepts of non-alignment, the protection of territorial integrity and national
sovereignty". 38
 It also claims that "In international fora .... Mauritius strives for the
strengthening and maintenance of world peace and security, the promotion of
friendship among nations, the furtherance of international co-operation for a just and
equitable world order". 39
 Mauritius participates in international affairs as best as it
36 Eliphas G. Mukonoweshuro, "Containing political instability in a poly-ethnic society: the case of Mauritius", in Ethnic and
Racial Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, April 1991 pp. 199 - 222
37 The Ministry of Information, Mauritius, The Mauritius Handbook, pp. 4 - 5
38 Ibid. p. 62
39 Ibid. p. 62
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can and is a member of the United Nations and the Commonwealth. Although
Mauritius has attempted to maintain a non-aligned status it is closer to the Western
world in reality. There are ten resident embassies in Mauritius and Mauritius has
twelve diplomatic missions abroad.* While the issue of Diego Garcia remains a
problem the United States maintains cordial relations with Mauritius, closer for
example, than the relationship that existed between Mauritius and the Soviet
Union. According to the US government the Diego Garcia affair is a matter for
Britain and Mauritius and they are only there at the invitation of Britain. The Soviet
Union did sign a fisheries agreement with Mauritius and had offered educational
assistance in the form of scholarships, but these were as far as it went. Mauritius
plays an active role in the region and pays lip service to routine issues of importance
to the Non-Aligned Movement such as apartheid and the Palestine issue. Because of
the numerous ethnic groups it has close contacts with various countries such as
France, India, and the Islamic world.
Mauritius' relationship with its former colonial master, Britain, has always
been cordial. It had a defence agreement with Britain (the Anglo-Mauritian
Defence Agreement) which guaranteed security, but this was terminated in 1975. In
1984 the Prime Minister Sir Aneerood Jugnauth stated that, "Britain has a special
place in the hearts of all our Mauritian citizens".40 However, the issue of Diego
Garcia has led to tensions between the two states from time to time. Its relationship
with France is somewhat different. The underlying basis for its close ties with France
are cultural links. French is widely spoken and despite the British period of colonial
rule French culture never diminished. France provides generous financial aid to
Mauritius in technical assistance, educational aid, rural development and also in the
health sector. However, one of the main areas where French assistance is prominent
is the promotion of the French language, especially in schools and the use of French
in broadcasting. Besides, France is closer to Mauritius territorially vis-à-vis the
French Departement d'Outre Mer of Reunion. The French presence in the Indian
* See Appendix E
40 Quoted in Bowman, Mauritius: Democracy and Development in the Indian Ocean, p. 144
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Ocean is welcomed by Mauritius. In their turn, France assisted Mauritius to become a
member of the African-Malagasy Common Organisation (OCAM). Mauritius was the
first Commonwealth country to gain Yaounde status in the EEC. In 1990 the French
President, Francois Mitterrand, paid a visit to the country.
One of the closest allies of Mauritius is India. This is no surprise as two-
thirds of the Mauritian population is ethnically of Indian origin. An Indo-Mauritian
Joint Commission was set up in 1979 and regular sessions are held.4 ' Besides, both
countries have stressed the importance of close ties and state visits are frequent at the
highest level. The late Indira Gandhi and the late Rajiv Gandhi visited Mauritius;
Indira Gandhi in 1970, 1976, 1982 and Rajiv Gandhi in 1986. Financial aid has
always been generously provided by India, especially in the field of technical
assistance, credit agreements and educational and cultural programmes. India also
provides security advisors. Mauritius also has close contact with China and the
countries of South East Asia. There are many immigrants of Chinese origin in
Mauritius. A joint commission has been established and a technical co-operation and
economic agreement was signed between the two countries in December 1990.
Assistance from Beijing includes the construction of an air terminal at the
international airport and of a sports stadium among others. Investments from Hong
Kong form a major part in the EPZ investments.
Mauritius also has close relations with its neighbouring states. It has
concluded a cultural, scientific and technical co-operation agreement with
Madagascar and Mauritius assists Madagascar in its attempt to industrialise by
transfer of technology. 42 Mauritius has also established a joint commission with the
Seychelles to co-operate on improving ties, especially economic co-operation.
However, Mauritius' relationship with the countries of the African mainland remains
somewhat indifferent. Although Mauritius claims to be an African state and hosted
41 Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. XXXV, No.3, External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of
India, March 1989, pp. 79 - 80
42 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 24 March 1990, p. 2
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an OAU summit in 1976, it has very little trade contact with the countries of Africa
apart from South Africa. Mauritius is also one of the main advocates in attempting to
establish a regional forum 'the Indian Ocean Rim' for promoting economic co-
operation among the Indian Ocean littoral. The Mauritian Finance Minister claimed
that, "The Indian Ocean is thus becoming increasingly conspicuous as the only region
without an official organisation to promote economic co-operation". 43 Although a
member of the Indian Ocean Commission, he argues that, "the smallness of the IOC
seriously limits its ability to fully explore trade, investment and other economic
possibilities among member nations and to make more efficient use of the region's
resources".44 As such, Mauritius hosted the first official meeting of those keen to
establish an Indian Ocean Rim group. They are India, Australia, Kenya, Oman,
Singapore and South Africa and the meeting took place in Port Louis on 31 March
1995.45 In order to enhance its international standing such international gatherings are
often hosted by Mauritius. An OCAM summit was held in Mauritius in 1973 and a
parliamentary conference of Francophone states in 1975. 46 However, in general,
Mauritius has gained international recognition through its maintenance of democracy,
especially compared to its neighbouring SIDS of the Seychelles and Comoros; and
for its human rights record and social stability among many diverse ethnic groups.47
Economic Resources
The land and climate are good for agricultural development, especially the
cultivation of sugar-cane. Under the Sugar Protocol the guaranteed quota for
Mauritius stands at 507,000 tonnes. 48 Other important markets are the United States,
Canada and New Zealand. All manufactured sugar is marketed by the Mauritian
Sugar Syndicate. Various measures have been taken by the government to strengthen
the industry, including the establishment of a bulk sugar terminal in 1980 that is the
43 Hon. Ramalcrishna Sithanen, The Minister of Finance of Mauritius, Speech delivered at the opening ceremony of the
meeting of experts on the Indian Ocean Rim initiative, Grand Bale, Mauritius, 29 March 1995
44 Ibid.
45 BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, 3rd Series, Asia-Pacific, Part 3, 6 April 1995
46 Bowman, Mauritius: Democracy and Development in the Indian Ocean, p.145
47 Ibid. p.142
48 Ministry of Information, Mauritius, The Mauritius Handbook, p. 24
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third largest in the world and capable of containing 350,000 metric tons. In all, in
1987 the agricultural sector contributed 15% of GDP and 41% of total foreign
exchange earnings.49
Although it was totally dependent on sugar at the time of its independence,
there has been diversification from sugar to manufacturing and tourism. The Export
Processing Zone set up in 1971 has been extremely successful. The EPZ consists
mainly of firms engaged in the manufacturing of garments, electrical and electronic
goods, toys, razor blades, industrial detergents etc. Today, Mauritius has become the
third largest exporter of new woollen goods in the world. 50 Of the investment in the
EPZ around 60% is locally owned. The EPZ exports rose from Rs.3.9 million in
1971 to Rs.4,959.6 million in 1986, thus replacing sugar as the main export
product.51
Tourism is the third most important foreign exchange earner. Mauritius is
blessed with beautiful beaches, ideal for the development of tourism. Tourist arrivals
increased from 27,650 in 1970 to 375,000 in 1993. 52 The majority of the tourists
come from the neighbouring French DOM of Reunion. Others include French from
mainland France, South Africans, Germans, British and Italian tourists. However,
care is taken to diversify the markets and open Mauritius to the people of the Far
East. The government has attempted to boost the tourism industry by setting up
schemes for property development (The Development Certificate Scheme) and for
hotel management and marketing services (The Hotel Management Certificate),
which provide several concessions that include corporate tax rebates, tax free
dividend for ten years etc. Further, certain zones have been selected for hotel
development in order to avoid congestion on the beaches. Mauritius also has an
excellent international credit rating. Unlike many of the SIDS, fishing has never
been a strong economic activity (most of the fish consumed in Mauritius is
49 Ibid. p.23
50 Donal L Sparks, "Economy" (Mauritius),Africa: South oldie Sahara, 1995, p. 619
51 Ibid. p. 619
52 Ibid. p. 620
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imported) but now it is being given considerable importance with assistance received
from Australia and Japan. Mauritius has an EEZ of around 1.7 million square
kilometres and off-shore fishing licences have been granted to vessels from Japan,
Taiwan and the Republic of Korea. A Mauritius Tuna Fishing and Canning
Enterprise Limited was established with a processing capacity of 8,000 tonnes of tuna
and a second plant was opened in 1988 with a 10,000 ton initial capacity. 53 Two
purse seiners are also used in the south west Indian Ocean. Mauritius also participates
with Comoros, Reunion and Madagascar in a regional tuna fishing project that carries
out biological studies and collect fishery statistics. The port at Port Louis harbour
acts as the main terminal for imports and exports.
Mauritius has also set up institutions to fuel economic growth. A Bank of
Mauritius was set up in 1966 and acts as a central bank controlling the activities of
the commercial banks. Altogether 14 commercial banks operate in Mauritius. The
Development Bank of Mauritius also co-ordinates the effort to develop the country
economically. It provides loans for industrial and agricultural development and also
assists small enterprises. The legislative framework in Mauritius is modern and ideal
for off-shore investments. Further, international investors favour Mauritius due to the
zero-tax regime and tax treaties exist with Britain, France, Germany, India, Malaysia,
South Africa, Sweden, Italy and Zimbabwe.
Human Resources
The total population of Mauritius was estimated at 1,084,000 in 1992. 54 The
original immigrants were mostly slaves and indentured labourers. Three ethnic
groups can be identified:- Indo-Mauritians, Sino-Mauritians and the third group,
known as the General Population. The Indo-Mauritians are further divided into
Hindus and Muslims. Other important sub-divisions include the Indo-Mauritians by
caste and mother tongue. The Indo-Mauritians are the largest group (about two-thirds
of the population). The Sino-Mauritians are a small community. The General
53 Ibid. p. 619
54 "Mauritiusp: Physical and Social Geography" , Africa: South of the Sahara, 1995., p. 615
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Population are the Mauritians of European (mainly French) descent and the Creoles
(descendants of African slaves). The European community is the smallest among all
the communities. The Creoles make-up the second largest community. The ethnic
composition of Mauritius is important in the sense that it covers links with the
Western Europe through France as well as Asia through the Indian sub-continent.
Due to the various linguistic groups Mauritius has been called a modern day Tower
of Babel. Twenty-two languages were being spoken on the island according to a
census in 1983. However, Creole is universally spoken and used as a medium of
communication by many Mauritians. English and French are also widely used. While
there are linguistic, religious and cultural diversities, the extensive use of Creole has
become a national cultural bond. 55
 One other important factor that has contributed to
harmony within such a diverse society can be attributed to the fact that residence is
not divided on communal lines. There is no specific geographical territory dominated
by any one ethnic group. 56
 Furthermore, there is no official state religion although
Hindus form a majority. All religious institutions receive subsidies from the state
based on the strength of their membership. There are 281 primary schools, 123
secondary schools and 19 vocational and technical training centres. 57
 There is also a
polytechnic and a university that had 2161 students enrolled in 1993.58
Although Mauritius faces surprisingly little in the way of societal security
problems such as ethnic problems, it has had to combat problems that have risen
from the narcotic trade, and several measures have been introduced by the
government. In December 1984 a Select Committee of the Parliament was set up to
investigate and examine the drug problem. The committee reported that drug abuse
was on the increase and the main drugs used were cannabis, which was locally
grown, and heroin. It also found that heroin was introduced into the country in 1982
but it had become common within period of less than three years. A Drugs
55 See also Thomas Hylland Eriksen, "Linguistic diversity and the quest for national identity: the case of Mauritius", Ethnic
and Racial Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 1990, P. 1 - 24
56 John Addison and K. Hazareesingh, A New History of Mauritius, (Macmillan Publishers, London and Basingstoke, 1984),
g;775Africa: South of the Sahara 1995, p.626
58 Ibid.
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Commission was set up and the Parliament passed the Dangerous Drug Act on 11
June 1986 in the wake of the drug crisis involving some members of the Parliament.
Among the measures recommended by the Commission included the setting up of a
Drug Intelligence Unit within the ADSU and furthering co-operation with India
which is where the majority of the drugs come from. Further, the Prime Minister
promised that security will be tightened at the docks and airport to prevent the
smuggling of drugs into the country and that all VIP luggage will be searched at the
airport. Currently the Mauritian Parliament is attempting to revise the anti-drug
legislation to introduce tough measures, including the introduction of the death
penalty for traffickers. Mauritius has also attempted to co-operate with its
neighbours. On 15 March 1990, Mauritius and Madagascar signed an agreement for
"mutual administrative assistance" with a view to "preventing, seeking and
punishing" the infraction of customs regulation and drug trafficking.59
 Under the
agreement customs officers of both states will have a communications system
permanently linked. It will enable them to transfer information regarding the above
issue.
Environmental Resources
In order to protect the natural environment the government of Mauritius has
taken several steps. Since 1983 a legal framework has been created via The Forest
and Reserves Act and the Wild Life Act to regulate the management of the natural
environment. In 1985, a White Paper was published by the Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Natural Resources on a 'National Conservation Strategy' the main
objective of which has been outlined as "to maintain essential ecological processes
and life support systems on which human survival and development depend". A
Nature Reserve Board was established and a national committee on afforestation
created. Mauritius also participates at the international level to protect the
environment and is a participant in the United Nations Environment Programme, the
59 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 24 March 1990, p. 2
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World Wild Life Protection Trust and the International Council for Bird Protection.60
In 1989, Mauritius received US$90 million in the form of grants and loans at a
donors meeting to finance an Environmental Investment Programme. 61
 This was
secured after a World Bank Report on the environmental situation in Mauritius
called for urgent action to prevent environmental deterioration. Mauritius also
participated in the UN Conference on Environment and Development and is also a
member of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS).
Contemporary Problems
Threats: Potential, Latent and Manifest
Security problems facing Mauritius are mainly in the area of vulnerability
rather than actual threats. Militarily the Mauritian armed force is extremely small and
therefore the country is open to military threats. Although there are more resources
available to Mauritius, both in terms of economic and human resources than there is
for the Maldives, it has chosen to limit its defence force. Therefore, any kind of
military threat is a danger to the country as the country is virtually defenceless.
However, it is unlikely that at the moment the country faces any actual military
threats. By virtue of good relations with its neighbours, institutionalised democratic
practice, and the lack of any dissatisfied overseas population who seek the overthrow
of the government, it has managed to stay clear of the threats from coups,
mercenaries and political instability that have plagued the other SIDS of the Indian
Ocean.
On the external front, Mauritius is vulnerable to external pressures. The
vulnerability of Mauritius to the influence of larger powers, especially in the past,
can be clearly seen in the case of Diego Garcia. It was unable to stop the detachment
of Diego Garcia and the rest of the Chagos archipelago to create the BIOT and
indeed in some way went along with it trading a part of their territory for
60 Ministry of Information, Mauritius, The Mauritius Handbook, pp. 93 - 94
61 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 28 January 1989, p. 6
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independence. The vulnerability and dependence of SIDS like Mauritius and the
difficulties they encounter in balancing what they see as 'international duties' against
the reality of economic problems was also seen in the past in the relationship of
Mauritius with South Africa. According to a Mauritian civil servant "If (Mauritius)
were to boycott South Africa and import from elsewhere the cost of living in
Mauritius would go up by 30% overnight." 62 However, today Mauritius is in a much
better position to withstand foreign pressure. This is not to say that it is not
vulnerable. Because Mauritius is dependent on the West for its trade and its
continued economic development, it is still vulnerable to the domination of the
West. This is seen today in its relationship with Britain over the issue of Diego
Garcia. Mauritius wants Diego Garcia back and is willing to take up the issue at
various international gatherings, yet it appears that it does not want to antagonise
Britain too much simply because Mauritius depends heavily on the EC as a market
for its exports, especially sugar. Therefore, although it is in a better position to
withstand foreign influence and has the capacity to pursue its own interests in the
international community, nevertheless there are areas where it is still vulnerable.
Politically the country appears to be relatively stable. The ability of the
various political parties to form alliances with each other has enabled the internal
situation in Mauritius to remain on a democratic footing. At the same time, it has also
muted ideological differences. Elections are held regularly and the majority of the
people support the existing political system. The threats of coups or the use of
mercenaries to overthrow the government is almost non-existent. However, the two
assassination attempts on the Prime Minister demonstrated that certain types of
threats still remain. More than anything else the two incidents disturbed the
otherwise peaceful society where political violence is minimal. Furthermore,
corruption and nepotism still continues and could create political tension and
instability in the future. Although Mauritius appears to be a country relatively free
from most kinds of domestic political threats faced by other SIDS of the Indian
62 Bowman, Mauritius: Democracy and Development in the Indian Ocean, p. 155
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Ocean, there are still underlying vulnerabilities. The political system is highly
personalised. Individuals dominate politics and political parties rather than
ideologies. Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam was the dominant figure in the 1960s and
1970s and it was he as a person who commanded the respect of the people rather than
his party in general. Today, he is regarded as the 'father of the nation'. Currently, this
role is being held by the Prime Minister Sir Aneerood Jugnauth. Further, parties are
often divided on ethnic lines, although once again Mauritius has managed to reduce
the possibility of alienating ethnic minorities by introducing the 'best loser system' in
the Parliament.
On the economic front, vulnerabilities and threats may seem minimal.
However, the economy is still vulnerable to external shocks. Its main product, sugar,
is susceptible to the vagaries of the climate. Cyclones can damage crops and it also
increases the cost of insurance. Additionally, a fall in world prices as well as any
change in the Sugar Protocol arrangements can hit the industry badly. Moreover, the
sugar industry has been on the decline in recent years. Other problems facing the
industry include falling world prices and ageing machinery. The establishment of
the EPZ greatly contributed to the growth of the economy. However, many of the
industries faced difficulties in the early 1980s and many were forced to close down.
Furthermore, the EPZ is dominated by the textile and clothing industry (80% of total
EPZ exports). This domination of a single industry makes the EPZ vulnerable to
import quotas and other protectionist measures by the importing countries. Besides,
the EPZ now faces a shortage of labour, the availability of which helped the rapid
growth of the EPZ in the first place. While the off-shore business sector is thriving it
is also vulnerable due to its high concentration on just one country, India. Although
there is a bilateral double taxation agreement in place between Mauritius and India, if
India moves to change the treaty it could lead to a lot of problems and could affect
the industry seriously. 63 Even the tourism industry is not without its problems. Rising
wages, high taxes and unfair competition from unregistered operators are some of the
63 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 22 July 1995, p. 6
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problems facing the tourism industry. 64 Furthermore, the high rate of population
growth could also lead to considerable strains on the economy in the future.
Nevertheless, in general, the country's economy appears to be in better position to
withstand some shocks that could cripple the economies of other SIDS.
Societal threats are also minimal as far as ethnic problems are concerned.
Mauritius has managed to accommodate the numerous ethnic groups, although
attempts to create a Mauritian identity is still in its infant stages. Ethnic divisions
remain strong and there is potential for ethnic problems to surface. Ethnic
communities identify with their original homelands and religions. Additionally,
custom and practice reproduces within the Indian community divisions along the
caste system. The main societal threat confronted by Mauritius is the growing
influence of the drug traffickers. According to a report presented to the US Congress
by the US State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement Affairs in March 1995, the major problem in Mauritius appears to be
the "trafficking of heroin brought into the country from Bombay by couriers via
commercial airlines".65
 It went on to say that the United States was willing to assist
Mauritius in limiting the "very real potential for growth in narcotics transhipment and
money laundering". 66 One of the biggest difficulties in dealing with the problem of
narcotic drugs is that certain people in the government hierarchy seem to be involved
with the problem. Further, the ineffectiveness of the ADSU have also led to
difficulties in prosecuting the traffickers. According to reports in 1993, sixteen
packets of hard drugs and 175,000 rupees (US$9,500), which represented key
evidence for a trial, simply 'disappeared' while in the headquarters of the ADSU.
Moreover, in February 1994, it was discovered that 46 grams of heroin that also
represented key evidence had 'turned' into cocoa beans while at the premises of the
ADSU.67
 Another hindrance is the difficulty in detecting drugs being brought into
the country through the airport. Being dependent on tourism, it is difficult for
64 See De Backer, "Mauritius: Going for Gold again" p. 28
65 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 25 March 1995, P. 5
66 Ibid. p. 5
67 !bid, 23 April 1994, p.2
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Mauritius to be too strict in the search of luggage of those entering the country,
especially the luggage of tourists. As the Drug Commission suggested, "That might
damage the reputation of (our) country as a gracious and hospitable land".68
Mauritius also acknowledges the difficulty of detecting smugglers using the
numerous bays and inlets on the islands to dump their cargoes. As such, although the
country attempts to fight the threat from the narcotic trade, the problem is a real one.
Environmental threats do exist and are real threats. The country is vulnerable to the
weather, especially the agricultural sector. Industrial pollution due to the lack of
proper treatment is also a problem that could adversely affect the development of
tourism. But again Mauritius is in a better position to meet the threats. Although it
can do nothing to prevent cyclones from harming the sugar crop or stop global
warming, Mauritius has put certain measures in place and earmarked resources to
encounter these difficulties.
Conclusion
Mauritius appears to be relatively secure. The country has managed to
minimise potential threats and it has relied on a democratic system that is accepted
by the society as a whole. It has established good relations with most of the
international community. Even where problems exist, such as the issue of the Chagos
Archipelago, it has proceeded cautiously in order not to let the issue alienate the
country from Britain and the United States. It is obvious that Mauritius seeks the
return of the Chagos. Although Mauritius may claim that the Indian Ocean should
be free from military weapons its claim on the Chagos appears to be directed more
towards the return of the islands so that it can benefit from leasing Diego Garcia to
the US rather than Britain doing so. 69
 It is unlikely that the issue will be resolved
soon. Britain has expressed no interest in returning the islands at present and
Mauritius is cautious in its demand for the return of the islands. Although Mauritius
has raised the issue at the United Nations in the past, the Mauritian Prime Minister in
68 Findings of the Commission of Enquiry on Drugs, (Government Printers, Mauritius, June 1987), p. 39
69 See The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 3 February 1990, p.2
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70 •Sir Aneerood Jugnauth, Prime Minister of Mauritius, address to the 49th session of the UNGA, 5 October 1994
71 Jean Houbert, "Globalisation and Mauritius", The Indian Ocean Review, March 1995, p.26
his address to the 49th session of the General Assembly mentioned it only briefly
saying that, "..we have continued to pursue positive dialogue with Britain and some
progress has been registered". 70
 However, this issue could create problems in the
future if any future government of Mauritius change its stance.
At present, Mauritius seems to have taken the necessary steps to maintain its
low threat scenario. By maintaining close relationships and handling conflicting
issues such as the problem of Diego Garcia in a friendly manner, Mauritius seems
distant from external threats. Domestically, the political system is valued with
institutionalised democratic practices accepted by all. Economically, it is developing
strongly. As far as societal threats are concerned it has so far minimised the potential
risk of such problems surfacing in the country. Environmentally, it has established
means to deal with at least some of the threats. As such, on the surface, Mauritius
faces very few of the threats that are faced by the SIDS in general. However, it could
also be that Mauritius may be moving out of the category of the SIDS. If the one
million cut-off point is imposed strictly, then Mauritius is not one of the SIDS.
However, it is not this fact that has made Mauritius face fewer threats. It is also
because it should no longer be considered strictly as a 'developing' island state. At
the time of independence Mauritius was a country totally dependent on agriculture;
yet today it is considered as one of the newly industrialising countries. While this
may seem the ideal path for other SIDS to follow there are two historical aspects in
the Mauritian story that have contributed to its success. Firstly, from the time
Mauritius was colonised there were no indigenous institutions hampering the
development of a modem state system, capitalism and a market economy. As Jean
Houbert claims, "the modem state and the market economy found virgin soil in
Mauritius. There were no pre-colonial institutions in the way: no 'tribal' structure, no
'Asiatic Despotism', to hamper the establishment of modern rule; no pre-colonial
modes of production standing in the path of capitalism". 71
 Although this could be
true of some of the other SIDS such as the Seychelles, a second factor ensured that
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this establishment of a modern state and market economy continued. This goes back
to the time of independence when its political leaders chose to continue democratic
practices and safeguard the rights of businessmen and the sugar producers. The
people themselves accepted that this was the right path and therefore a modern state
based on democratic practices, and an economy based on capitalism, became
institutionalised in Mauritius, respected by all. Unlike many of the states who
received independence from colonial powers there was no nationalisation of
industries in Mauritius. Furthermore, future governments have continued this policy
and there is consensus among the political parties on the type of development
policies chosen. There is also a third aspect to the success of Mauritius which lies
partly in the geo-politics of the Indian Ocean and partly in the ethnic composition of
Mauritius. Mauritius has been able to make use of the fact that Britain is in
possession of part of its territory. By maintaining close contacts with Britain it has
been able to gain aid and assistance from Britain which is keen to keep the Diego
Garcia issue in the background. Furthermore, Mauritius is also able to get
developmental assistance from a France keen to be accepted as part of an Indian
Ocean country. As such, by pragmatic policies Mauritius has been able to maximise
its position vis-à-vis Britain and France. Additionally, it has also been able to
maintain good economic relations with its neighbour South Africa during the
apartheid years and despite opposition from African countries. Moreover, with a
majority population of Indian origin, it receives substantial assistance from India, the
other main dominant actor in the Indian Ocean. Although it can perhaps be claimed
that Mauritius has managed to minimise its security problems because it is strictly no
longer a 'small' and 'developing' state, it is these factors that have led Mauritius to
the position the country is in today. Therefore, in this respect, the Mauritian story is
somewhat unique.
However, this not say that Mauritius is without any security problems. It is
simply the case that security problems in Mauritius are more in the area of
vulnerabilities rather than threats. Military vulnerability exists in Mauritius.
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Politically, the country appears strong on the surface yet many of the inherent
vulnerabilities of the SIDS such as personalisation of politics and openness to
external influence and pressure remains. Although Mauritius is now categorised as a
newly industrialising country, the economy is still vulnerable to external threats.
Potential threats remain in the form of economic shocks such as those that may arise
from sudden changes of trade patterns from the countries that Mauritius exports, and
changes in world prices, especially that of sugar. The Minister in charge of
Economic Planning and Development stated, "Despite our current success we are still
a very fragile economy which has to keep in step with others". 72
 While the different
ethnic communities live in harmony, potential societal threats in the form of ethnic
problems could surface unless the present level of unity is maintained. Furthermore,
the society faces problems from narcotic drugs. Environmentally, the country is
vulnerable and potential and actual environmental threats exist. Some of these are a
direct result of economic development. Today only 1 % of the native forest remains
in Mauritius. 73
 Other problems such as those due to global warming and sea level
rise and to cyclones are beyond the control of Mauritius. Although at present
Mauritius has succeeded in minimising its threat scenario, the question is can
Mauritius continue on this path in the future? It is difficult to predict what the future
holds in any case, let alone as far as the security of a SIDS is concerned. However, as
long as Mauritius manages to continue its present policies it is apparent that it could
lead to a further reduction of its vulnerabilities and threats.
72 Quoted in The Courier, No. 135, September-October 1992, P. 3073 Ibrahim Alladin, Economic Miracle in the Indian Ocean: Can Mauritius show the way, (Editions de l'Ocean lndien, Rose-
Hill, Mauritius, 1993), p. 177
219
Chapter VIII
THE INDIAN OCEAN SECURITY MATRIX
(Threats, Vulnerabilities, Strategies and Responses in a comparative context)
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part will compare and
contrast the various security problems of the three Indian Ocean SIDS (I0S). It will
demonstrate the similarities and difference among the IOS in the national, regional
and international context. The second part identifies the numerous strategies and
responses that have been used by the IOS and are available to these states at various
levels. These will be divided into domestic (self-help), bilateral (patron-client), and
regional and international levels.
Threats and Vulnerabilities
The National Dimension
In analysing the security problems of the IOS some vulnerabilities and threats
are more real than others. Militarily, all the three IOS are weak. They lack the
necessary military resources to defend themselves against determined armed attack
from outside sources. They all have limited human resources and hardware. They all
are handicapped in the area of command and control and often rely on foreign
expertise to assist in their defence policy making. Even if they might have sufficient
resources to hold off an armed attack from a non-governmental source for some time,
the likelihood is that foreign help will have to be sought and soon. The Maldives and
the Seychelles have maintained defence forces, though they are costly and take a
large share of their budgets that could have been used for other purposes. The
Seychelles has actually cut down their defence budget as well as the number of
personnel in their armed services in the last year. The Mauritian armed force is also
small, although they have a Special Mobile Unit to deal with external threats.
However, actual threats of armed intervention in all three are low. Although both the
Maldives and the Seychelles have experienced mercenary attacks in the past, the
possibility of this happening again in the near future is doubtful. In the case of the
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Maldives the prompt assistance received from India during the 1988 attack could
deter dissidents from seeking assistance from non-governmental sources such as
mercenaries in the future. In the case of the Seychelles, it was once again overseas
dissidents barred from returning home who were the organisers of the attack and
today, with the re-establishment of multi-party democracy, the need to replace the
ruling elite by such means does not appear to be likely. Mauritius has been free of
the problem of coups and mercenary attacks, mainly due to well established
democratic practices unlike the other two, and the fact that Mauritius does not have
an active overseas population that is keen to see a change of government by
undemocratic means. Besides, all three maintain good relations with the rest of the
world. As far as the Maldives and the Seychelles are concerned no serious disputes,
especially territorial ones, exist with other states or neighbours and the only IOS with
such a problem is Mauritius over Diego Garcia. Furthermore, they have so far
proved successful in maintaining a balance of friendship between neighbours who
may have problems with each other in the region and have avoided taking sides. As
such, armed intervention, whether it be from another state or from foreign
mercenaries, is not a key threat to the IOS at present although the problem of
mercenaries remains a potential threat as long as political suppression, together with
people willing to use force for financial gains, remain.
The IOS are not only weak militarily. Political weakness and openness also
appear to be two problems that are real in all three, although to varying degrees. In
all of them personalisation of politics is a key feature. In all three, the ruling elite
have dominated the political scene for a long time and the head of the government
plays the 'father figure'. He is often portrayed as a person which the country cannot
do without. As such, in the three SIDS relatively few people tend to dominate
politics. Although they appear to enjoy political stability, the abuse of power by
those in goverment, as well as allegations of nepotism and corruption are potential
problems that could well threaten these states in the future. This has created among
some a strong desire for change that may lead to the use of undesirable means to
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bring a change of leader. In the Maldives President Gayoom has faced three attempts
to overthrow his government and it is difficult to quantify the numerous coups and
alleged coup attempts designed to overthrow President Rene of Seychelles.
Mauritius, once more, seems to be the least affected of the three. Although the
tendency for a few to dominate politics exists in Mauritius, this is accepted by the
people as long as power is exercised by democratic means. The current Prime
Minister, Sir Aneerood Jugnauth, remains in office because he has invited various
opposition parties to join him as partners rather than because he is the only candidate
in elections. This contrasts with one candidate elections in the Seychelles in the past
and which remain the policy in the Maldives. As far as threats are concerned, actual
domestic political threats at present are low and the IOS appear to be rather stable.
However, potential problems exist on the political front, especially for the Maldives.
In the case of the Seychelles the long term effects of the newly established multi-
party system remains to be seen. If it is continued as the accepted way then it should
reduce potential political problems.
Furthermore, all three are dependent on foreign resources to overcome
problems in several areas. Lack of resources has meant that foreign assistance has
become vital, although this is less obvious in Mauritius due to its better economic
performance. Both the Maldives and the Seychelles rely heavily on foreign expertise
and assistance, not just for their economic development but also in other areas such
as environmental policy making and the day to day running of the government. This
has made all three open to foreign influences and pressure. Additionally, they have
very little ability to influence events outside their territorial borders, even in their
own region. In the past, the IOS have all raised their concern about the threat from
the militarisation of the Indian Ocean, especially by the larger powers of the
international community. However, this issue appears to have become a lower
priority in their lists of security concerns after the end of the Cold War. More
worrying is the growing military strength and increasing role in the Indian Ocean by
regional powers like India. One of the major threats to all three IOS is that of foreign
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influence and pressure, especially from India and France (in the western Indian
Ocean). In all three IOS, India plays a vital role. To carry out any policy contrary to
the interest of India is therefore going to be extremely difficult. This scenario is also
true as regards French influence, though not to the Maldives as the country is not
situated in the south west Indian Ocean where French interest is mostly
concentrated. Although at present all three IOS maintain good relations with most
states, foreign pressure continues in some areas, especially for Mauritius from Britain
over the issue of Diego Garcia. This is a key problem as part of the territory of
Mauritius is being used by another state for its own purpose, bearing in mind that the
British have rented it out to the Americans.
One of the key security problems faced by all the SIDS is that of economic
vulnerability and the subsequent dependence on foreign assistance, although once
again this is less obvious in Mauritius. In the Maldives and the Seychelles the
economic resource base is extremely narrow and both are heavily dependent on one
or two industries, especially tourism. Their economies are open to external
vicissitudes as their ratio of imports to GDP is fairly high. They are vulnerable to
economic shocks. Even in the case of Mauritius, the country is sensitive to price
fluctuations and import quotas imposed by other states can seriously affect the
country. In the early 1980s many industries in the EPZ of Mauritius had to close
down due to recession in European markets and imports quotas imposed by Britain,
France, Italy and the United States, which had serious effects on the textile industry.
A World Bank report in 1989 stressed the need for Mauritius to diversify more in
order to cut down dependence on a few products and reduce vulnerability to price
fluctuations in the international markets.' Dependence on foreign aid has also
created problems. They cannot afford to antagonise their donors and this appears to
be a considerable problem in all three. Further, economic development has also led to
the drying up of foreign aid, especially to the Seychelles and to a lesser extent the
Maldives. The main issue here is that while the SIDS have improved their economic
1 See Donald L. Sparks "Economy" (Mauritius), Africa: South of the Sahara, 1995, p. 621
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performances, they still require considerable amounts of assistance by the
international community to continue to develop, diversify their economies and
improve their overall economic resilience. If such assistance is withdrawn then it
could lead to all sorts of problems. Economic hardship can create public
dissatisfaction and could lead to political instability. This fear is more real in the
Seychelles where the country is experimenting with multi-party democracy after 14
years of being a one party state. Besides, one of the key problems faced by the SIDS
is the dominance of foreign owned business interests. This is more so in the
Seychelles. They need foreign investment but at the same time are vulnerable to its
dominance. Linked with economic vulnerability as well as territorial protection, one
of the primary problems faced by all three is the violation of their waters by foreign
vessels, especially unlawful poaching in the EEZ. All three have vast zones that need
to be protected yet all three lack the means to do so, especially in the case of
Seychelles where the EEZ is over 1.3 million square kilometres.
As far as societal vulnerabilities and threats are concerned all three have
managed to minimise societal threats. The Maldives, being a homogenous society,
faces no ethnic problems and although secessionism was a problem in the past this is
not the case today. Both the Seychelles and Mauritius have multi-ethnic societies but
so far ethnic problems are minimal. The existence of numerous constitutional
safeguards as well as inbreeding has encouraged unity between the various ethnic
communities. However, future problems between different ethnic communities can
become a problem, especially in Mauritius where the ethnic communities identify
with their respective ethnic origins and religion; and the people of Indian origin are
also divided by caste. Drugs are also a considerable problem, although it has not
affected the countries as much as it has in the SIDS of the Caribbean. It can become a
serious hazard if not tackled effectively.
Environmental and ecological vulnerabilities exist in all three IOS. Island
environments are especially precarious and vulnerable. Destruction of coral reefs,
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erosion of coastal areas, and marine pollution are common. Further, the improper
disposal of domestic and industrial waste is also a major threat. All the IOS have
numerous programmes and policies to overcome environmental problems. However,
these need to be sustained and more international assistance, especially in the form of
further research into the various causes of and solutions to environmental problems,
needs to be carried out. As far as the Maldives is concerned the single greatest
environmental threat facing the country today is that of global warming and
associated sea level rise. This is a problem beyond its control although it is
somewhat less threatening to the Seychelles and Mauritius as in both states most
islands are granitic.
The Regional Dimension
Although the three IOS have some similarities as regards vulnerabilities and
threats, the security problems of the IOS, when analysed together, do not form a
similar pattern. Their vulnerabilities are primarily a function of their own individual
conditions and apart from the dominant role of India in all three, common linkages
are rare. In the past, the Indian Ocean was a theatre for the Cold War, yet the IOS
have managed to withstand the politics of bipolarity with minimal participation. Even
in the Seychelles, where a socialist government dominated in the late 1970s and
1980s, the influence of the former Soviet Union was minimised and it was able to
maintain a balance between the two superpowers. Mauritius, although declaring itself
to be a non-aligned country, was always pro-Western. The Maldives, in relative
isolation from the rest of the world for most of its history, also managed to stay clear
of any superpower influences, mainly due to the fact that the British had a military
base in Gan until 1977 and therefore was 'out of bounds' for the Soviet Union. After
the departure of the British it did find itself having to fend off advances from the
Soviet Union for the lease of Gan. It somehow managed to avoid a Soviet
entanglement and therefore was able to be non-aligned, receiving aid and assistance
from both camps yet pledging allegiance to none. All three IOS did express strong
concerns about the militarisation of the Indian Ocean during the 1970s and 1980s
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though there was hardly any evidence that they faced any real threats. Today, this
issue has somewhat fizzled out.
As far as the region is concerned one common element facing the IOS is the
influence of India. Even in this case the relationship with the IOS appears to be
different. Mauritius, by virtue of having a majority of people of Indian origin, shares
cultural links with India, unlike the Seychelles. The Maldives do not have any
cultural or linguistic links with India although located in its immediate vicinity.
France is the other power which plays a regional role. However, the French influence
appears to be limited to the Seychelles and Mauritius. This is not surprising as they
were both French colonies in the past and, furthermore, the French DOM of Reunion
is located near them. As far as the Maldives are concerned there are no historical
contacts with France and hardly any French influence. South Africa did affect the
two SIDS of the south western Indian Ocean and caused real problems, especially in
the Seychelles. With the dismantling of apartheid it remains to be seen how or if
South Africa will involve itself in the Indian Ocean. At a recent seminar on Defence
Equipment Co-operation in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Defence Minister, Joe Modise,
stated that "Collective responsibility for the maintenance of peace has emerged as a
key activity in international co-operation. As a partner in both the region and the
continent, South Africa can be expected to become involved in the support of peace
operations" •2 It appears that this new role will be rather different to the one South
Africa undertook in the past, which was one of sponsoring mercenaries to overthrow
governments and bribing the SIDS to break the trade embargo. The United States is
the only non-regional power that has a major interest in the Indian Ocean. It
maintains the military base in Diego Garcia and it was very much the target regarding
the establishment of a Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean. Despite the fact that the
IOS staunchly supported the Indian Ocean 'Zone of Peace' concept the relationship
between them and the United States was more or less cordial. The Seychelles allowed
the United States to maintain a satellite tracking station even after the establishment
2 Quoted in the Asian Defence Journal, April 1995, p. 14
226
of a socialist one party state and refused the Soviets the base that they allegedly
wanted. The Maldives has not had a close relationship with the United States in the
past but this has changed over the last four or five years. Although Mauritius has
called for the return of Diego Garcia, this seems to be directed towards Britain rather
than the United States. As such, the direct influence on the IOS by the presence of the
United States in the Indian Ocean has been limited.
Although the IOS individually had confronted many threats in the past there
was hardly a regional element to them. Even today, in the several areas where
vulnerabilities and threats exist, they are somewhat different in each case. In the
Maldives the key threats today appear to be environmental and economic and those
that may arise domestically with the people's desire to bring change to the political
system. In the Seychelles the main threats appear to be economic, especially those
that could arise from the influence of foreign business interests and the depletion of
external development aid. Although the Seychelles also faces potential domestic
political threats, the eventuality of this happening appears to be more related to
economic vulnerabilities than any desire of the people to bring change to local
politics, particularly now that the people in the Seychelles have established a multi-
party democracy. In the case of Mauritius the main problem appear to be externally,
the issue of Diego Garcia, and internally, domestic political problems in the form of
corruption. Therefore, the vulnerabilities of the IOS are similar in kind to the SIDS
of the world as a whole rather than unique to the Indian Ocean. Similarly, where
threats are concerned, the problems once again seem to conform to the particularities
of the IOS rather than the region as a whole. This is hardly surprising as the three IOS
form a region in a geographical sense only in that they are all located in some part of
the Indian Ocean. This is especially true of the Maldives, located in South Asia and
quite distant from the other two. The Seychelles and Mauritius are located closer to
each other. As for common external threats, the one factor that could play a major
role in the security scenario in all three is the growing dominant role of India in the
Indian Ocean. The desire of India to take on the role of the regional policeman,
227
especially in South Asia, was seen in India's involvement in trying to broker peace
between the separatist Tamils and the government in Sri Lanka; and in the military
assistance to the Maldives to put down the mercenary attack in 1988. The possibility
that India wants to expand this role to the rest of the Indian Ocean is feared by many
in the Indian Ocean littoral and hinterland states. This fear is not without reason.
India has been expanding its navy and has the largest naval fleet among the
countries of the Indian Ocean. Although the IOS currently enjoy a close relationship
with India, there is an underlying fear of India's hegemonial ambitions. If India
continues to expand its role in the Indian Ocean it could make it extremely difficult
for the IOS to refuse to do what India desires, even if it is detrimental to their own
national interests. Further, the expansion of the nuclear capability of both India and
Pakistan could affect the geo-politics of the region. Although India and Pakistan have
fought three wars the last one was in 1971. Then the situation more or less stabilised,
with each making intimidating gestures and threatening statements followed by
attempts to diffuse tensions. However, in recent years tensions have been increasing
over the disputed territory of Kashmir. As such, it is feared that the expansion of
nuclear capability in both countries can destabilise the region and in effect lead the
sub-continent into destruction. Although neither India nor Pakistan claims that they
possess nuclear weapons it is generally agreed that they both are nuclear powers. For
the IOS such a situation will be disastrous, especially to the Maldives which has a
close relationship with both countries and relies on assistance from both. The IOS
benefited from the role of India in the Indian Ocean in the past with generous
developmental and military assistance. They also welcome the assistance received
from Pakistan, although on a much smaller scale. However, a war in the Indian sub-
continent could change all that. The growth of Indian influence in the region could
also affect the position of other powers such as France in the western Indian ocean.
Although the island of Reunion is a French DOM, the Tamil population has been
growing and they have been demanding greater political participation. If they wish to
establish a more closer relationship with India then it could be a cause for concern to
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France. 3
 Although in the future the geo-politics of the Indian Ocean could alter the
security scenario for the IOS, at present their security problems appears to be derived
more from the fact that they are small and island developing states rather than as a
consequence of them being SIDS located in the Indian Ocean. This is not to say that
there is no regional influence, but that the security problems due to regional
influences are limited.
The International Dimension
The smallness of the IOS and the fact that they are developing states which
are islands rather than some part of a geographical mainland have resulted in certain
characteristic that they share with other SIDS. The smallness of the IOS means that
they only possess limited abilities to deter and defend themselves. Therefore, they
are militarily weak and vulnerable to external threats. Thus militarily all three IOS
fall into the category of states with high vulnerability and low actual threats making
the security problems more systemic than specific. Similarly, they share with the
other SIDS problems of weakness, not only militarily but politically and
economically. Although political stability exists today, the IOS have had their share
of domestic upheaval in the past and continue to face possible external interference
and pressure. Therefore, politically once more all three have high vulnerability and
low actual threats. However, potential threats do exist, especially in the Maldives and
the Seychelles. This scenario prevails where societal security problems are
concentrated. Economically Mauritius is the only success story so far. The Maldives
and the Seychelles are both resource-poor and dependent on foreign resources and
have high vulnerability and a high threat factor making their economic security
problems all encompassing. This is true where environmental security problems are
concerned and applies to all three IOS. Most of the potential threats they face are
common to the SIDS located in the Caribbean and the South Pacific and if there are
differences, they vary only in degree and not in kind. Even where actual threats are
concerned other SIDS also face similar threats or have faced such threats in the past.
3 Admiral M.P. Awati, "The Geo-political and Geo-strategic importance of the Islands of the Indian Ocean" in S. Chandra et
al (eds), The Indian Ocean and its Islands: Strategic, Scientific and Historical Perspectives, pp. 80 - 81
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This is especially true where economic and environmental threats are concerned.
Although many such vulnerabilities and threats may also be common to small states
in general, there are certain problems faced by the IOS that are only shared by other
SIDS. The explanation for this is self-evident. The IOS are not only just small but
they are island states and therefore they share features peculiar to small island states.
The IOS are remote in terms of distance and transport. Besides, they are multi-island
states and therefore inter-island communication within the state is difficult and
expensive. They possess vast areas of maritime territory, yet they are unable to fully
utilise their resources let alone protect them from exploitation by others. The
environments of the IOS are fragile and vulnerable to threats that are often beyond
their control and for which they are not responsible. Besides, their insular nature
affects their societies and also the way they perceive and carry out their activities as
sovereign states. Therefore, the security problems of the IOS are also common to
most of the SIDS in other parts of the world. There may be some differences based
on the geo-politics of the area where the SIDS are located. As far as the IOS are
concerned, although the geo-politics of the Indian Ocean do influence and shape the
security of the IOS, this is less of a determinant of their security problems than it is
for SIDS located in other areas such as the Caribbean or the South Pacific.
Strategies and Responses
The IOS have resorted to various means in their attempt to reduce their
vulnerabilities and at the same time find means of confronting threats. The different
ways that these states have tried to deal with their security problems can be roughly
divided into self-help measures, patron-client methods (bilateral), regional measures
and international measures. Self-help measures are those measures that these states
have taken and can take on their own without any outside assistance. Patron-client
methods are those strategies and responses that are designed to deliver resources and
assistance from a larger power in order to reduce vulnerabilities and threats. The
most obvious example of this is a bilateral defence pact to combat military threats.
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Regional measures are those put in place by regional bodies or a group of regional
states. International measures are those organised and delivered by various
international organisations. For the purpose of the thesis only the measures instituted
by the two major international organisations currently involved in the issues of small
states (the Commonwealth and the UN) will be analysed.
Self-help
However small the SIDS may be the first response has to come from within
the states themselves. It is the SIDS who have to recognise the need for security and
try to identify the security problems they face and may have to face, both
domestically and internationally. Unless there is an initiative on the part of the SIDS
themselves, it would prove futile for the rest of the international community to try
and provide solutions to their security problems.
The three SIDS of the Indian Ocean have some capabilities to meet some of
the threats they confront. (See individual case studies.) However, the issue here is
not just having some measures in place. It is paramount that the security situation is
carefully analysed and vulnerabilities and threats identified. In many instances, the
SIDS follow a reactionary policy to security problems rather than a forward planning
one. For example, in the Maldives, after the mercenary attack in 1988, the whole
defence policy appears to have been geared to meet a threat from mercenaries who
may arrive by boat! In most cases, realistic analysis is rarely attempted. This is more
so because in the SIDS regime security often becomes synonymous with the security
of the SIDS as a whole. This may be true to a certain extent in that, for example, any
threat such as a coup or mercenary attack to topple the regime in power can have a
strong impact on the country as whole. However, there are many instances where the
threat scenario is mainly or, in some cases, wholly geared to the regime in power.
Artificial threats against the regime from outside sources are often conjectured in
order for the government to carry out policies that otherwise may not be popular with
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the people. This was the situation in the Seychelles in the past as 'threats from
mercenaries' against the country appeared to be always on the horizon. For most
SIDS, some sort of forward planning is carried out, especially on the economic and
the environmental front. However, in other areas, especially with regard to military,
political and societal threats, there is very little forward thinking. This has to change
as this is one way that the SIDS can help themselves. They need to carefully analyse
their security scenario to detect real threats and assess the dangers in order to
maximise the limited resources available to them.
In order to establish an effective strategy by the SIDS themselves, many
measures have been suggested among which can be included the strategy of the 4 D's:
deterrence, defence, development and diplomacy. 4 Deterrence and defence may be
achieved in many ways. The most common example cited for defending the SIDS
from security threats is that of strengthening military defences. Although the desire
to maintain an effective army, navy and airforce exists in nearly all states, it is not
always possible for the SIDS to do so. Considering the limited resources available to
these states, the ideal would be to have an armed force that is multipurpose and
mobile, specially in the case of archipelagos where troops might have to be des-
patched to far flung islands. 5 They should be able to carry out a wide range of
functions from police duties to that of patrolling the maritime zones. As mentioned
before, the Maldives do not have distinctive army, navy and airforce divisions. The
National Security Service perform all the functions. The Seychelles has a citizen
militia that could be called up in times of crisis as well as their regular armed force.
This is convenient as there are a limited number of people available for the defence
force. The armed forces in the Seychelles are also trained in building and
construction work, mechanics, farming and fishing. 6 In the case of Mauritius, there is
a highly trained Special Mobile Unit. Even though an effective armed force can be
seen as crucial, an over-zealous armed force can be dangerous as was found in the
5 See the Commonwealth Consultative Group, Vulnerability: Small states in a global society, and Neville 0. Linton, "A
policy perspective" in Clarke and Payne (eds), Politics, Security and Development in small states,p. 217
6 Franda, The Seychelles: Unquiet Islands, pp.69 - 72, 118
4 H.E. Chang Heng Chee, Permanent Representative of Singapore to the UN, at the UN General Assembly, 19 October 1987.
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Seychelles in the past and in Sao Tome in August 1995. Henceforth, the SIDS will
have to discipline their armed forces to a high level although this might not be such
an easy thing to achieve. However, the difficulty with self-help is that already
limited resources have to be used for the development of an armed service that could,
at best, just manage to hold off an armed attack until outside help arrives. Some
factions in the Seychelles have claimed that the Seychelles do not need a military
force following the détente between the US and the Soviet Union. This claim was
dismissed by the Chief of Staff, James Michael, in January 1991, pointing out that it
was every country's right to have an army or military force to defend itself and its
national sovereignty against aggression: "Seychelles is no exception". 7 Mauritius
appears to be the only one among the SIDS of the Indian Ocean that has the resources
to form an effective armed force. Mauritius has a larger population and is better
developed economically and therefore has more resources available.
Defence in many contexts not only means the strengthening of their armed
forces. One of the main problems in the past is the lack of defence against political
threats, both from internal and external sources. One of the ways that this can be
remedied and coups, political instability and the notorious use of mercenaries to
overthrow governments avoided, is through the establishment of democratic
practices. Although some have criticised such a strategy by saying that a weak
democracy is worse than a benevolent dictatorship, democracy is the accepted norm
today. Already many SIDS have what can be called 'tailor-made democratic
practices' to suit their needs. The problem with some of the SIDS is that many are
ruled by people who do not necessarily reflect the political structure of the whole
community. It is, therefore, essential that wider political participation is undertaken
so as to tap into all the resources available. In the case of the Maldives and the
Seychelles, the threats from mercenaries involved dissident elements from within the
country as well. The problem with the SIDS is that because of the personalisation of
politics everything is taken on a personal level and therefore acceptance of criticisms
7 Quoted in Publication No. 038, Government Information Service, Seychelles
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is difficult for those in power. This appeared to be specially true in the Seychelles in
the past and is to some degree the situation in the Maldives today. While bearing in
mind that no government could satisfy the demands of all the people, it might be
worthwhile to analyse the demands of the dissidents. In some cases they might have
genuine grievances. The case for democracy is strong, especially when the security
situation of Mauritius is analysed. Mauritius has managed to avoid the threats from
coups and mercenaries that have plagued the other two SIDS, despite the multi-ethnic
community and a party system that has ethnic undertones. The main reason for it
appears to be well-established democratic practices whereby elections are regularly
held which are fair and free and accepted by the majority, and that freedom of
expression is generally allowed, if not openly welcomed by the ruling elite,
whichever party is in power. Further, the larger population appears to have made the
politics of Mauritius somewhat less personalised than the other two, although it is
still based on the dominance of personalities. This is not the case in the Seychelles (a
one-party state from 1979 - 1992) and in the Maldives where no political parties
exist. As such, there appears to be a case for democracy as a means of defence
against domestic political security problems. However, in some of the SIDS there is
also a very real barrier to the establishment of democracy. For example, the
Maldives has always been ruled by a small political elite. Democracy is a concept
that is understood only by a few educated people as the functional literacy in the
country is rather low. Although the ruling elite claims that the Maldives is a
democratic country, the introduction of real democracy is going to be difficult. The
concept of freedom of speech, although generally seen as a right of the people, is
accepted only as a limited concept. For example, criticisms of the government are not
only discouraged by the ruling elite but the majority of the people themselves often
see it as being disloyal to the country. There is thus still some way to go although
this scenario is somewhat changing today as more and more people are becoming
literate and educated. Therefore, wider political participation and political legitimacy
are an essential part of the defence structure against the threat from coups and
political instability.
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As for defence against external political threats, all three rely on the policy of
'make as many friends and as few enemies as possible'. The three IOS enjoy cordial
relations with a large number of states in the international community and seek to
maintain a good reputation. This could prove a vital self-help measure as it could
raise the political costs to would-be aggressors. The IOS have also joined various
regional and international organisations in order to enhance their role among the
members of the international community. However, just becoming a member of such
an organisation does not mean very much on its own. Participation to the maximum
extent possible at such gatherings, where the main actors of the regional and
international community convene, is vital. Many SIDS lack the necessary resources
to attend many international gatherings. However, the IOS have attempted to raise
their profile at international level by hosting various regional and international
gatherings. Island states are often seen to be perfect locations for such meetings away
from the political turmoil in other areas of the world. While the SIDS may lack the
necessary resources to 'go to the mountain' bringing 'the mountain' to themselves
may be one way that they can continue to participate meaningfully in the
international community. International gatherings are one area where the IOS have
played a key role in drawing the attention of the international community to the
plight of the small states. All three have raised their concerns at various regional and
international gatherings and the Seychelles and Mauritius co-sponsored the Maldives'
initiative in raising the issue of the security of small states at the United Nations. In
order to reduce external pressure, many SIDS also opt for non-alignment. The
Maldives, the Seychelles and Mauritius have done the same. Although this may be
seen as a better alternative by most of these states than the alternative of joining one
of the allied camps this is less of a security guarantee. For these countries, most of
the security problems they faced, the Caribbean excepted, did not emanate from the
superpowers. As such, being non-aligned, while it did provide certain benefits, such
as aid from both camps, did not really solve most of the problems they faced.
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As for strengthening their defence against the major economic threats,
development appears to be the answer (This will be dealt later). Where the problem
is poaching in the EEZ the solutions available to the IOS are limited. They do have
coast guards but in reality there is very little they can do to effectively monitor their
vast EEZs. The Maldives have recently installed a radar to detect vessels entering its
EEZ. None of the three SIDS face major societal threats from ethnic discrimination.
The Maldives is a homogenous country. In Mauritius 'ethnic peace' is mainly due to
the establishment of a legislative framework whereby no community is alienated.
Integration and inbreeding have also helped reduce ethnic problems, especially in the
Seychelles. The attempt to create a national Seychellois identity is also one the
factors that has helped unite the Seychelles. Integration has also helped reduce the
possible threat of secessionism although differences between the various island
communities still remains to some degree. Another factor that could strengthen
national identity is the attempt to avoid marginalisation of outer islands. All three
IOS have attached great importance to this issue. The IOS have also put in place
constitutional measures to combat threats from the drugs trade, although it is a small
step compared to the potential threat from drugs. Lack of trained personnel in
enforcing the law appears to be the major problem that needs to be tackled. Further,
there appears to be a lack of resources, especially on the rehabilitation side. However,
domestic anti-drug education is one area where the IOS can help themselves and this
is an area that has to be expanded in all three IOS. More programmes to create
awareness using such mediums as the radio can be useful in SIDS, especially in
archipelagos such as the Maldives.
As far as environmental problems are concerned, the IOS have managed to
put in place legislative frameworks to protect their environments. Yet difficulties
exist with the enforcement of the law. Moreover, self-help is extremely limited.
There is very little these SIDS have done to contribute to the environmental problems
they are facing today. Most of the problems of global warming and sea level rise and
the increasing frequency of cyclones and storms are beyond their control. Even in the
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case of waste disposal there is only limited action available to the SIDS. Raising
awareness among the people as to the importance of environment is one of the key
issues. Environmental impact assessments often need assistance from outside.
Although disaster-preparedness is vital for these SIDS in order to cope with sudden
cyclones and tropical storms, training programmes cost money and forecasting such
disasters, warning the people, planning and stockpiling emergency funds are often
beyond the means of SIDS and therefore require foreign assistance.
For many of the SIDS development is a cornerstone of an effective security
strategy. As Robert McNamara, a former President of the World Bank, summed up,
"Security is not military hardware, though it may include it; security is not military
force, though it may involve it; security is not traditional military activity, though it
may encompass it. Security is development, and without development there can be no
security." 8
 For many of the SIDS, economic vulnerability is one of their main
problems and this vulnerability is the main element underlying many of the other
security problems that they face. Therefore, economic development becomes vital,
not only to reduce their economic vulnerability but as a prerequisite to meet the
security threats in many of the other areas. Not only will it "prevent the emergence of
weaknesses which can be exploited by the others" but it will also provide much
needed resources that could be channelled into the defence of the country without
having to sacrifice other sectors. 9 Economic development would also enable these
states to overcome the technological bottlenecks that most of them now confront
and enhance facilities for communication and exchange of vital information. Even in
the case of military defence, economic development contributes a great deal. For
example, in the Maldives it was the newly installed communication facility that
enabled the Maldivian leadership to appeal for international assistance on the fateful
day in November 1988. Since it was a newly constructed building on a stronger
foundation than most of the older buildings in Male, it was able to withstand the
constant assault by the mercenaries. However, once again self-help is rather limited
9 H.E. Chang Heng Chee, Permanent Representative of Singapore to the UN, at the UN General Assembly, 19 October 1987
8 Robert McNamara, The essence of security, (Harper and Row, New York, 1987)
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in the search for economic development. The poor resource base means they
usually rely on one or two primary products. However, the IOS have attempted to
maximise the resources they have as well as attempting to diversify into other areas.
The Maldives has continued to expand its fisheries sector while tourism is given
equal importance. The Seychelles has followed a more or less similar policy although
it also has manufacturing on a small scale. Mauritius has come out the best of the
three. It has successfully moved from a sugar based economy to one in which the
main strength is now manufacturing. Tourism comes a close third and the fisheries
sector is also being developed. While the Maldives and the Seychelles are also
attempting to follow this path, for them, once again, self-help is limited. The SIDS
may have vast areas of EEZ with plentiful stocks of fish, and they may have beautiful
sandy beaches, but these in themselves cannot foster the growth of successful
industries. In order to foster development they need additional resources but their
availability is limited. As such, there is little that these SIDS can do without external
assistance. Although foreign investment can be encouraged by the prospect of good
economic returns on capital, the best form of self-help in encouraging foreign
investment is the establishment of a sound political system in the country. It is
axiomatic that foreign investors will be extremely reluctant to invest in a country torn
by political instability or where there is high political risk. Further, foreign
investment can also be encouraged by a sound legal system. These appear to be two
of the underlying factors that encouraged foreign companies to invest in the Export
Processing Zone of Mauritius. In the case of the Maldives, the legal system is based
on the Islamic Shariath and commercial laws need to be developed that would
encourage foreign investment. At the moment this seems to be one of the main
factors that make foreign investors hesitate to invest in the country. Further, careful
policies and laws need to be enforced in order to avoid the undesirable influences and
pressures from foreign business ventures as they themselves can pose a threat to the
SIDS as it was found in the Seychelles.
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One of the important mechanisms that acts as a general deterrent
factor for security threats is diplomacy. In an interdependent international community
no SIDS can really afford to remain as an 'island'. Therefore, the need to establish a
"prudent foreign policy and an effective diplomacy" cannot be over-emphasised. m It
is necessary to have a more open policy, establish close relations with other states
and altogether have a more open outlook. As mentioned before, it is also important
for these small countries to participate in international gatherings. Not only do such
meetings foster goodwill but they often prove to be "an excellent mechanism for
communication and exchange of vital information regarding security concerns"."
The problem for most of the SIDS is that they cannot afford to send representatives
or establish resident embassies in various countries, due to the lack of resources,
both financial and human. The Seychelles and Mauritius have established a
reasonable presence in foreign countries, but the Maldives only has three resident
missions overseas. More often than not, the representatives from such states are
inexperienced and untrained. But this should not be a limitation on an effective
diplomatic policy. They should be able to put to good use their limited resources and
could co-operate and share diplomatic facilities. Many small states use the same
office building at the United Nations sponsored by the Commonwealth, and the UN
has proven to be a vital link to the smaller states to enable them to maintain contact
with other states. As in many cases, alongside the benefits of joining international
organisations come negative effects as well. In many instances their votes are
canvassed by representatives from other more powerful countries and they may be
offered incentives by these states which the SIDS find difficult to reject. I2 In
summary, while there are certain areas that the SIDS themselves can tackle to
enhance their security, self-help is clearly limited and they need to look elsewhere
for assistance.
11 H.E. Ibrahim Hussain Zaki, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Maldives, Smallness and Vulnerability of Small
States, paper presented at the Workshop on Security of Small States, Giraavaru, Maldives, May 1991
12 C. E. Diggines, "The problems of small states", The Round Table, No.295, 1984, pp.195 -205
10 See Linton in Clarke and Payne (eds) Politics, Security and Development in small states,p. 219
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Patron-client methods
Bilateral measures play a vital role in the security concerns of SIDS. Some
SIDS seek to strengthen their military and political security by establishing a defence
pact with a regional neighbour which is relatively powerful. Or in some cases the
bigger neighbours provide some type of military assistance, as found in the South
Pacific where Australia and New Zealand have provided general and technical
defence assistance for their smaller neighbouring island states. In the past decades,
some SIDS leased part of their territory to larger powers to set up military bases
providing an element of security for the SIDS. In some instances this type of
defence pact or defence assistance is not regarded favourably, as such types of secu-
rity arrangements are unlikely to occur without some substantial benefit to the larger
power. However, it must be borne in mind that the ultimate question is whether the
SIDS is satisfied with the arrangement. All too often that the larger powers are
criticised for interfering and undermining the sovereignty of smaller states, but if the
SIDS themselves have requested such assistance then it may prove worthwhile; as
sovereign members of the international community they should have the right to
choose a protective umbrella from a larger power if they so wish.
The IOS at present have no defence pacts with other states. However, they
have received assistance from neighbouring states and the most obvious example is
that of the Indian assistance in the mercenary attack on the Maldives and the French
assistance to the Comoros. The Seychelles has held joint military exercises with
Tanzania and Madagascar, and in the Maldives, Indian armed forces also help in the
training of the National Security Service. Training may not be restricted to military
personnel but also include civil servants and diplomatic staff. It is far better that they
receive this sort of training in neighbouring countries if these countries share
common cultural and social ties. Training in states which are not similar to these
small states could result in the personnel being indoctrinated in foreign ideologies,
especially when sent to distant countries.
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India has a close relationship with all three IOS. Indian assistance is not just
of a military nature but developmental and technological as well. This has assisted
the IOS to overcome some of their vulnerabilities, especially in the form of human
resource development and training of personnel, both in the government and the
industrial sectors. India has also provided soft loans for economic development and
often encourages foreign investment in the IOS by Indian businessmen. The nature of
Indian assistance to these IOS is something of an enigma. The IOS see the
relationship between themselves and India on a purely bilateral level. Nevertheless,
this may not be the same as far as India is concerned. It sees it as part of a regional
approach whereby India is mainly assisting states in its natural sphere of influence,
with a view to discouraging extra-regional influences. 13 Although Indian assistance
may be seen by some of the Indian Ocean states as part of a more sinister plan, the
fact remains that India is one of the most powerful states in the Indian Ocean and
therefore it is better for the IOS to have India as a friend than an enemy. As for
India, as long as the IOS remains friendly there is very little need for it to interfere in
their internal affairs. In the south western Indian Ocean the same dilemma is created
by the French presence. By virtue of territorial possession France is an Indian Ocean
power and any signs of France diminishing influence by giving up these territories is
unlikely at present. As far as threats and vulnerabilities are concerned, France
continues to assist the SIDS in numerous ways. However, the SIDS have to be
careful in their acceptance of the French role in order to maintain relations on a
cordial basis and not to let French assistance become unwelcome influence.
Bilateral assistance is welcome but the need to minimise dependence,
especially on one power, should be the eventual goal. Although the IOS maintain
their bilateral relationships at a reasonable level this always has to be carefully
analysed and assessed, otherwise the solution might become part of the problem in
the form of foreign pressure and undesirable influences. Even if the IOZP concept
becomes a reality (which is rather unlikely anyway) India and France are Indian
13 See Ross H. Munro, "Superpower Rising", Time (International Edition) 3 April 1989, p. 8
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Ocean powers and will remain so for the foreseeable future. For the IOS the
acceptance of this fact is vital and the IOS have to shape their relationships with
these powers in a way which is more beneficial to them. This is also true with non-
regional powers who have a vested interest in the Indian Ocean. The United States is
the number one non-regional power in the area. Although Mauritius continues to
seek the return of Diego Garcia it is important that the IOS maintain good relations
with the United States. The main interest of the United States in the Indian Ocean lies
in the Gulf and South East Asia and unlike the Caribbean SIDS, who often fear
American hegemonic influence, this scenario is somewhat different with regard to the
IOS. As such, the presence of the United States in the Indian Ocean (with the
exception of the Diego Garcia issue) is seen by the IOS as of no direct threat to them.
As such, American assistance, especially in the military sector, is often welcomed by
the IOS as way of reducing their military vulnerability. To sum up, bilateral relations
need not always be seen as a threat by the SIDS. On the contrary, maintaining
cordial relations with other states while at the same time not depending on one single
power can assist these states to enhance their security.
Regional Measures
Regional co-operation and regional solutions have been seen by many as an
approach that could enhance the security of the SIDS. An important aspect,
especially with regard to military security, is a regional defence system. It might be
useful for certain SIDS to become members of one of the larger defence pacts but
this will depend to a large extent on the eligibility of the state. Regional co-operation
could also prove vital in the case of protection against mercenaries and terrorism. In
many cases the mercenary groups or the terrorist organisations have their bases in
neighbouring countries. It is important for SIDS to exchange intelligence information
about the region. Although many states are reluctant to share their intelligence
information an attempt at even the most basic level could prove to be vital. For
example, if the Maldives government could have found out about the departure of the
mercenaries from Sri Lanka they would have been in a better position to meet the
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threat rather than being taken by total surprise. This is similar to the case in the
Seychelles in 1981. It was only after the discovery of weapons in the bags of the
mercenaries that the Seychelles' authorities became aware of the planned coup attack.
Some of the measures that have been suggested to overcome this sort of handicap are
the establishment of regional networks, documentation centres, data banks and other
methods of collecting and disseminating data.14
One important defence system that has appeared to be successful so far is the
Regional Security System in the Eastern Caribbean. Here they carry out joint training
sessions, co-operate in the patrolling of their maritime zones and carry out anti-
drug patrols. The armed force of each state is under national command but may
be placed at the disposal of the system in a crisis. One problem is that this type of de-
fence system may not be suitable to all regions. The IOS, unlike the Caribbean, are
scattered far and wide and do not form a cohesive community. Therefore, the
success of such a defence system would undoubtedly depend on the geopolitics of the
region concerned.
There is no regional organisation that caters for the whole of the Indian
Ocean. The closest the Indian Ocean region has come together in the past was in the
movement to establish an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace. This was mainly aimed at
removing the presence of extra-regional powers such as the United States and the
former Soviet Union. However, the focus of the movement has changed with more
attention being given to the regional powers and the introduction of confidence
building measures between them. This may prove crucial for the IOS. For example,
one of the main problems for the Maldives in its immediate security environment of
South Asia is the existing tension between India and Pakistan and the fear of Indian
hegemonic ambitions by the other countries. If such tensions could be removed,
which at present seems rather remote, then the whole security scenario of the region
could change considerably.
14 Commonwealth Consultative Group, Vulnerability: Small states in a global society
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Although there is no Indian Ocean regional group, regional organisations in
sub-systems of the Indian Ocean have provided for the IOS in areas such as
economic co-operation. The IOS are all members of such regional organisations, the
Maldives being a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation
(SAARC) and the Seychelles and Mauritius being members of the Indian Ocean
Commission (IOC).
South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC): The SAARC may be
a means whereby the South Asian countries could eventually establish a defence
system in the military sense. This possibility was mentioned by the late Indian Prime
Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, who on the eve of the inaugural summit expressed the view
that "SAARC can become an approach to regional security in South Asia".15
Nevertheless, the likelihood of this happening is still very distant. Even though the
SAARC has agreed that bilateral problems should not interfere with the SAARC, too
many problems and differences exist among its member states that would easily
restrain the idea. One of the main obstacles is the differences in interests and goals
among the member countries. While most defence organisations are based on the
idea of a common enemy or common threats, this is not true of the SAARC
countries. The two largest member countries, India and Pakistan, see each other as
the main threat and therefore the possibility of the SAARC evolving into a security
community with regard to military problems is distant. 16 The closest it has come to
this form of security co-operation is the ratification of the SAARC Regional
Convention on Suppression of Terrorism. The convention was signed in November
1987 and came into effect on 22 August 1988, under which member countries
pledged to extradite or prosecute alleged terrorists. The exchange of information,
intelligence and expertise are also identified as areas for co-operation. However,
SAARC has made progress in several areas that have been useful for the Maldives,
15 Quoted in R. V. Aryasinha, South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC): The potential for regional
security, Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies, Colombo, 1990, P. 34
16 See R.V.R. Chandrasekhara Rao, "Regional Co-operation in South Asia", in The Round Table, No.293, 1985, p.53 - 65
244
especially with regard to economic, societal and environmental security. In 1991 a
Regional Study on Trade, Manufacturing and Services recommended areas where
regional co-operation can be carried out and following this a Committee on
Economic co-operation was established. The SAARC Preferential Trade Agreement
(SAPTA) was signed in April 1993 which contains provisions giving "Special and
Favourable Treatment" to the least developed member countries. Further, an Inter-
governmental Group on Trade Liberalisation was established to negotiate trade
concessions. Although this may seem quite beneficial for a SIDS like the Maldives,
the trade pattern of the Maldives suggests that the SAARC countries accounts for
only 15.6 % of imports to the Maldives and around 30.5 % of the exports.17
The SAARC has also facilitated co-operation in other areas such as the
control of narcotic drugs and environmental problems. The SAARC Convention on
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was signed in November 1990 and
came into force on 15 September 1993, the purpose of which is described as "to
promote co-operation among the member States so that they may address more
effectively the various aspects of prevention and control of drug abuse and the
suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances which are
specific to the SAARC region." 18 Previously, a Technical Committee was established
in 1987 under whose guidance seminars and training programmes have been carried
out to promote co-operation between drug law enforcement agencies in member
countries. The SAARC Drug Offences Monitoring Desk was set up in Colombo to
collate and analyse information on drug offences. While this could prove to be an
important mechanism for the Maldives to deal with the growing problem of drug
abuse, it has so far met with little success. The drug problem appears to be on the
increase with the import of drugs from within the SAARC region originating mainly
in India. The main problem here is not the non-existence of regional mechanisms to
deal with the problems but the lack of effectiveness in the operation of existing
18 The SAARC Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, SAARC Secretariat, Kathmandu, Nepal
17 Ministry of Planning, Human Resources and Development, Male, Statistical Yearbook, 1994
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mechanisms. Where environmental security is concerned, the SAARC has
undertaken national studies on "Causes and consequences of natural disasters and the
protection and preservation of the environment", and following that a study on the
"Greenhouse effect and its impact on the region". 19 These were carried out by the
SAARC Technical Committee on the Environment and the committee identified
several areas for immediate action among which include "the improvement of climate
monitoring capabilities through networking arrangements and the SAARC
Meteorological Research Centre, making available to member states expertise on
climate research and monitoring greenhouse gas emissions, exchange of information,
etc."20
The Indian Ocean Commission (IOC): The Indian Ocean Commission was
established in 1982 and was formally inaugurated in 1984. It has provided a forum
for regional co-operation for the IOS of the south west Indian Ocean. The IOC was
established to promote economic and social development within the area. Article 1 of
the Victoria Accord outlined four areas of co-operation: diplomatic; economic and
commercial; agriculture, fishing and conservation; and cultural, scientific,
educational and justice. The IOC took some time to establish itself with a Secretariat
being established in Mauritius only in 1988, four years after its inception.
Committees have been established for regional co-operation in the areas of tourism,
commercial exchange, labour force, industrial co-operation, environment, maritime
transport, fishing and sports. The IOC has made some progress in the areas of co-
operation among the member states. The Regional Committee for commercial
exchange was established in 1984 and steps were taken to improve inter-island trade
within the region among which were the convening of a group of experts examining
tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers to regional trade; and the establishment of a data
bank relating to external trade. In other areas the possibility of developing a regional
shipping company was examined and a marine school was established in
Madagascar. In July 1995, the EU allocated ECU 9.3 million to the IOC for financing
19 Information: SAARC Secretariat, Kathmandu, Nepal
20 Ibid.
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the Programme Regional Integre de Developpment des Echanges des Pays de l'Ocean
Indien (PRIDE) to improve the contacts between companies in the region and to
improve the availability of commercial information.21
The IOC appears to be one way that the SIDS of the south west Indian Ocean
could overcome some of their vulnerabilities. However, real progress remains modest
as the interests of the member states of the IOC appear to differ and the various
projects carried out under the auspices of IOC regional co-operation remains
limited. While the IOC could prove beneficial to the IOS, the main problem is that
economic contacts between the member states are low and therefore there is little
interest in furthering the role of the IOC. One of the significant developments of the
IOC is the membership of France in 1986. This has enhanced the role that France
already plays in the Indian Ocean and is seen by the French as recognition by the
other states of the French role in the region. However, the IOC is far from a security
organisation. It was not designed to be one and therefore it appears unlikely that it
will ever become one.
The Indian Ocean Rim: The Indian Ocean has several sub-regional groupings such as
the IOC, SAARC, ASEAN, etc. Nevertheless, there is a growing movement to bring
all the Indian Ocean countries together to form some sort of a regional Indian Ocean
group. In March 1995, a meeting was held in Mauritius to discuss the Indian Ocean
Rim initiative. The meeting was attended by officials and academics from Australia,
India, Kenya, Oman, Singapore, South Africa and Mauritius, representing the various
sub-systems of the Indian Ocean. The purpose of the meeting was to seek ways into
which the Indian Ocean countries could come together to form a regional trading bloc
to represent the interests of the Indian Ocean countries as a region against other
trading blocs of the world. In June 1995, the International Forum on the Indian Ocean
Region was held in Perth, Australia. From the conference emerged a consultative
Business Network where membership will be accorded to all business groups in the
21 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 15 July 1995, p.7
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region with working groups co-operating on matters including information
technology, customs and trade documentation, non-tariff barriers and impediments to
investment and maritime co-operation. An Indian Ocean Academic Research
Network was also established to promote the exchange of information and encourage
joint research projects.
For the IOS such a regional grouping may provide certain benefits, especially
on the economic front. Mauritius is economically strong and an Indian Ocean trade
group could provide the market it needs for its products apart from the EC. However,
if such a regional bloc is established it will be the larger powers of the region that
will dominate. As such, for the IOS like the Maldives and the Seychelles, it may not
necessarily be as beneficial as it initially seems. Besides, it is not going to be a
defence organisation. Australia was the only country from the seven countries that
participated in meeting in Mauritius that wanted to discuss such measures. However,
they appeared to back down later and the Australian Foreign Minister stated that, "the
truth is that right from the very outset we knew perfectly well that the real action was
likely to be in the economic and trade area" 22 The problem for the Maldives and the
Seychelles is that although a larger trade grouping may be beneficial to some extent it
may not necessarily be the answer to their main problems. In any case, to instil
regionalism in the Indian Ocean as a whole is not going to happen overnight and
therefore it is going to take some time for the Indian Ocean Rim to become a truly
regional body. However, the forging of any close links among the Indian Ocean
states that could lead to the improving of the relations among them would be
welcomed by the IOS as it could lead to improved stability in the region.
Regional initiatives have worked in many instances to improve co-operation
among SIDS located in the Caribbean and the South Pacific. This option, however,
is not available to the IOS where regionalism among the SIDS, especially between
the Maldives and the SIDS in the south western Indian Ocean, is non-existent. As
22 Quoted in Aafathis, 15 June 1995, Male, Maldives
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such, an attempt to bring the IOS together in the manner of the SIDS in the
Caribbean or the South Pacific remains at present a futile exercise. A common Indian
Ocean regional framework to meet the security problems of the IOS is therefore a
long way off. Nevertheless, this is not to say that regional responses are useless. In
their own sub-regions, the existing regional mechanisms can be better utilised to
serve the needs of the SIDS, especially the IOC as it is main membership is made up
of SIDS. Thus it appears to be an ideal body in which SIDS can explore regional
responses to their existing problems. The SAARC in this sense is less ideal as the
membership is composed of states from varying backgrounds and the Maldives is the
only SIDS in the SAARC.
International Measures
It is the international community which can ultimately accord protection to
these SIDS. Under international law all states are equal; therefore all states should be
allowed to enjoy the privileges of being sovereign members of the international
community. The principle of non-interference and non-intervention in the domestic
affairs of sovereign states must be respected, even among the smaller members of the
community.
The Commonwealth: The issues concerning the security of SIDS are given priority
in the affairs of the Commonwealth. Among its member countries 32 states have a
population of less than one million and 24 among them are island states. 23 The issue
was first raised at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Delhi in
October 1983 following which a consultative group was established to study the
vulnerability and needs of small states. The study group published their findings in
their report Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society with their
recommendations. The report highlights the inherent vulnerabilities of small states to
external interference and economic vulnerabilities and details threats to economic,
political and territorial security. It also recommends measures to reduce
23 Information by the Commonwealth Secretariat, London
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vulnerabilities such as strengthening national defence capabilities, improving
economic growth, promoting international stability and cohesion, and measures in
dealing with the international community such as prudent diplomatic and foreign
policy management. The report also recommends measures that can be taken at
national, regional and international leve1. 24 Since then, the Commonwealth has
accorded special assistance to the SIDS and small states in general. A
Commonwealth Ministerial Group on Small States and a Commonwealth
Consultative Group on Small States and an inter-divisional task force was
established.
The Commonwealth helps the SIDS to reduce their vulnerabilities in several
areas. Among these include human resources development and capacity building,
training of personnel, providing experts in the field of science and technology, and
also technical assistance to the industrial development and export needs of SIDS.
This is a vital area as one of the reasons for vulnerability in SIDS is the lack of
qualified human resources. It is a problem in all three IOS although less obvious in
Mauritius. The activities of the Commonwealth include the publication of several
studies in the educational sector of SIDS, and the implementation of programmes to
train personnel in SIDS. In Mauritius, a scheme for performance appraisal is being
conducted to improve the management performance of the civil servants. The
Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation is one of the tools of assistance and
in 1993/94 56% of the expenditure was directed to assist small states in genera1.25
The Commonwealth has also taken a keen interest in the environmental vulnerability
of SIDS and has provided assistance in such areas as effective waste management.
Water pollution is a problem for all IOS. In June 1994, a training workshop was
organised in Mauritius on ground water modelling so that water resources
management can be more effective. Further, the Commonwealth has published a
book on Coastal Zone Management for tropical islands.
24 Commonwealth Consultative Group, Vulnerability: Small states in the global society,
25 Information by the Commonwealth Secretariat, London
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The Commonwealth also assists in resource management by offering
legal assistance in such issues as maritime boundary delimitation. Such assistance
was provided to the Maldives in its boundary agreement with Britain (BIOT) and it
has also assisted the Seychelles. Moreover, the Commonwealth offers economic
policy advice in developing effective policies by the SIDS. The Commonwealth
Secretariat's Debt Management and Recording Systems (DRMS) have helped the
SIDS by providing low cost software to help them manage their debt burdens better
and the SIDS assisted so far include the Maldives and Mauritius. The
Commonwealth has also assisted Mauritius in developing its non-banking financial
sector. The Seychelles received assistance in developing an effective petroleum
policy. Although most of these are related directly to development, it nevertheless,
assists the SIDS in overcoming some of their vulnerabilities, especially in the
development of manpower. Although the Commonwealth has recognised that small
states face security problems of a direct military nature there is little the
Commonwealth can do or has done to directly assist SIDS in this area. However, the
Commonwealth has provided support in the maintenance of good governance and
the promotion of sound political values which can contribute to the reduction of
threats. It assists SIDS in their electoral process by sending observers to ensure that
elections are 'free and fair'. Seychelles was one such benefactor in their first multi-
party elections held for over a decade. It is clear that the majority of the threats of a
direct military nature does not arise for SIDS from outside sources alone but also has
some local involvement as well. Although the threat from mercenaries and terrorists
cannot be totally wiped out, by promoting sound political values this threat can be
reduced to a certain extent.
The Commonwealth continues to give priority to the problems of the small
states and the second meeting of the Commonwealth Consultative Group on small
states was held in May 1995. They raised the importance of security issues to the
SIDS and repeated their support for the sovereign independence and equality of all
states and to continue their support for enhancing small states security at regional
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and international level by creating closer links between the Commonwealth and
various regional bodies such as the South Pacific Forum, as well as supporting the
issues of small states security at the United Nations.
The United Nations: The United Nations is the international body that has been
endowed with the task of maintaining peace and security within the international
community. In this respect there is no difference between small and large states,
island and continental states. After the November 1988 attack in the Maldives, the
government of the Maldives forwarded a resolution to the 44th session of the United
Nations General Assembly which was co-sponsored by 54 other states and was
adopted without a vote. The resolution entitled 'Protection and Security of Small
States' called for international recognition of the vulnerability of small states and
appealed to the international community for assistance to small states to strengthen of
their security. 26 The resolution also called for the Secretary General of the United
Nations to play a wider role in accordance with Article 99 of the Charter. Article 99
of the UN Charter empowers the Secretary General to bring matters which he
considers a threat to international peace and security to the attention of the Security
Council. The SIDS believe that this "is particularly suited for monitoring the security
issues of small states".27
In May 1991, representatives from eleven small states (including Mauritius
and the Seychelles), and representatives from the Commonwealth and the UN met
in the Maldives to discuss what further measures could be taken to reduce security
problems. Among the final recommendations of the Workshop on Protection and
Security of Small States were the following: consideration to be accorded to "the
establishment of a UN force of a rapid response nature. This would be under the
direct control of the UN Secretary General to be used to meet the security threats of
small states at their request". 28 It also suggested that the activation of the force could
26 UNGA Resolution 44/51, The Protection and Security of Small States, 8 December 1988 See Appendix F
27 Explanatory memorandum presented by the Maldives to the UN General Assembly 10 August 1989
28 Final Recommendations of the Workshop on the Protection and Security of Small States, Maldives, May 1991 See
Appendix G
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be in the hands of the Secretary-General in consultation with the Security Council
and would include paramilitary personnel from the regular armed forces from various
states and this should be done on a voluntary basis.
In theory, the above suggestion appears to be a near perfect answer to
security problems of a direct military nature. If there is an armed attack by another
state or even a group of mercenaries the SIDS would 'dial 999' and the Secretary-
General would despatch the rapid deployment force to that state to meet the threat.
However, the possibility of such an eventuality appears to be remote, especially since
the Final Recommendations called for the force to be under the direct control of the
Secretary-General whereas the it is Chapter VI of the UN Charter that deals with the
threats to peace, breaches of peace and aggression and therefore it is the Security
Council which has the authority to determine the existence of threats and make
recommendations or decide what measures to be taken. At present, the actual
establishment of an international armed force that could be used to assist SIDS in
times of crisis appears to be wishful thinking on the part of the SIDS at this stage.
Although the resolution on the protection and security of small
states was adopted without a vote, little has been achieved since. According
to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the UNGA resolution 44/51 the Secretary-
General invited member states to explore the ways and means of
protecting small states and to submit their suggestions by October
1990. However, only 22 countries replied by the extended deadline of
(CONTINUED ON PAGE 254)
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be in the hands of the Security Council and would include paramilitary personnel
from the regular armed forces from various states and this should be done on a
voluntary basis.
In theory, the above suggestion appears to be a near perfect answer to
security problems of a direct military nature. If there is an armed attack by another
state or even a group of mercenaries the SIDS would 'dial 999' and the Security
Council would despatch the rapid deployment force to that state to meet the threat.
However, the possibility of such an eventuality appears to be remote and the Final
Recommendations left many questions unanswered. Firstly, it brings up the question
of actually mobilising and training such a force. Does the United Nations pay for the
cost or the countries themselves? Even if the UN bears the brunt of the cost, what
about the actual transferring of troops to far flung corners of the world, to these
remote island states? The Gulf War demonstrated difficulties of this nature. Even
though the deployment of troops to a small state in trouble will be nothing compared
to the scale and the size of the forces in the Gulf, it still leaves many technical
questions unanswered. Who provides the transport? It might take a considerable
length of time to transfer troops to these isolated areas. Finally, it brings up the all
important question of the threat to the state and the threat to the government. Does
the United Nations decide the answer? On what basis? Consequently, even if the UN
did manage to get a force there are many gaps to be filled in and difficulties to iron
out before such a force could actually be of assistance to the SIDS. Therefore, the
actual establishment of an international armed force that could be used to assist SIDS
in times of crisis appears to be wishful thinking on the part of the SIDS at this stage.
Although the resolution on the protection and security of small states was
adopted without a vote, little has been achieved since. According to paragraphs 5
and 6 of the UNGA resolution the Secretary General invited member states to
explore the ways and means of protecting small states and to submit their suggestions
by October 1990. However, only 22 countries replied by the extended deadline of
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1991. Further, the discussion at the Security Council led to differences in opinion as
to whether small states should be accorded special status or not. Some were of the
opinion that as the UN was based on the principle of sovereign equality there was no
need to accord special status to small states.
Nevertheless, there are other measures that could be taken by the international
community to help small states, be they islands or otherwise, to meet their security
problems. One such measure discussed at the UN was the establishment of
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs); by co-operation and trying to establish more
stable relations between states. Further international conventions against mercenaries
and terrorists are also seen as a way to enhance international security. One such
measure is the Convention on the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa adopted by
the OAU. The SAARC has concluded the 'SAARC Regional Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism' which came into force in August 1988. But far more
important, and of greater significance, is the International Convention against the
Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. The Convention is useful
because it prohibits states from assisting mercenaries. It is almost always the case
that, when mercenary attacks take place, they are backed by another state in one way
or the other i.e. by providing them with arms or training bases etc. The ratification of
this convention should result in the closure of such support for mercenaries, at least
in theory. Also, the international community should be encouraged to pass
appropriate domestic laws that would ban the recruitment of mercenaries on their
own territory. A Convention of a similar nature regarding terrorism may prove worth-
while. The difficulty with dealing with mercenaries, and even to a greater extent
terrorism, is that there is no internationally accepted definition of these terms. This
enables both the mercenaries/terrorists to get around Conventions; and states who
assist such aggressors fall back on the infamous dictum 'one man's terrorist is another
man's freedom fighter'. Even if the international community did come up with an
acceptable definition the actual enforcement of these conventions is still going to be a
considerable task.
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More realistic and useful has been work carried out to reduce vulnerability in
other areas, especially on the economic and the environmental front. Economic
assistance has been forthcoming from the UN through such agencies as the UNDP,
the IMF, World Bank and so on. They assist the SIDS in their economic development
which can reduce vulnerabilities and threats on the economic front. In order to do so,
without sacrificing other sectors, sustainable development has become the buzz
word today. Further, there are international agreements concluded by organisations
such as the ACP countries and the EU which, through the Lome Convention, has
provided some assistance to the SIDS such as the Seychelles and Mauritius. On the
environmental front the UN has assisted the SIDS in several ways. The United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) is the main UN body concerned with the
vulnerability of SIDS to environmental changes, especially to global warming and
sea level rise. Regional task teams were formed in 1987 to study the potential impact
of global warming on these states. In June 1988 the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climatic Change (IPCC) was established to analyse and assess scientific information
relating to climatic change. In July 1989 a meeting was held in Majuro, Marshall
Islands by the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme. Although this was
mainly to highlight the environmental problems faced by the South Pacific countries
the meeting was also attended by the Maldives and Mauritius. In 1989, the Small
States Conference on Sea Level Rise was held in the Maldives resulting in the Male
Declaration which calls for wider international recognition of the environmental
problems of SIDS and for greater international assistance.
Although the SIDS have been able to unite themselves in an ad-hoc manner to
highlight their numerous problems in the international community as a whole, the
first time they united to form an official group was with the establishment of the
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). AOSIS was established at the end of the
Second World Climate Conference in 1990, with an initial membership of 24 states,
to raise the awareness among the international community of the vulnerability of
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small island states to environmental threats. 29
 AOSIS has had mixed successes in its
campaigns. At the fourth negotiating session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee to establish the framework convention on climate change prior to the UN
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) a draft proposal was
submitted to establish a mechanism at the international level that would compensate
for the loss or damage caused to the SIDS by climatic change. However, this was
rejected by the industrialised nations. The AOSIS has now moved to include other
developmental issues in its agenda and has 41 members. After the AOSIS campaign
at Rio for more priority to be given to the situation of small island states in Agenda
21, a separate programme area was allocated for the SIDS and agreement was
reached to convene a global conference on the sustainable development of SIDS.
Subsequently, the Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small
Island Developing States was held in Barbados in 1994. The Conference was
attended by the IOS. The Conference adopted a Programme of Action that outlined
key problems faced by the SIDS. 30
 The main emphasis was on environmental
problems such as the impact of climate change and natural disasters, and on
developmental issues such as the need for technical, institutional and human resource
development. It highlights the need for action at national, regional and international
levels. One of the initiatives agreed in Barbados is the establishment of the Small
Island Developing States Information Network (SIDS/NET) and the Small Island
Developing States Technical Assistance Programme (SIDS/TAP). The SIDS/NET is
aimed at linking the SIDS through computers to share information and expertise. The
problem with the Barbados Conference is that most industrialised states appeared not
to take the conference seriously and were mainly represented by low level delegates.
Only Australia, New Zealand, Germany and Canada sent ministerial level
representatives and the SIDS did not receive any serious extra funding from the UN.
However, the fact that there was a Conference at international level to deal with the
issues of the SIDS gives recognition to the problems of the SIDS and is seen by the
29 For membership of the AOSIS see Appendix H
30 Report of the Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of the Small Island Developing States, Bridgetown,
Barbados, 25 April -6 May, 1995
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IOS as an important step forward. International recognition, and more importantly
international assistance, is needed for the IOS to reduce their vulnerabilities.
Conclusion 
Although IOS in general have sought responses at all levels, including
regional solutions, the main security problems arise from these states being small
and island developing states and therefore the responses have to relate to their
smallness and islandness rather than from an Indian Ocean perspective. The
responses have to be shaped by the fact that the Maldives, Mauritius and the
Seychelles are first and foremost Small Island Developing States rather than being
SIDS located in the Indian Ocean. They are SIDS and are going to remain as Small
Island States. They may change their status from developing to developed or may
move out of the category of small when their populations multiply, but this seems to
be a long way off. As such, many of their characteristics of being small and island
states are going to remain with them. The responses needed to reduce their security
problems have to take account of this and have to come from all levels. Although
SIDS, including the IOS, have managed to attract the international community's
attention as far as their security problems are concerned, there is still much to be
done. Security problems for the SIDS are multi-faceted and they need a multi-faceted
response. The SIDS require a security regime that is strong in all sectors and not just
the strengthening of their armed forces. It has to be from all fronts; national, regional
and international. At the national level threats have to be not only identified but also
distinguished between actual and latent threats. Capabilities have to be assessed and
realistic targets need to be set to reduce vulnerabilities. Assistance at both regional
and international level is also vital and where regional responses are necessary and
where a wider international assistance is needed these have to be carefully identified
and assessed. The SIDS have managed to bring to the attention of the international
community their numerous problems. By co-operation and uniting to voice their
concern at the Commonwealth and the UN, and in alliances such as the AOSIS, they
have succeeded to a certain extent in putting their case on the international agenda. In
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this sense, AOSIS has proven that there is strength in numbers. Nevertheless, this is
just a first step. Recognition of the problems is not going to reduce vulnerabilities
and threats. It must be followed by appropriate responses. There has to be a
willingness and a commitment on the part of the international community to assist
the SIDS in finding appropriate responses to their problems. There is the need for the
establishment of a wider international regime that recognises the status of the SIDS
and their security problems and which will assist them in overcoming these
problems. Furthermore, it has to be recognised that security is not an absolute
concept. At present most SIDS fall into the category of high vulnerability and high
threats with total security problems in many areas. Or they have high vulnerability
and low threats with systemic security problems. The aim should be to make the
SIDS states with low vulnerability and low threats and therefore with minimal
security problems. No state can be virtually free from security problems. Therefore,
the measures needed to meet the threats could help to make these states less exposed
to threats and more secure, but only in varying degrees and not totally. As such, there
is always going to be a degree of insecurity. The question for the SIDS is how much
insecurity are they going to accept?
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Chapter IX
CONCLUSIONS
The case studies of the IOS reinforce the hypothesis that the security
problems of SIDS are specific to them. As such, it is clear that in the current
international climate security needs to be applied on a broader basis than it was
traditionally used, especially in relations to SIDS. By virtue of being small and island
developing states, the SIDS have confronted special problems that removes them
from the traditional 'power politics' scenario. Economic, societal and environmental
issues have entered the equation as well as the more traditional ones of military and
political problems. These new areas have become equally and in some instances
more important to the SIDS. Security problems therefore affect all walks of life in
these states. Additionally, in spite of the fact that SIDS belong to the Third World,
there are substantial differences in the security scenario of SIDS from the larger
states of the Third World.
Although there had been difficulty in defining 'smallness' in the past, the issue
has been more or less resolved today with consensus around the one million
population as a cut-off point (or near to that figure). The security problems of SIDS
in general, can be identified by assessing the vulnerabilities of the SIDS together with
the threats that confront them. Four main areas of vulnerability have been identified:
weakness, openness, dependence and islandness that collectively contribute in
shaping the core security problems for SIDS. Many of these areas are linked to the
smallness of these states. Although the vulnerabilities of the IOS vary, they differ
from SIDS elsewhere in degree and not in kind. In this sense, in many areas the IOS
are have high vulnerability. Security threats are the other main consideration. For
SIDS the list is fairly long with military, political, economic, societal and
environmental issues all adding to their security problems. In the case of the IOS, the
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threat scenario varies among the three, with Mauritius having an overall lower threat
scenario, and the Maldives and the Seychelles having relatively higher threat
scenarios, especially on the economic and environmental fronts.
While it can be seen that vulnerabilities are very real for the SIDS this is not
so true of some of the threats. Many are often exaggerated by those governing these
states. For the majority of the SIDS actual threats from foreign invasions are almost
non-existent although theoretically this will always be a threat in an anarchic
international system. Occupation of their territories by foreign powers is therefore
unlikely, although the situation of Mauritius and the British control of the Chagos
archipelago still remains and will do so for some time. Threats from non-
governmental sources such as mercenaries and terrorists are also high on the list of
threats by these states and it is true that there has been genuine reason for concern in
states such as the Maldives and the Seychelles. However, very little appears to have
been done to address the underlying cause of the problem. Very often the basis for
such threats arises from the practices of those ruling the states and the core of the
problem appears to be internal rather than external. This is true of the IOS. As such,
the international clamour by SIDS that these are real threats emanating mainly from
foreign sources seems to be based either rhetoric, aimed at gaining international
attention or on misunderstanding or misperception which overlooks the root cause of
the problem. The consequence is that the SIDS appear to be unwilling to do much to
address the real issues unless forced into doing so by the international community.
Not least for the reason that forcing any country to admit to its faults is not an easy
task. This can be seen from the Seychelles experience.
As for other types of threats, economic threats are real ones for the IOS,
something they have in common with most SIDS and which has an effect on almost
all areas of security. With regard to the IOS, societal problems are minimal
irrespective of the fact that two of the SIDS are multi-ethnic societies. However,
problems from narcotics can spread if not controlled. In recent times one of the areas
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in which the concept of security has been enlarged is that of environmental security.
This is absolutely crucial when it comes to SIDS. No matter which part of the globe
they are located in, and whether they are volcanic or low lying islands, single islands
or archipelagic, environmental problems are real problems demanding a response
which goes beyond rhetoric. Some may argue that those who claim that global
warming and the subsequent sea level rise could result in the disappearance of low
lying islands are just scare-mongering. Although the rate of sea level rise is widely
disputed, it is unrealistic to expect the inhabitants of these states to adopt a 'wait and
see approach' when what is at stake is their existence as a nation. In such
circumstances, the future for these SIDS remains uncertain, if not precarious.
The identification of the security problem for each IOS established
similarities among all three. However, in relations to SIDS in other parts of the
world there are two main observations. Firstly, in the Caribbean and South Pacific
there are strong regional influences that help shape their security problems. Although
individual differences do exist between the two regions, the security environments of
the SIDS are heavily influenced by the geopolitics of the region. For the IOS this is
less obvious. This may be due to the fact that the IOS do not conform to a 'region' as
such. Although regional influences in the Indian Ocean do affect the security
environment of the IOS and may do so in the future, especially depending on the role
that the various Indian Ocean littorals such as India and South Africa decide to
undertake in the future, these influences are very much based on a one-to-one
relationship between individual IOS and the larger power rather than a uniform
regional issue. As such, very little evidence is found for a common Indian Ocean
security problem or problems. Secondly, the security problems of the IOS are more in
line with the security problems of all SIDS in general. Although similar types of
security problems exist these stem more from individual situations i.e. to the fact that
these states are Small Island Developing States. One of the main questions that has
been posed by the research is the question of why Mauritius has been able to do
much better in reducing its vulnerabilities and threats as compared to the Seychelles
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or the Maldives. The answer appears to lie in the unique historical and political
circumstances that Mauritius has found itself to be in, and not in the development of
a general policy that is specific to it being a small and island developing state. As
such, while there are lessons to be learnt from the Mauritian example there are
limits to what the Maldives and the Seychelles or indeed other SIDS can ultimately
gain from Mauritius.
The thesis has argued that there are similar problems facing almost all SIDS
in the international community. The vulnerabilities facing the IOS are common to
most SIDS and very often they cannot be resolved by the SIDS themselves.
Responses have to come from all fronts. In dealing with the strategies and responses
regional responses are often advocated. However, in the case of the IOS international
responses may be more suited to their needs. This is not to say that regional
responses are totally futile. Regional strategies could be beneficial, especially in the
south west Indian Ocean where the Seychelles and Mauritius have already united to
establish a regional body, the Indian Ocean Commission. But due to the fact that
there are very few 'regional' problems in the Indian Ocean as a whole, this must be a
limited approach. As such there is very little scope for a regional security agenda that
involves all the IOS. In such a situation it is up to the IOS to determine their security
problems, and the strategies and responses they need, individually rather than
collectively. However, international responses in reducing vulnerabilities and
confronting threats depends a great deal on the willingness of the international
community to assist the SIDS. To get the international community to acknowledge
that the SIDS have special problems that require their assistance is the easy part. The
difficulty is to get them to do something about it. There is an urgent need for an
international regime that not only recognises the problems but provides for others to
assist the SIDS on a universalist basis.
Thus in the case of the IOS the onus is very much on the international
community. However, in assessing the security problems of the IOS, and possible
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responses and strategies, there are two main points that need to be emphasised.
Firstly, the need for international assistance must be put in perspective. While what
the SIDS can do on their own is fairly limited, there are some areas where the
international community cannot assist unless the SIDS are willing to assist
themselves. This is true regarding the threat from mercenaries and terrorists, an
issue raised by SIDS at the UN and at other international gatherings. It must be noted
though that in many such instances it is the SIDS who need to put their own house in
order, albeit 'with a little help' from international friends. Secondly, the need to
identify the appropriate responses to problems of economic security. Economic
problems are widely accepted by the international community as real problems that
need international assistance and the international community is often genuinely
willing to assist the SIDS. But at the same time there is also the question of when to
halt assistance. It appears that although the international community assists the
SIDS to stand up a little bit on their own feet, they are quick to abandon their help
before the SIDS can actually walk on their own. As in the case of the Seychelles, the
moment the country's economic performance improved international assistance
declined drastically. This is a real problem that needs to be addressed and failure to
do so can increase security problems for the Seychelles.
Security problems in the IOS therefore corresponds to many of the
problems confronted by SIDS in other parts of the world. The problems identified are
not going to go away. Something needs to be done about them. Some of these
problems need urgent action; some are potential problems that may become real if
not tackled now; and some are systemic problems that not only require help today
but continuous assistance for years to come. Additionally, there is limited scope for
the IOS to unite together in the manner of the Caribbean or the South Pacific SIDS.
Although this is true, the future for the IOS may not be quite so
bleak. There are options available to them. Assistance can be sought from
bilateral relationships and from regional and international organisations.
Further, joining forces with the rest of the SIDS in international bodies
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such as the AOSIS is vital. This is more so in the current climate where the
two main regions of SIDS, the Caribbean and the South Pacific, have forged ahead
by giving a special focus to regional strategies and responses of their own. If the IOS
fail to canvass support among the SIDS, they will be left to fend for themselves,
unable to put their own difficulties on the international agenda. As such, not only
are the UN and the Commonwealth important but so also is keeping in contact with
other SIDS in the Caribbean on the South Pacific.
Ultimately it is the SIDS themselves who have to decide the type of security
they want. Many of the characteristics of being Small and Island Developing States
are not open to easy change. The problems associated with remoteness, the
pervasiveness of the oceans, environmental fragility and islandness, together with
the difficulties of being small, are going to remain with these states. Neither
assistance from regional nor international communities can change this overnight.
This is not to say that the SIDS will have to adopt a defeatist attitude; rather there is a
need to realise the situation they are in order to prioritise their security needs,
determine what are the real vulnerabilities and threats, and identify where urgent
action is needed. If they want to maximise the limited resources available to them
(and minimise vulnerabilities and threats) there will have to be a realistic assessment
of their problems and of how they are going to allocate the resources. The SIDS will
have to decide how much security has to be sacrificed today for tomorrow. Further,
this has to be more than simply making a list of security problems to be presented
at the next international gathering. It has to be a continuous process as security
problems are not static but change with time. In this context it is important to
remember that the security of SIDS is never absolute but relative, and contingent on
time and place. So that while at present there is only a limited scope for an Indian
Ocean security agenda this may not always be true. The IOS, along with other SIDS,
will have to be more alert than many other states to change at home and abroad if
they are to survive and thrive in the modern world system.
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APPENDIX A
SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES
States Population ('000) 1993
1. Tuvalu 9
2. Nauru 10
3. St. Christopher and Nevis 41
4. Marshall Islands * 52
5. Antigua and Barbuda 67
6. Seychelles 70
7. Dominica 72
8. Kiribati 76
9. Grenada 91
10. Tonga 93
11. Micronesia* 100 (1991)
12. St. Vincent and the Grenadines 110
13. Sao Tome and Principe 125
14. St. Lucia 158
15. Vanuatu 161
16. Western Samoa 163
17. Maldives 236
18. Barbados 260
19. Bahamas 266
20. Solomon Islands 346
21. Malta 362
22. Cape Verde 398
23. Comoros 528
24. Bahrain 544
25. Cyprus 718
26. Fiji 759
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27. Mauritius	 1111
28. Trinidad and Tobago	 1282
Source: Commonwealth Secretariat, London
* Source: Far East and Australasia 1995 26th edition, (Europa Publications Ltd.,
London, 1994)
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APPENDIX B
UN General Assembly Resolution
Declaring the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace
Resolution 2832 (XXVI), December 16, 1971
The General Assembly,
Conscious of the determination of the people of the littoral and hinterland States of
the Indian Ocean to preserve their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity,
and to resolve their political, economic and social problems under conditions of
peace and tranquillity,
Recalling the Declaration of the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government
of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lusaka in September 1970, calling upon all States
to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which great Power
rivalries and competition as well as bases conceived in the context of such rivalries
and competition should be excluded, and declaring that the area should also be free
of nuclear weapons,
Conceived of the desirability of ensuring the maintenance of such conditions in the
area by means other than military alliances, as such alliances entail financial and
other obligations that call for the diversion of the limited resources of these States
from the more compelling and productive task of economic and social reconstruction
and could further involve them in the rivalries of power blocs in a manner
prejudicial to their independence and freedom of action, thereby increasing
international tension.
Concerned at recent developments that portend the extension of the arms race into
the Indian Ocean area, thereby posing a serious threat to the maintenance of such
conditions in the area,
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Convinced that the establishment of a zone of peace in an extensive geographical
area in one region could have a beneficial influence on the establishment of
permanent universal peace based on equal rights and justice for all, in accordance
with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Solemnly declares that the Indian Ocean, within the limits to be determined,
together with the air space above the ocean floor subjacent thereto, is hereby
designated for all time as a zone of peace,
2. Calls upon the great Powers, in conformity with this Declaration, to enter into
immediate consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to:
(a) Halting the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the
Indian Ocean; (b) Eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations,
logistical supply facilities, disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass
destruction and any manifestation of great Power military presence in the Indian
Ocean conceived in the context of great Power rivalry;
3. Calls upon the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent
members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian
Ocean, in pursuit of the objective of establishing a system of universal collective
security without military alliances and strengthening international security through
regional and other co-operation, to enter into consultations with a view to the
implementation of this Declaration and such action as may be necessary to ensure
that: (a) Warships and military aircraft may not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or
use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or independence of any
littoral or hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations; (b) Subject to the foregoing and to
the norms and principles of international law, the right to free and unimpeded use of
the zone by vessels of all nations is unaffected; (c) Appropriate arrangements are
made to give effect to any international agreement that may ultimately be reached for
the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace;
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4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-
seventh session on the progress that has been made with regard to the implementation
of this Declaration;
5. Decides to include the item entitled "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of
peace" in the provisional agenda of its twenty-seventh session.
Recorded Vote
In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bhutan, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad,
China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial
Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan,
Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia,
Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua*, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Panama, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria,
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania,
Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.
Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Byelorussia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,
Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Lesotho,
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda,
Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, USSR, United
Kingdom, United States, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Zaire.
Absent: Albania, Bahrain, Barbados, Botswana, Ecuador, Gabon, Gambia, Iraq**
Malawi, Maldives, Mauritius, Niger, Oman, Paraguay, Sierra Leone, United Arab
Emirates.
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* Later advised the Secretariat it had intended to abstain
** Later advised the Secretariat it had intended to vote in favour
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APPENDIX C
MALDIVES
1/ Military Resources
National Security Service:
Personnel: 2,000 (approx.)
Coast Guard: 
- Personnel: 400
- 4 Tracker II Class (Patrol craft)
Kaani 133 (ex -11)
Midhili 151 (Ex - 13)
Kuredhi 142 (Ex - 12)
Nirolhu 106 (Ex - 14)
Displacement tons: 38 full load
Dimensions, feet (metres): 65.6 x 17.1 x 4.9 (20 x 5.2 x 1.5)
Main Machinery: 2 Detroit 12V-7 ITA Diesels; 840 hp(627 kW); sustained, 2 shafts
Speed knots: 25
Range: 450 miles at 20 kts
Complement: 10
Guns: 1-12.7 mm MG, 1-7.62 mm MG
Radars: Surface search; Kroden; I band
Comments: First one ordered June 1985 from Fairey Marinteknik and commissioned
in April 1987. Three more acquired July 1987 ex-UK customs craft. Used for fishery
protection and EEZ patrol. Seven days normal endurance.
- 1 Cheverton Class Burevi 115 {Ex - 7} (Patrol Craft)
Displacement tons: 24 full load
Dimensions, feet (metres): 55.8 x 14.8 x 3.9 (17 x 4.5 x 1.2)
Main Machinery: 2 Detroit 8V-7 1TI Diesels; 850 hp(634 kW); sustained; 2 shafts
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Speed knots: 22
Range: 590 miles at 18 kts
Complement: 10
Guns: 1-12.7 mm MG, 1-7.62 mm MG
Radars: Surface search; Kroden; I band
Comments: GRP hull and aluminium superstructure. Originally build for Kiribati and
subsequently sold to the Maldives in 1984
- 1 Dagger Class Funa 124 (Patrol boat)
Displacement tons: 20 full load
Dimensions, feet (metres): 36.8 x 11.2 x 5(11.2 x 3.4 x 1.2)
Main Machinery: 2 Sabre Diesels; 660 hp(492 kW) sustained; 2 shafts
Speed knots: 35
Complement: 6
Guns: 1-7.62 mm MG
Radars: Surface search; Furuno; I band
Comments: Built by Fairey Marine at Cowey, Isle of Wight and delivered in 1982
Source: Capt. R Sharpe, Jane's Fighting Ships 1995-96, 98th edition, (Jane's
Information Group Limited, Surrey, 1995) pp. 434 - 435
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2/ Diplomatic Representation in the Maldives
1. India
2. Pakistan
3. Sri Lanka
Diplomatic Representation Abroad
1. Sri Lanka
2. United Kingdom
3. United States
3/ Membership in major international and regional organisations
1. Colombo Plan
2. United Nations
3. United Nations Development Fund (UNDP)
4. UN Conference in Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
5. UN Environment Programme (UNEP)
6. UN Population Fund (UNFPA)
7. World Health Organisation (WHO)
8. International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
9. International Maritime Organisation (IMO)
10. Universal Postal Union (UPU)
11. United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
12. Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO)
13. International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)
14. Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC)
15. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific (ESCAP)
16. Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
17. International Monetary Fund
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18. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
19. International Development Association (IDA)
20. Asian Development Bank (ADB)
21. World Meteorological Organisation (WMO)
22. FAO/Indian Ocean Fishery Commission (IOFC)
23. International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD)
24. Islamic Development Bank (IDB)
25. Asia Pacific Telecommunity (APT)
26. United Nations Education, Scientific and
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)
27. World Tourism Organisation (WTO)
28. South Asia Co-operative Environment
Programme (SACEP)
29. Asia Pacific Postal Union (APPU)
30. Commonwealth
31. International Finance Co-operation (IFC)
32. General Agreements on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT)
33. Asia Pacific Development Centre(APDC)
34. South Asian Association for Regional
Co-operation (SAARC)
35. Asian Forum of Parliamentarians on Population
and Development
36. INTERPOL
37. Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting and
Development (AIBD)
38. Inter-governmental Organisation for Marketing
Information and Technical Advisory Service for
Fishing Products in the Asia & Pacific
Region (INFOFISH)
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39. Unified Hijree Calendar Committee
40. United Nations Industrial Development
Organisation (UNIDO)
41. Commonwealth Foundation
42. International Organisation for
Folk Art (IOFA)
43. International Textile Clothing Bureau
44. Asia Pacific Broadcasting Union
45. World Assembly of Youth
46. Association of Management Development
Institutions in South Asia (AMDISA)
47. Asian Youth Council
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APPENDIX D
SEYCHELLES
1/ Military Resources
Total Armed Forces: 300 (active)
Army: 300
1 infantry battalion,
2 artillery troops,
Equipment:
Recce: 6 BRDM-2,
Towed Artillery: 122mm:3 D-30,
Mortars: 82mm: 6 M-43,
Rocket Launcher: RPG-7,
Air Defence Guns: 57mm:S-60,
SAM: 10 SA-7
Paramilitary:
National Guard: 1,000
Source: The Military Balance 1995 - 1996, (Oxford University Press for International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995), p.254
Coast guard
Personnel: 300 (Including 80 air wing and 100 marines)
Base: Port Victoria
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Patrol Forces 
- 1 Type FPB 42 (Large Patrol Craft)
Andromache
Displacement, tons: 268 full load
Dimensions, feet (meters): 137.8 x 26 x 8.2 (41.8 x 8 x 2.5)
Main machinery: 2 Paxman Valenta 16 CM diesels; 6650 hp (5 MW)
sustained; 2 shafts
Speed, knots: 26; Range, miles: 3000 at 16 knots
Complement: 22 (3 officers)
Guns: 1 Oerlikon 25mm; 2 - 7,62 mm MGs
Depth charge: 1 rack
Radars: Navigation: Furuno; I band
Comments: Ordered from Inma, La Spezia in November 1981. Pennant numbers no
longer worn. A second of class reported ordered in 1991 but this was not confirmed.
- 2 Zhuk (type 1400M) Class (Coastal Patrol Craft)
Constant
	 Fortune
Displacement, tons: 39 full load
Dimensions, feet (meters): 78.7 x 16.4 x 3.9 (24 x 5 x 1.2)
Main machinery: 2 Type M 40 1B diesels; 2200hp (1.6 MW) sustained; 2
shafts
Speed, knots: 30; Range, miles: 1100 at 15 knots
Complement: 12 (3 officers)
Guns: 4- 14.4 mm (2 twin) MGs,
Radars: surface search; Furuno I band
Comments: Transferred from the USSR on 11 October 1981 and 6 November 1982
respectively.
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- 1 Sirius Class (Large Patrol Craft)
Topaz
Displacement, tons: 440 full load
Dimensions, feet (meters): 152 x 28 x 8.2 (46.4 x 8.6 x 2.5)
Main machinery: 2 SEMT-Pielstick diesels; 2000hp(m) (1.47 MW) 2 shafts
Speed, knots: 15; Range, miles: 3000 at 10 knots
Complement: 38
Guns: 1 Bofors 40 mm/60, 1 Oerlikon 20 mm
Comments: Ex-French minesweeper built in 1956 and transferred without sweep gear
in January 1979. Paid off in 1987 but brought back into service in late 1990. Not in
good repair and probably non-operational.
Auxiliary
1 Landing Craft (tank)
Cinq Juin
Displacement, tons: 855 full load
Dimensions, feet (meters): 186.8 x 38 x 6(56.9 x11.6 x 1.9)
Main machinery: 2 Poyaud A 12 150M diesels; 880hp(m) (647kW); 2 shafts
Speed, knots: 9; Range, miles: 2000 at 8 knots
Military lift: 300 tons plus 1 LCP
Comments: Ordered December 1977. Although government owned, this ship is
commercially operated except for occasional exercises.
Land-based maritime aircraft
Numbers/Type: 1 HAL (Aerospatiale) Chetak (Alouette III)
Operational speed: 113 kts (210 km/h)
Service Ceiling: 10 500ft (3200 m)
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Range: 290 nm (540 km)
Role/weapon systems: Support helicopter; used for police and anti-smuggler patrols.
Sensors: None
Weapons: 2 x 7.62 mm machine guns can be fitted
Numbers/Type: 1 Pilatus Britten-Norman Maritime Defender
Operational speed: 150 kts (280 km/h)
Service Ceiling: 18 900 ft (5760 m)
Range: 1500 nm (27751cm)
Role/weapon systems: Coastal surveillance and surface search aircraft.
Sensors: Search radar.
Weapons: Provisions for rockets or guns
Source: Capt. R Sharpe, Jane's Fighting ships 1995-96, 98th edition, (Jane's
Information Group Limited, Surrey, 1995), pp. 635 - 636
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2/ Diplomatic Representation in the Seychelles
1. China
2. Cuba
3. France
4. India
5. Netherlands
6. Russia
7. South Africa
8. United Kingdom
9. United States
Diplomatic Representation Abroad
1. Belgium
2. France
3. United Kingdom
4. United States
3/ Membership in major regional and international organisations
1. ACP state of EEC
2. African Development Bank (AfDB)
3. Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)
4. Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO)
5. G-77
6. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (113RD)
7. International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)
8. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
9. International Finance Corporation (IFC)
10. International Labour Organisation(ILO)
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11. International Monetary Fund (IMF)
12. International Maritime Organisation (IMO)
13. International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL)
14. Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)
15. Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
16. Organisation of African Unity (OAU)
17. United Nations (UN)
18. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)
19. Universal Postal Union (UPU)
20. World Health Organisation (WHO)
21. World Meteorological Organisation (WMO)
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APPENDIX E
MAURITIUS
1/ Military Resources
Special Mobile Force: 1,300
6 rifle, 2 mobile, 1 engineering company, support troops
Equipment:
Armoured Personnel Carrier: 10 VAB
Mortars: 81mm: 2
Rocket Launcher: 89mm: 4 LRAC
Police Air wing: 2 Alouette III
Source: The Military Balance 1995-1996 (Oxford University Press for the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995)
Coast guard
Base: Port Louis (plus 12 manned stations)
Personnel: 600
Patrol Forces:
0 + 1 Offshore Patrol Vessel
Displacement tons: 1650 full load
Dimensions, feet (metres): 246.1 x 45.9 x 12.8 (75 x 14 x 3.9)
Main machinery: 4 Caterpillar 35 16 diesels; 11,530hp (8.6 MW); 2 shafts
Speed, knots: 22
Range, miles: 6500 at 19 kts
Complement: 57 (11 Officers) plus 20 spare
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Guns: 1 Bofors 40mm170.2 - 12.7 mm MGs
Radar: Surface search I band
Helicopters: 1 light
Comments: Contract signed with the Western Canada Marine Group in March 1994.
The vessel's keel was laid at ASMAR's Talcahuano Yard in Chile in April 1994 and
is expected to complete in November 1995, with delivery in March 1996. Full
helicopter facilities are included in the design which is based on a Canadian fisheries
vessel.
- 1 Abhay Class (large patrol craft)
Amar P 1
Displacement tons: 120 standard; 15 1 full load
Dimensions, feet (metres): 117.2 x 20 x 5(35.7 x 6.1 x 1.5)
Main machinery: 2 Paxman diesels; 1000hp (746 kW); 2 shafts
Speed, knots: 18 Range, miles: 500 at 12 kts
Complement: 20
Guns: 1 Bofors 40mi-n160
Radar: Surface search: Racal Decca 978; I band
Comment: The last of the old Abhay class built by Garden Reach Workshops Ltd.
Calcutta 1969. Transferred April 1974. Retained original name. Planned to pay off in
1996.
- 9 Mandovi Class (inshore patrol craft)
Marlin	 Barracuda	 Castor
	
Polaris
Sirius	 Pollux	 Capella
	
Canopus	 Rigel
Displacement tons: 15 full load
Dimensions, feet (metres): 49.2 x 11.8 x 2.6 (15 x 3.6 x0.8)
Main machinery: 2 Deutz MWM TBD232V 12 Marine Diesels; 750 hp(m) (551
kW); 2	 Hamilton waterjets
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Speed, knots: 24 Range, miles: 250 at 14 kts
Complement: 8
Guns: 1-7.62 mm MG
Radar: Navigation; Furono FR 8030; I band
Comment: Ordered in 1987 from Mandovi Marine Private Ltd. courtesy of the Indian
Government. First two delivered early in 1989; second batch of the three with some
modifications on 1 May 1990 and the last four at the end of 1990. Satellite navigation
fitted.
- 2 Zhuk Class Type 1400M (Patrol craft)
Rescuer
	 Retriever
Displacement tons: 39 full load
Dimensions, feet (metres): 78.7 x 16.4 x 3.9 (24 x 5 x 12)
Main machinery: 2 M 40 1B diesels; 2200 hp(m) (1.6 MW) sustained; 2 shafts
Speed, knots: 30 Range, miles: 1100 at 15kts
Complement: 14
Guns: 4- 14.5 mm (2 twin) MGs
Radar: Surface search; Spin Trough I band
Comment: Acquired from the USSR in 1990
- 1 SDB Mk 3 Class (Patrol craft)
Displacement tons: 210 full load
Dimensions, feet (metres): 124 x 24.6 x 6.2 (37.8 x 7.5 x 1.9)
Main machinery: 2 MTU 16V 538 TB92 diesels; 6820 hp(m) (5 MW) sustained; 2
shafts
Speed, knots: 30 Complement: 32
Guns: 2 Bofors 40mm160; 80° elevation; 120 rounds/minute to 10km (5.5 nm);
weight of shell 0.89kg
Comments: Transferred from Indian navy in 1993; Built by Garden Reach, Calcutta
in 1984
284
32 Patrol Boats
Comment: Two Rover 663 FPC donated by Australia and 30 Rigid Inflatable craft
mostly RHIBS, AVONS and ZODIACS acquired in 1988-89
Maritime Aircraft
Numbers/Type: 1 Dornier 228 (MPCG 01)
Source: Capt. R Sharpe, Jane's Fighting ships 1995-96, 98th edition, (Jane's
Information Group Limited, Surrey, 1995)
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2/ Diplomatic Representation in Mauritius
1. Australia
2. China
3. Egypt
4. France
5. India
6. Madagascar
7. Pakistan
8. Russia
9. United Kingdom
10. United States
Diplomatic Representation Abroad
1. Australia
2. Belgium
3. Egypt
4. France
5. India
6. Madagascar
7. Malaysia
8. Pakistan
9. South Africa
10. Switzerland
11. United Kingdom
12. United States
Info: The High Commission of Mauritius, London
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3/ Membership in major regional and international organisations
1. ACP State of EEC
2. African Development Bank (AfDB)
3. Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)
4. Customs Co-operation Council (CCC)
5. Commonwealth
6. Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)
7. Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO)
8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
9. G-77
10. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
11. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
12. International Civil Aviation Association (ICAO)
13. International Conference of Free Trade (ICFTU)
14. International Development Association (IDA)
15. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
16. International Finance Corporation (IFC)
17. International Labour Organisation (ILO)
18. International Monetary Fund (IMF)
19. International Maritime Organisation (IMO)
20. INTELSAT
21. INTERPOL
22. Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)
23. International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
24. International Wheat Council (IWC)
25. Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
26. Organisation of African Unity (OAU)
27. African Malagasy Common Organisation (OCAM)
28. Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA)
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29. United Nations (UN)
30. United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)
31. United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO)
32. Universal Postal Union (UPU)
33. World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)
34. World Health Organisation (WHO)
35. World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO)
36. World Meteorological Organisation (WMO)
37. World Tourism Organisation (WTO)
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APPENDIX F
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 44/51 ON THE PROTECTION
AND SECURITY OF SMALL STATES
Date: 8 December 1989
	
Meeting: 78
Adopted without a vote 	 Report: A/44/707
The General Assembly.,
Reaffirming  its commitment to international peace and security,
Recalling the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations,
Conscious that small States may be particularly vulnerable to external threats and
acts of interference in their internal affairs and may have special needs consonant
with the right to sovereignty and territorial integrity that they share with all nations,
Concerned at the danger that mercenaries can represent for small States,
Recalling with deep concern the various incidents in which groups of mercenaries
have attempted to infringe upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of small
States, including the attempted invasion of Maldives in November 1988,
1. Recognises that small States may be particularly vulnerable to external threats
and acts of interference in their internal affairs;
2. Stresses in this regard the significance of the obligation of all States to respect the
principle of territorial integrity and the other principles of the Charter of the United
Nations;
3. Appeals to the relevant regional and international organisations to provide
assistance when requested by small states for the strengthening of their security in
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter;
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4. Urges the Secretary-General to pay special attention to monitoring the security
situation of small States and to consider making use of the provisions of Article 99 of
the Charter;
5. Invites the Secretary-General to explore ways and means, within the United
Nations and in accordance with the Charter, of preserving the security of small
States;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to hold consultations with the members of the
Security Council and interested Governments and to submit a report to it at its forty-
sixth session on the implementation of the present resolution;
7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-sixth session the item
entitled "Protection and Security of Small States".
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APPENDIX G
FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE WORKSHOP
ON PROTECTION AND SECURITY OF SMALL STATES
1. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
1.1 The UN Charter contains many articles which if effectively implemented would
enhance the security of small states. In particular, members of the UN should
facilitate the implementation of article 39-51 (Chapter VII) designed to deal with the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression and make
every effort to enhance the effectiveness of the Security Council.
1.2 The Workshop endorsed the view that there is a need for consistent
implementation of all UN Security Council resolutions without exception.
1.3 The Secretary-General should play a more active role in the spirit of Article 99.
In particular he should, in cases of incipient and low-level security threats, consider
responding positively to a request from a state, feeling itself under military threat
from another state, for a mission to its territory. Alternatively, he could send a
personal representative or an official of the United Nations Secretariat to obtain a
firsthand assessment of the situation.
1.4 Serious consideration should be given to the establishment of either a permanent
or an ad-hoc UN force that may be activated under Chapter VII for international
security needs.
1.5 It would also be worth considering the establishment of a UN Force of a rapid
response nature which would be under the direct control of the UN Secretary General
to be used to meet the security threats of small states at their request. The activation
of the Force could be at the initiative of the Secretary General in consultation with
the Security Council. The stationing of the Force should be constantly reviewed by
the Security Council. The Force would consist of paramilitary personnel provided
from the regular armed forces of various countries, including the small countries, on
a voluntary basis. The members of the Force would be trained under the aegis of the
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United Nations at various military institutions of high repute. The Secretary-General
should be empowered to initiate consultations with interested countries.
1.6 The Security Council should consider providing collective security guarantees to
smaller states in appropriate circumstances.
1.7 Bearing in mind that a sizeable number of the UN member states could claim to
be small states, the Workshop urged that:
(a) the "Global Watch" facility should focus on the security problem of small states
(b) the UN Secretary-General should consider the feasibility of establishing a unit to
the study and co-ordination of activities relating to the protection and security of
small states.
2. REGIONAL SECURITY
2.1 Regional security measures proved to be quite successful and effective in some
parts of the world and, where appropriate and applicable, may be encouraged.
However, this should not be a substitute for possible UN action. The UN should
explore measures that could facilitate action at the regional level in accordance with
Chapter VII of the UN Charter to enhance the protection and security of small states.
3 NATIONAL SECURITY
3.1 The Workshop recognised that the question of national security is a responsibility
to be borne by the nation state itself. There is no substitute for building the internal
resilience of small states. However, many small states have inadequate resource
endowments to undertake their own defence needs effectively. Moreover many of the
threats to national security may have an external origin. Examples of these problems
are found in -
(a) dealing with the international drug network
(b) policing the territorial seas and the EEZs
(c) the problems of piracy, mercenaries and terrorists.
The Workshop advocated enhancing the capacity of small states to deal with these
problems through greater exchange of information, adequate surveillance capacity,
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provision of training and appropriate technical assistance, including suitable
technology and equipment.
3.2 The Workshop urges the member state of the UN to ratify the International
Convention Against The Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries.
5-6 May 1991
Maldives
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Male, Maldives
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APPENDIX H
ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES (AOSIS)
Members 
1. Antigua and Barbuda
2. Bahamas
3. Barbados
4. Belize
5. Cape Verde
6. Comoros
7. Cook Island
8. Cuba
9. Cyprus
10. Dominica
11. Federated States of Micronesia
12. Fiji
13. Grenada
14. Guinea-Bissau
15. Guyana
16. Jamaica
17. Kiribati
18. Maldives
19. Malta
20. Marshall Islands
21. Mauritius
22. Nauru
23. Papua New Guinea
24. St. Kitts and Nevis
25. St. Lucia
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26. St.Vincent and the Grenadines
27. Samoa
28. Sao Tome and Principe
29. Seychelles
30. Singapore
31. Solomon Islands
32. Tonga
33. Trinidad and Tobago
34. Tuvalu
35. Vanuatu
Observers
1. American Samoa
2. Guam
3. Netherland Antilles
4. Niue
5. US Virgin Islands
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